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Abstract 
This dissertation aimed to inform a cognitive vulnerability-stress theory of mania, which 
addresses both the content and structure of the self-schema, along with the conditions under 
which these self-relevant cognitions are activated. Extant research on mania has primarily 
considered self-schema content, or an individual’s actual beliefs (e.g., “I am incompetent”). 
Although these investigations have successfully identified maladaptive self-beliefs associated 
with bipolar disorder, this research has been prone to inconsistencies and limited in 
distinguishing between mania and related forms of psychopathology (e.g., unipolar 
depression). Furthermore, very little research on mania has considered the organization of 
self-schema beliefs, referred to here as self-schema structure. Accordingly, three studies of 
non-clinical samples examined self-schema structure, as well as content, in relation to mania 
risk (i.e., the Hypomanic Personality Scale). To address other assumptions of a cognitive 
vulnerability-stress model, the importance of mood priming and potential interactions 
between self-schema characteristics and life events were also explored. Results indicate that 
mania risk is associated with several types of self-schema content, including dysfunctional 
attitudes about achievement, multidimensional perfectionism, and obsessive passion. Some 
of these characteristics (e.g., cognitive distortions) showed greater relevance for depressive 
versus manic symptoms. Conversely, there was a distinct pattern of results for self-schema 
structure, in which mania risk and symptoms appear to correspond with highly 
interconnected, positive self-schema content. In particular, longitudinal findings suggest that 
positive self-schema structure predicts prospective increases in manic symptoms. Notably, 
mania risk also corresponded with greater temporal instability of self-schema structure. With 
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respect to life events, measures of self-schema structure, but not content, interacted 
with positive life events to predict the course of manic symptoms. Across the three studies, 
findings were mixed as to whether certain domains (i.e., achievement or interpersonal) of 
self-schema structure show distinct patterns in relation to mania. Further, mood priming did 
not appear to play a significant role in the examination of self-schema characteristics. 
Overall, the present findings suggest that the manic self-schema may contain a structural 
component that predicts the course of manic symptoms and shows meaningful interactions 
with life events. Future research directions and clinical implications are then discussed.    
Keywords: mania, cognitive vulnerability-stress model, self-schema structure, self-
schema content, life events, mood induction procedures.  
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Summary for Lay Audience 
Researchers have long been interested in how self-beliefs play a role in the development and 
maintenance of psychological disorders. The cognitive vulnerability-stress model theorizes 
that sources of ‘cognitive vulnerability’ (e.g., negative beliefs about oneself) lead to 
psychological disorders (e.g., depression), when a person also experiences certain stressful 
life events (e.g., social rejection). Limited research, however, informs a cognitive 
vulnerability-stress model of mania (a feature of bipolar disorder). In particular, little is 
known about how beliefs about the self may be organized. For example, if an individual’s 
negative beliefs were highly interconnected, a situation triggering a negative thought (e.g., 
failing an exam and thinking “I am stupid”) would likely trigger a similar negative thought 
(e.g., “No one will ever love me”). Therefore, if beliefs are more highly interconnected, a 
larger emotional response would be triggered. Studying the organization of self-beliefs is 
important, since evidence suggests that, at least in cases of depression, this is associated with 
the severity of symptoms and occurrence of symptoms following negative life events. Thus, 
this project examined both the nature and organization of self-beliefs associated with mania, 
within community and university student samples. Participants fell along a continuum in 
terms of their ‘risk for mania’; that is, whether they showed certain personality 
features/experiences that have strongly predicted future development of (hypo)manic 
episodes. Across three studies, it was found that individuals at higher risk for mania showed 
unhelpful beliefs about goal attainment (e.g., “I need to excel at everything I do”), 
perfectionistic attitudes, and obsessiveness regarding a valued activity. Notably, individuals 
at high mania risk also displayed highly interconnected, positive self-beliefs. This 
organizational pattern was associated with greater manic symptoms, particularly when 
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higher-risk individuals also experienced certain positive events (e.g., 
achievements). Conversely, their actual beliefs did not predict manic symptoms following 
these life events. Importantly, it appeared that the organization of self-beliefs among higher-
risk individuals was subject to change over time, whereas this seemed stable among others. 
Overall, these findings allude to the problematic organization of self-beliefs among 
individuals at high risk for mania, which would correspond with unstable views and feelings 
about oneself. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
Bipolar disorder is one of the deadliest (Eroglu et al., 2013; Goldstein et al., 2012) and most 
debilitating (Mitchell et al., 2004) mental disorders, costing individuals more years of life and 
productivity than heart attacks, epilepsy, dementia, and infectious disease (WHO, 2008). As one of 
the most heritable psychiatric conditions (Edvardsen et al., 2008), researchers and clinicians have 
historically emphasized the biological underpinnings of this disorder. However, in recent decades, 
numerous investigations have demonstrated that psychosocial factors play a role in the onset and 
maintenance of bipolar disorder (e.g., Alloy et al., 2005), and thus have important clinical 
implications. As one illustration, the development of an evidence-based treatment for bipolar 
disorder, family-focused therapy (FFT), was spurred by observations that unhelpful family dynamics 
are predictive of relapse (for a review, see Peris & Miklowitz, 2015). 
An inherent challenge to studying psychological vulnerability factors in bipolar disorder is 
teasing apart features associated with mania, the hallmark of the illness, and depression, which is 
often a facet of the disorder. This is an important consideration since evidence suggests that 
vulnerability factors in depression and mania are separable, albeit correlated (e.g., genetic; McGuffin 
et al., 2003). Moreover, greater understanding of the vulnerability factors differentially associated 
with mania would be helpful from a treatment perspective. At present, psychological interventions in 
cases of bipolar disorder are typically biased towards depressive symptoms, and it is less understood 
how treatments might be beneficial for addressing manic symptoms (see Oud et al., 2016).  
To further complicate the picture, expressions of mania can vary substantially across and 
within individuals. This may range from a severe manic episode involving psychotic symptoms and a 
need for hospitalization; to a hypomanic episode in which there is a clear change in an individual’s 
mood and functioning without considerable impairment; to a display of manic symptoms (e.g., 
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decreased need for sleep) or temperamental characteristics (e.g., hyper-confidence) that do not meet 
diagnostic criteria for a mood episode. As such, this introduction first reviews the common features 
and symptoms of mania, along with further considerations for operationalizing psychopathology, 
prior to examining extant research on psychological vulnerability to mania. 
Common Features and Symptoms of Mania  
The bipolar spectrum disorders include bipolar I disorder (BD-I), bipolar II disorder (BD-II), 
cyclothymic disorder, and subthreshold conditions (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). 
In this dissertation, the term ‘bipolar disorder’ is used to refer broadly to this family of disorders. 
Diagnosis of a bipolar spectrum disorder hinges on the operationalization of manic and hypomanic 
episodes. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; APA, 2013) has 
characterized (hypo)manic episodes as reflecting a time-limited change from an individual’s usual 
level of functioning, highlighting the episodic nature of manic-depressive illness that scholars as 
early as Kraepelin (1921) have emphasized. Specifically, a manic episode is a discrete period of (i) 
elevated, expansive, or irritable mood, coupled with (ii) goal-directed activity or energy (APA, 
2013). These cardinal symptoms are accompanied by feelings of grandiosity, flight of ideas, physical 
agitation, talkativeness/incomprehensibility, decreased need for sleep, and/or excessive engagement 
in risky behaviours. Symptoms persist for the majority of a week or lead to hospitalization, and cause 
individuals considerable distress or impairment. Hypomania, literally ‘less than mania’, is a milder 
variant in which the same symptoms are present but are not severe enough to “markedly” interfere 
with functioning (APA, 2013). There is also a lower threshold for the duration of hypomanic 
episodes (i.e., four days). 
Individuals may experience manic symptoms with psychotic features, such as mood-
congruent hallucinations or delusions (e.g., believing one is strong enough to lift a car over their 
head). In addition, certain diagnoses within the Bipolar and Related Disorders category of the DSM-5 
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also involve the presence of a major depressive episode (i.e., BD-II) or depressive symptoms (i.e., 
cyclothymic disorder). Thus, individuals who experience manic symptoms may also suffer episodes 
of depressed mood or decreased interest/pleasure, changes in weight or appetite, 
insomnia/hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation/retardation, decreased energy, feelings of 
worthlessness or guilt, difficulty concentrating or indecisiveness, and thoughts of death or suicidal 
behaviours (APA, 2013). 
A Continuum of Manic Symptomatology 
Milder expressions of mania strongly predict the development of more severe presentations 
(e.g., Alloy et al. 2012a, 2012b; Berk et al., 2007), providing evidence that manic tendencies exist 
along a spectrum of severity. Thus, examining diverse presentations of manic symptoms contributes 
to a greater understanding of bipolar disorder (see Alloy et al., 2015). Accordingly, several measures 
have been developed to assess risk for mania, including the Hypomanic Personality Scale (Eckblad 
& Chapman, 1986) and General Behaviour Inventory (Depue, 1987). Specifically, these measures 
evaluate tendencies towards subsyndromal manic symptoms and personality traits associated with 
bipolar disorder. For instance, a widely used measure of mania risk, the Hypomanic Personality 
Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), assesses a constellation of attributes in which individuals 
appear gregarious, energetic, hyper-confident, intensely emotional, ambitious, and impulsive.  
The validity of instruments assessing mania risk has been well supported by research 
indicating that high scores on these measures have been robustly associated with future onset of 
(hypo)manic episodes (Kwapil et al., 2000; Merikangas et al., 2007). To illustrate, one study found 
that 73% of individuals who met a high cut-off score on the HPS developed diagnosable symptoms 
of bipolar disorder over a 3-year follow-up period (Kwapil et al., 2000). Moreover, a burgeoning 
literature indicates that measures of mania risk show robust associations with psychosocial predictors 
of the course of manic symptoms (e.g., Alloy et al., 2008; Jones, Mansell & Waller, 2006; Mansell, 
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Rigby, Tai, & Lowe, 2008). The results of genetic research have also linked mania risk (as indexed 
by the HPS) to several candidate genes that have been implicated in the onset of bipolar disorder 
(Johnson, Carver, Joorman, & Cuccaro, 2015). 
In addition, there are certain advantages to a sampling approach that utilizes mania risk, as 
opposed to remitted diagnostic status, when studying vulnerability factors associated with bipolar 
disorder (Johnson et al., 2015; Just, Abramson, & Alloy, 2001; Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & 
Franklin, 1981). In particular, the utilization of measures of mania risk allows for the examination of 
vulnerability factors without confounding influences (e.g., physical health, lifestyle, medication) that 
likely accompany a serious history of mental disorder. Thus, mania risk is a valuable construct to 
examine, in order to advance knowledge concerning psychological vulnerability to bipolar disorder. 
As such, measures of mania risk have been heavily utilized in studies of mania, including the use of 
these measures to index risk for the future development of bipolar disorder while exploring potential 
vulnerability mechanisms (e.g. Devlin, Johnson, & Gruber, 2015; Kim, Kwon, & Meyer, 2017; 
Pornpattananangkul, Hu, & Nusslock, 2015).  
Psychological Vulnerability Models of Mania 
Extant psychological research on bipolar disorder has considered its relation to various 
constructs, such as cognitive styles, affective processes, and life events, to name a few (Gruber et al., 
2008; Mann-Wrobel et al., 2011; Urošević et al., 2008). Within this area of study, the reward 
sensitivity model of mania (Alloy & Abramson, 2010; Johnson et al., 2012) has garnered substantial 
research support and posits that individuals at risk for mania display a hypersensitive reward system, 
also referred to as the behavioural activation system (BAS; Gray, 1970). 
Reward Sensitivity and Bipolar Disorder  
By definition, mania is a goal-driven state marked by increased energy, speed, and intense 
emotion (APA, 2013). Thus, it follows that individuals who experience mania may differ from those 
 
 
 
5 
who do not in systems that govern motivation and reward. Depue and Iacono (1989) were the first to 
draw a parallel between mania and the BAS when they observed that manic symptoms closely 
resemble the theorized outputs of this system. The BAS is a biologically-based system that governs 
‘approach’ behaviour in response to rewarding stimuli in the environment (Gray, 1970, 1990). Thus, 
it has been described as a broadband system encompassing a number of cognitive and affective 
processes that promote goal-directed activity. As such, there is considerable overlap between the 
BAS and the trait of impulsivity (Corr, 2004; Gray, 1970). Reward-relevant stimuli or environmental 
cues of goal-directed behaviour constitute the inputs of this system, whereas the various outputs of 
this system include increased energy, activity, confidence, exploration, and interest in rewards 
(Depue & Iacono, 1989; Gray, 1970, 1990). The sensitivity of the BAS may differ across individuals, 
such that a hypersensitive BAS would reflect greater output given a certain level of input (Gray, 
1970, 1990).  
The results of cross-sectional and longitudinal studies utilizing self-report and/or behavioural 
measures (i.e., experimental paradigms) of BAS sensitivity indicate that levels are elevated amongst 
persons with bipolar disorder compared to healthy control participants (see Johnson et al., 2012, for a 
review). Within this area of study, most compelling are findings that demonstrate the prognostic 
value of BAS sensitivity. A number of longitudinal studies have indicated that BAS sensitivity 
predicts: (i) the onset of bipolar spectrum disorder (Alloy et al. 2012a, 2012b), (ii) a more severe 
course of bipolar disorder (Alloy et al., 2008, 2009; Meyer et al., 2001; Salavert et al., 2007), and 
(iii) the transition to a more severe form of disorder (cyclothymia to BD-I, and BD-II to BD-I; Alloy 
et al., 2012a, 2012b). 
Related to BAS sensitivity is a more explicit discussion of goal-setting and attainment. 
Available evidence suggests that persons with a history of manic symptoms, along with their healthy 
family members, are overrepresented among highly accomplished, creative individuals (see Johnson, 
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2005, for a review). In particular, it appears that periods of subthreshold mania (e.g., hypomania, 
premorbid state in BD-I) are associated with high levels of functioning (e.g., greater creativity, 
enhanced interpersonal functioning, occupational success; e.g., Coryell et al., 1989; Jamison, 1996; 
Kutcher, Robertson & Bird, 1998). One possible explanation is that bipolar disorder is associated 
with a stable pattern of high goal-setting. Extremely optimistic life ambitions that are extrinsically 
motivated (e.g., related to wealth, fame) rather than intrinsically motivated (e.g., maintaining close 
relationships) have been noted among individuals with the disorder and those at risk for mania 
(Gruber & Johnson, 2009; Johnson & Carver, 2006; Johnson, Eisner, & Carver, 2009).  
In addition, a number of studies have found that individuals with bipolar disorder exhibit a 
distinct pattern of responding to success. Evidence suggests that the majority of people in the general 
population exhibit ‘coasting’, or a short-term reduction in effort towards further goals once a goal has 
been attained (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fulford et al., 2010). Among persons diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder, success has been associated with higher levels of activation and goal pursuit (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998; Fulford et al., 2010). It appears that this pattern generalizes to individuals at risk for 
bipolar disorder (Johnson 2005; Johnson et al., 2008b), and distinguishes between those with a high 
versus low lifetime frequency of manic episodes (Wright, Lam, & Brown, 2008). Increased 
engagement in goal pursuit has also prospectively predicted elevations in manic symptoms among 
patients with BD-I, BD-II and cyclothymia (Alloy et al., 2009; Francis-Raniere, Alloy, & Abramson, 
2006; Johnson, Carver, & Gotlib, 2012b; Lee, Lam, Mansell, & Farmer, 2010).  
These persuasive results implicating reward and motivational processes in the aetiology of 
bipolar disorder have frequently inspired research initiatives within different domains of study (e.g., 
Johnson, Carver, & Gotlib, 2012; Urošević et al., 2008).  Of particular importance to the present 
dissertation, this has included the study of cognitive characteristics associated with mania. These 
relevant findings are described in more detail below.  
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Previous Research on Cognitive Vulnerability to Mania 
Leahy and Beck (1988) originally posited that the ‘manic’ cognitive style would stand in 
direct opposition to depressogenic cognition, and would thereby be marked by positively-biased 
automatic thoughts, dysfunctional attitudes, and information processing. Studies that have examined 
thinking styles within the context of positive mood states lend some support for this theory. In 
particular, a history of (hypo)mania has been associated with high confidence in one’s abilities 
following a success experience (e.g., Eisner et al., 2008) – a phenomenon referred to as ‘positive 
overgeneralization’. Similarly, evidence suggests that individuals at a heightened risk for mania tend 
to respond to positive affect with positive, self-focused rumination (Feldman et al., 2008; Gruber et 
al., 2008b; Raes et al., 2010). This process describes personal reflection of one’s accomplishments 
and aspirations, and has been prospectively related to a more severe course of manic symptoms 
(Lam, Wright, & Sham, 2005). Of note, it has been proposed that these state-dependent cognitions 
may reflect prodromal symptoms of (hypo)mania (e.g., Chen & Johnson, 2012; Fulford et al., 2009; 
Wright et al., 2005). 
Despite these findings, a burgeoning literature indicates that a negative cognitive style 
underlies bipolar disorder, similar to unipolar depression. During depressive episodes, individuals 
with bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder show the same negative attitudes about the self 
(e.g., Hill et al., 1989, Rosenfarb et al., 1998). However, such a negative cognitive style is also 
apparent during euthymic states. Compared to healthy control participants, individuals with bipolar 
disorder in a euthymic state display biased recall of negative self-referent adjectives, more negative 
inferential styles, higher levels of rumination, greater dysfunctional attitudes, and relatively little 
positive self-referent information (e.g., Adams, Shapero, Pendergast, Alloy, & Abramson, 2014; 
Jones et al., 2005, Scott et al., 2000, Van der Gucht et al., 2009), similar to individuals with unipolar 
depression (e.g., Jones et al., 2005; Just & Alloy, 1997). Notably, research has demonstrated that 
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concurrent depressive symptoms only partially mediate negative cognitive biases observed during 
euthymic states, indicating that an underlying cognitive vulnerability exists in cases of bipolar 
disorder that cannot be fully explained by mood state (Adams et al., 2014).  
Moreover, although individuals with bipolar disorder continue to show negative cognitive 
styles during (hypo)manic states (French et al., 1996), existing research suggests that certain forms of 
negative cognitive content may reflect an underlying vulnerability towards depressive symptoms, 
rather than manic symptoms, within the context of bipolar disorder. As one illustration, Johnson and 
Fingerhut (2004) found that negative automatic thoughts predicted future depressive symptoms, but 
not manic symptoms, over a 6-month follow-up.  
Thus, within the bipolar disorder research literature, it is often unclear how cognitive 
characteristics may be differentially associated with vulnerability towards mania versus depression. 
One promising line of research has examined cognitive styles that may be prominent in light of the 
reward sensitivity model of mania (e.g., Alloy, Abramson, Walshaw, et al., 2009; Chen & Johnson, 
2012). Just as negative beliefs are relevant for depression, researchers have considered the relevance 
of goal and achievement-related cognitions for mania. Indeed, evidence suggests that dysfunctional 
beliefs related to goal-striving are associated with bipolar disorder (Alloy et al., 2009; Chen & 
Johnson, 2012; Dodd et al., 2011a, 2011b; Lam et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2010). These include attitudes 
that emphasize perfectionism, ambitious goal-striving, the ability to excel at anything, and the 
importance of feeling positive and being active to avoid failure. Relatedly, dysfunctional attitudes 
that emphasize achievement also appear to be overrepresented and stably present among persons 
with bipolar disorder (Chen & Johnson, 2012; Lam et al., 2004; Lomax & Lam, 2010; Wright et al., 
2005). For instance, these individuals highly endorse beliefs that achievement is critical for one’s 
self-worth and it is necessary for achievement to be recognized by others (Lam et al., 2004). Notably, 
it has been demonstrated that dysfunctional attitudes about goal-striving and achievement are 
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apparent during euthymic states and among individuals at risk for mania (e.g., Lomax & Lam, 2010; 
Wright, Lam, & Newsom Davis, 2005). Dysfunctional beliefs about goal attainment have also 
distinguished individuals with bipolar disorder from those with unipolar depression during euthymic 
states (Lam et al., 2004). 
Summary of Contemporary Research on Cognitive Vulnerability to Mania 
As illustrated in the above review, the research to date on cognitive vulnerability factors 
associated with mania is somewhat disjointed and confusing, and at times even provides 
contradictory findings. In addition, much of this research has stemmed from investigations focused 
on other vulnerability factors associated with bipolar disorder, such as reward sensitivity. Although 
these findings are generally informative, still missing is a more comprehensive examination of how 
the cognitive constructs in this domain of research may operate in conjunction with other 
vulnerability factors to give rise to mood symptomatology. A promising theoretical framework for 
guiding this type of investigation is the cognitive vulnerability-stress model (e.g., Beck, 1967). This 
model, which forms the fundamental underlying conceptual framework for the present dissertation, is 
described in detail below. 
The Cognitive Vulnerability-Stress Framework 
The cognitive vulnerability-stress model is a prominent etiological framework that has had a 
profound impact on the understanding and treatment of various psychological disorders (e.g., 
Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, 1967; Dodge, 1986; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Matthews, 1988). The theories that utilize this approach posit that latent, maladaptive cognitive 
structures are activated by congruent environmental stressors, which, in turn, leads to the onset of 
symptoms of mental disorders (Beck et al., 1979). Ground breaking in the field has been Aaron 
Beck’s (1967) cognitive model of depression positing that vulnerability to depression can largely be 
explained by a negative cognitive style, wherein schemas are an integral component. Specially, 
 
 
 
10 
schemas are understood as “enduring internal structures of stored generic or prototypical features of 
stimuli, ideas, or experiences that are used to organize new information” (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 
1999, p. 79). The schema concept is centralized in Beck’s theory, as schemas add an element of 
organization to cognitions, representing an existing structure that all people have for filtering 
incoming information. It is theorized that schemas originate in childhood, and become elaborated and 
refined over the course of development (Beck, 1967).  
Schemas can be studied along two related dimensions – content and structure. Here, self-
schema content represents an individual’s actual beliefs (e.g., “I am incompetent”; Beck, 1967). 
Persuasive evidence links various types of negative content to risk for depression (see Lakdawalla, 
Hankin, & Mermelstein, 2007). By contrast, self-schema structure has been defined as the 
“architecture” or manner in which beliefs are “stored and organized” (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 
1998; p. 15). Specifically, it is theorized that schemas vary in terms of the interconnectedness of their 
contents, such that ideas contained within schemas may be more or less related to one another 
(Dozois & Beck, 2008). If self-schema elements are tightly organized, they would theoretically 
become easily activated, since the activation of one component would spread to other components 
(Segal, 1988). Accordingly, events that activate schemas would ostensibly provoke a larger 
emotional response when elements are more closely rather than loosely interrelated (Bower, 1981). 
Although negative content diminishes following recovery from a depressive episode, certain 
structural aspects seem to persist (e.g., Dozois, 2007).  
Examining Self-Schema Structure as a Vulnerability Factor for Mania 
The vast majority of previous research in this area has examined self-schema content. 
However, as previously mentioned, self-schemas can also be studied in terms of their structural 
characteristics. Although traditional self-referent encoding and semantic priming tasks can provide 
information about the underlying self-structure (e.g., Segal et al., 2006), the Psychological Distance 
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Scaling Task (PDST; Dozois & Dobson, 2001b) has been designed explicitly for this purpose. 
During this task, participants are presented with a number of adjectives (e.g., “Capable”, “Rejected”) 
on a computer screen. They are asked to position each adjective within a four-quadrant grid based on 
the adjective’s perceived self-descriptiveness (x-axis) and valence (y-axis). Over multiple iterations, 
the computer calculates the interstimulus distance between positive and negative rated adjectives, 
which theoretically provides an indication of self-schema interconnectedness or consolidation. The 
task has typically been used to examine the structural characteristics of two distinct forms of self-
schema content, namely, beliefs about oneself within interpersonal and achievement domains.  
The importance of examining self-schema structure in addition to self-schema content has 
been illustrated in cases of depression and other psychological disorders. Notably, Dozois and 
colleagues have demonstrated that the severity of depressive symptoms corresponds with greater 
interconnectedness of negative self-referent beliefs, along with reduced interconnectedness of 
positive self-referent information (e.g., Dozois & Dobson, 2001b; Dozois & Frewen, 2006). In 
addition, upon remission from a depressive episode, negative self-referent information appears to 
remain densely interconnected (Dozois, 2007; Dozois & Dobson, 2001a). As such, it has been 
proposed that this configuration is a vulnerability marker for depression, particularly for 
interpersonal, self-schema content (e.g., Dozois & Dobson, 2001b). Furthermore, the organization of 
positive and negative self-schema content within the interpersonal domain has been shown to interact 
with negative life events to predict the course of depressive symptoms (Seeds & Dozois, 2010).  
Available evidence on cognitive structure in mania derives from research on the ‘self-
compartmentalization model’ (Showers, 1992). This theory is concerned with how positive and 
negative information about the self is assimilated. The ‘integrated self’ characterizes an ability to 
incorporate differently valenced information into a single self-aspect, whereas the 
‘compartmentalized self’ describes a segregation of information based on valence (either positive or 
 
 
 
12 
negative). A handful of studies have indicated that individuals with a history of bipolar disorder or 
unipolar depression exhibit a higher degree of self-compartmentalization compared to individuals 
without a disorder (Alatiq et al., 2010; Power, de Jong, & Lloyd, 2002; Taylor et al., 2007). These 
researchers postulate that this finding could help to explain mood swings in bipolar disorder, in that 
an environmental event may activate beliefs about the self that are almost exclusively positive or 
negative in nature. However, since similar features appear to characterize unipolar depression, it is 
still unclear how these cognitive factors may uniquely predispose individuals towards mania.   
Life Events and Mania 
The findings just reviewed suggest that any consideration of a cognitive vulnerability-stress 
framework needs to also consider the potential influence of life events on manic symptoms. Here, 
numerous studies of bipolar disorder have documented the importance of negative life events. 
Specifically, negative life events have been linked to future depressive symptoms, as well as longer 
time to recovery from depressive episodes (e.g., Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Miller, 1997). However, 
these patterns do not appear to hold for manic symptoms (e.g., Johnson et al., 1999, 2008a). As a 
result, the impact of different types of life events on mania has been investigated. 
Goal Attainment and BAS-Activating Events. In line with a reward sensitivity model of 
mania, studies of bipolar disorder have examined events associated with goal-striving and 
achievement. Prospective research piloted by Johnson and colleagues (2000b, 2008b) has indicated 
that life events that reflect attainment of important goals (e.g., admission into graduate school, 
getting married) predict more severe manic, but not depressive, symptoms among individuals 
diagnosed with BD-I when statistically controlling for baseline symptoms. Similarly, events that 
involve striving towards important goals have also been implicated in the course of manic symptoms. 
In particular, a prospective study of students indicated that 42% of individuals diagnosed with BD-II 
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and cyclothymia developed a hypomanic episode following a goal-striving event (i.e., studying for 
final exams; Nusslock et al., 2007).  
More precisely, BAS-activating events have been described as situations in which there is a 
clear reward or desired goal that one has an opportunity to pursue (e.g., starting a new job; meeting 
an attractive stranger to attain a partner). It is posited that relevant events lead to ‘normal’ levels of 
BAS activation in most people, but lead to over-activation of the BAS in persons vulnerable to 
bipolar disorder, which may in turn trigger (hypo)mania (Alloy & Abramson, 2010; Urošević et al., 
2008). Conversely, it is posited that BAS-deactivating events constitute a loss or failure (e.g., losing 
a job; being rejected by a romantic interest). It is theorized that these events lead to extreme 
deactivation of the BAS in individuals prone to bipolar disorder, which in turn triggers depression. 
Data indicate that compared to healthy control participants, persons diagnosed with BD-II or 
cyclothymia experience more BAS-activating and deactivating life events, in general (Bender et al., 
2010; Urošević et al., 2010). 
The Interplay between Cognitive Content and Life Events 
Thus far, only a small number of investigations have examined how certain forms of 
cognitive content may interact with life events to influence the course of mania (Alloy et al., 1999; 
Alloy et al., 2006). One study of individuals with a history of hypomania found that negative 
cognitive content did not predict manic symptoms within the context of life events (Alloy et al., 
1999). Importantly, however, this study also found that a positive attributional style interacted with 
positive events to predict later fluctuations in manic symptoms (Alloy et al., 1999). A similar study 
reported that self-critical and perfectionistic attitudes interacted with negative and positive events to 
predict future increases in depressive and manic symptoms, respectively (Alloy et al., 2006).  
The above results provide preliminary evidence that cognitive constructs interact with certain 
life events (i.e., positive) to predict the course of manic symptoms. Thus, this line of research is 
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promising regarding the potential viability of a cognitive vulnerability-stress model of mania. 
Notably, no known investigations of mania have provided a more detailed examination of 
interactions between life events and self-schema constructs, by considering the role of self-schema 
structure, in addition to content, within these interactions. 
Mood Induction Procedures 
Given the hypothesized role of life events within a cognitive vulnerability-stress framework, 
an important consideration is how Mood Induction Procedures (MIPs) may affect the general study 
of self-schema characteristics. Since it is theorized that maladaptive schemas remain dormant until 
activated by life stress, certain features would theoretically be imperceptible under ordinary 
circumstances. Therefore, one approach to accessing these beliefs in potentially vulnerable persons is 
to apply MIPs to mimic the effects of stressors and ostensibly activate an individual’s cognitive 
network (e.g., Dozois & Backs-Dermott, 2000). Although mood priming may not be necessary to 
examine all aspects of the self-schema (e.g., schema structure; Dozois & Dobson, 2001a), research 
indicates that certain features cannot be identified without the use of priming, at least in cases of 
depression (e.g., Ingram et al., 1994). 
No known investigations have directly assessed whether MIPs sensitize the examination of 
self-schema characteristics among individuals with a history of, or risk, for mania. Exploring this 
question would support the understanding of cognitive vulnerability mechanisms in bipolar disorder. 
Furthermore, determining whether MIPs are necessary for the study of self-schema constructs would 
help to inform future research in this area. 
The Present Dissertation 
To summarize, previous research has examined cognitive vulnerability factors in relation to 
mania, primarily considering aspects of self-schema content. Despite some mood congruent findings, 
existing evidence indicates that the manic self-schema is largely characterized by negative content. 
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Dysfunctional beliefs surrounding goal-striving and achievement may distinguish bipolar disorder 
from related conditions, in line with a reward sensitivity model. Also congruent with this model, 
existing evidence links goal attainment and BAS-activating events to the onset of manic symptoms.  
Overall, a major gap in the current literature is research that teases apart the specific cognitive 
characteristics that are linked to mania, rather than related phenomena such as comorbid depressive 
symptoms and cases of unipolar depression. In particular, the current state of the research highlights 
more similarities than differences in cognitive vulnerability factors that characterize mania versus 
depression, particularly with reference to previously stated findings concerning negative cognitive 
style. In addition, much of this literature has relied on the reward sensitivity model to inform a 
cognitive vulnerability theory of mania. However, relying on a higher-level explanation does not 
necessarily clarify how self-schemas may dynamically operate in conjunction with other factors to 
predispose individuals toward mania.  
Together, the above considerations further suggest that examining self-schema content alone 
may be insufficient for explicating the cognitive mechanisms involved in conferring vulnerability 
towards mania. In this regard, few available studies can speak to self-schema organization in relation 
to mania, with no known investigations utilizing the PDST to examine the interconnectedness of 
positive and negative beliefs within the self-schema. Further, when applying a cognitive 
vulnerability-stress framework, it has yet to be considered how both self-schema content and 
structure may interact with life events to potentially influence manic symptomatology. In addition, 
using measures of mania risk to index mania, rather than remitted diagnostic status, is a widespread 
approach to in the field. Yet, very few studies have employed this method to study cognitive 
vulnerability mechanisms. Finally, no known studies have utilized mood priming to sensitively 
examine self-schema components (content and structure) within the context of mania.  
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In summary, the current dissertation aims to integrate and advance previous research findings 
by examining both self-schema content and structure, and the conditions under which these self-
schema components are activated (i.e., their interaction with life events and mood induction 
procedures). This research was conducted within non-clinical samples, using the hypomanic 
personality as an indicator of risk for developing future manic episodes. Overall, these research 
objectives serve to inform a more comprehensive, cognitive vulnerability-stress theory of mania that 
includes consideration of both self-schema components and life events.  Furthering our 
understanding of mania in this manner is important, as it may ultimately help to improve the 
application of mental health interventions in cases of bipolar disorder. 
Primary Objectives  
The three main studies of this dissertation address the following broad research questions. 
Briefly, Study 1 serves as a cross-sectional examination, in which basic relations between self-
schema components and mania are explored within a large, online community sample. Study 2 
provides a longitudinal investigation, in which a range of potential effects among self-schema 
components, life events, and mood symptoms are examined within an online community sample. 
Finally, Study 3 serves as a cross-sectional replication of major findings within a different, non-
clinical sample (i.e., a university student sample). 
Subsumed under each of the following research questions are more specific sub-questions and 
hypotheses addressing a number of relevant issues, which will be discussed in greater detail within 
the chapters that address objectives for each of the three studies.  
(i) Research Question 1. Are there aspects of self-schema content and structure that characterize 
high mania risk? 
A central goal of this dissertation is to simply examine the self-schema constructs of content and 
structure that may be associated with heightened risk for mania, since limited evidence is thus far 
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available, particularly for self-schema structure. The initial cross-sectional study of this dissertation 
focuses on this research objective. Broadly, it was hypothesized in Study 1 that heightened mania 
risk would correspond with maladaptive self-schema content associated with goal-striving and 
achievement, in light of existing research on the reward sensitivity model (e.g., Johnson et al., 2012). 
Regarding self-schema structure, it was hypothesized that mania risk would be associated with highly 
interconnected positive, as well as negative, self-schema content. Such a pattern would help to 
explain the mood swings observed in bipolar disorder, and is consistent with preliminary findings on 
the self-concept in mania (Taylor et al., 2007). 
(ii) Research Question 2. How do mood induction procedures (MIPs) influence the examination of 
self-schema content among those at different levels of mania risk? 
Study 1 also includes a test of a positive MIP. The aim is to elucidate whether MIPs increase the 
sensitivity with which self-schema constructs can be identified in relation to mania, which is an 
important consideration for research conducted in this area. 
(iii) Research Question 3. Do self-schema components show utility in predicting the course of mood 
symptoms?  
The cross-sectional component in Study 1 also examines the degree to which self-schema 
characteristics (content and structure) may play a role in maladaptive and adaptive pathways leading 
towards mood symptoms. Moreover, a longitudinal component of this research (Study 2) permits a 
more rigorous examination of self-schema characteristics as potential predictors of the course of mood 
symptoms. 
(iv) Research Question 4. Do self-schema components interact with congruent life events to predict 
the course of mood symptoms among those at high risk for mania? 
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Both Studies 2 and 3 investigate whether self-schema components interact with life events, as 
well as mania risk, to predict mood symptomatology. The longitudinal component in Study 2 permits 
examination of these patterns across time.  
(v) Research Question 5. Can major findings regarding self-schema components and their relation 
to mania show replication? 
Study 2 also examines whether cross-sectional findings from Study 1 can be replicated within 
the same sample type (i.e., an online, community sample), in a separate instance. In addition, Study 3 
serves as a replication within an entirely different nonclinical sample (i.e., an online, university 
student sample), in order to clarify whether major findings can be generalized beyond one group of 
individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
Chapter 2 
Study 1: An Initial Cross-Sectional Examination 
The cross-sectional approach used in Study l primarily addresses the first and second research 
questions of this dissertation, but additionally informs the third research question. As such, Study 1 
examines self-schema content and structure in relation to mania risk, as well as how these self-
schema constructs may bear on manic symptomatology. In addition, this study assesses the impact of 
mood induction procedures (MIPs) on the activation of mania-related aspects of self-schema content 
and structure. 
Research Question 1: Are there aspects of self-schema content and structure that characterize 
high mania risk? 
Self-Schema Content. As described earlier, some limited prior research has implicated 
maladaptive beliefs and dysfunctional attitudes related to goal-striving and achievement among 
individuals with a history of mania (e.g., Chen & Johnson, 2012; Dodd et al., 2011a, 2011b; Lam et 
al., 2004; Lee et al., 2010). These findings, which are consistent with a reward sensitivity model (see 
Johnson et al., 2012), have been promising in terms of isolating self-schema content that 
differentiates between mania and other forms of psychopathology, such as unipolar depression. The 
present study builds on this prior research by examining self-schema content in a non-clinical 
sample, using the hypomanic personality as an indicator of mania risk. This involves studying a set 
of dysfunctional attitudes pertaining to goal attainment, which have been previously documented 
among individuals with a history of bipolar disorder and appear less relevant to depression (Lam et 
al., 2004). These attitudes include beliefs about success being central to self-worth and the 
importance of consistently feeling positive. 
Study 1 further extends past research by examining constructs that appear to relate to goal-
striving and achievement, but have yet to be studied in relation to mania. This includes examining the 
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presence of cognitive distortions (e.g., mind-reading, catastrophizing), which refer to errors in 
information processing that result in a negatively-biased view of a situation (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979). In further elaboration of this line of research, the present study explores whether 
cognitive distortions are more apparent in achievement situations among those at high mania risk.  
In addition, several past studies have linked bipolar disorder with high levels of perfectionism 
(e.g., Lam et al., 2004; Scott et al., 2000). In particular, research conducted by Hewitt and colleagues 
(e.g., Hewitt & Flett, 1990; Hewitt et al., 1991) has supported three main dimensions of 
perfectionism. These are as follows: perfectionistic behaviour that is directed towards oneself (i.e., 
Self-Oriented), perfectionism directed towards others (i.e., Other-Oriented), and perfectionism 
attributed to external sources (i.e., Socially-Prescribed). Limited prior research has considered mania 
in relation to these different dimensions of perfectionism. Two studies of mixed clinical samples 
have suggested that chronic manic symptoms are associated with high levels of socially-prescribed 
perfectionism, in particular (Hewitt et al., 1998; Corry et al., 2017). The present study builds on this 
work by examining associations between mania risk and these dimensions of perfectionism.  
A further individual difference characteristic that may be relevant to manic self-schemas is 
obsessive passion (Vallerand et al., 2003). Obsessive passion describes an internal pressure to 
perform an activity due to strong internalization of the activity into one’s identity, often resulting in 
other areas of life being adversely affected (Vallerand et al., 2003). As such, the construct of 
obsessive passion may also be relevant to the goal-striving aspects of mania. Consistent with this 
proposal, past research has shown significant associations between obsessive passion and negative 
indicators of well-being (e.g., high levels of negative affect; Vallerand et al., 2003).    
In contrast, harmonious passion is described by Vallerand et al (2003) as being achieved 
when one can freely choose to engage in the activity, and it occupies a large but not disproportionate 
space in one’s identity, allowing the activity to exist in harmony with other aspects of life. Taken 
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together, these characteristics suggest minimal impact of harmonious passion on mania risk and 
related symptoms. However, there is the potential for harmonious passion to serve as a protective 
factor, particularly when considering a reward sensitivity model of mania. Existing research on 
harmonious passion and its association with well-being indicators (e.g., positive affect; Vallerand et 
al., 2003) again supports this hypothesis. 
Finally, self-referent beliefs about achievement that are adaptive in nature are also explored in 
Study 1 (e.g., “ I expect strengths and weaknesses, ups and downs, but overall I am positive about 
myself”; Hillson, 1997). These beliefs derive from research on positive personality dimensions, and 
are thought to serve a protective function given their association with positive well-being indicators 
within non-clinical samples (Hillson, 1997). Study 1 provides an initial examination of whether these 
beliefs may serve a similar function among individuals at heightened risk for mania. 
Self-Schema Content Hypotheses. It was hypothesized that the constructs addressing self-
schema content would share significant, positive relations with mania risk. Specifically, it was 
predicted that high endorsement of maladaptive beliefs related to achievement (i.e., dysfunctional 
attitudes about goal attainment and cognitive distortions within achievement situations) would 
correspond with high levels of the hypomanic personality. It was also hypothesized that mania risk 
would be positively associated with aspects of perfectionism and obsessive passion. Finally, it was 
tentatively predicted that harmonious passion and adaptive self-referent beliefs about success would 
serve a protective function within the context of mania risk. This may or may not be reflected in 
direct associations between mania risk and these constructs. For example, these adaptive 
characteristics may instead moderate between the hypomanic personality and manic symptoms. This 
issue was explored under the second research question of the dissertation (see further below). 
Self-Schema Structure. As previously described, this dissertation also examines self-schema 
structure, in order to consider how the organization of self-beliefs may be associated with mania risk. 
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Recall that a well-validated measure of self-schema structure, the PDST (Dozois & Dobson, 2001b), 
considers how positive and negative information about the self is organized, and also permits a more 
sensitive examination of content within specific domains (i.e., achievement and interpersonal).  
Self-Schema Structure Hypotheses. A central hypothesis of this dissertation was that high 
risk for mania would have clear associations with aspects of self-schema structure, and that these 
findings would be distinct from structural aspects that characterize depression. As previously 
mentioned, depression is characterized by densely interconnected, negative self-schema content and 
loosely connected, positive self-schema content – especially for content within the interpersonal 
domain (Dozois & Dobson, 2001b; Seeds & Dozois, 2010). The present hypothesis was that, similar 
to depression, individuals at high risk for mania would exhibit tightly interconnected negative 
content. This prediction was informed by previous research indicating the presence of negative self-
schema content within the context of bipolar disorder (e.g., Adams et al., 2014). Furthermore, in light 
of prior findings implicating dysfunctional attitudes related to goal-striving/achievement, a sub-
hypothesis was that negative content in the achievement domain, in particular, would exhibit dense 
connectivity among participants at high risk for mania.  
Importantly, it was further predicted that aspects of positive self-schema content would be 
tightly organized. This hypothesis is informed by the phenomenology of mania, in which grandiosity 
and inflated self-esteem are hallmark symptoms (APA, 2013). However, contrary to Leahy and 
Beck’s (1988) original hypothesis, manic symptomatology cannot simply be explained by positive 
self-referent beliefs and cognitive biases, since previous research suggests that individuals with 
bipolar disorder display relatively little positive self-referent information (e.g., Adams et al., 2014; 
Pyle & Mansell, 2010). Thus, a plausible alternative explanation advanced in the present study is that 
mania involves the activation of a relatively small, but densely organized, subset of positive beliefs. 
Once activated, these beliefs would ostensibly provoke a large, momentary, positive response in 
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individuals, consistent with the phenomenology of manic episodes. A specific sub-hypothesis was 
that those at high risk for mania would display dense connectivity of positive self-schema content 
within the achievement domain, in particular.  
Research Question 2. How do mood induction procedures (MIPs) influence the examination of 
self-schema content among those at different levels of mania risk? 
As mentioned in the General Introduction, few known investigations on mania have utilized 
mood priming to examine self-schema components. However, such priming may be necessary to 
reveal important characteristics. Given existing research on bipolar disorder that implicates reward 
sensitivity as a vulnerability factor (see Johnson et al., 2012), it was predicted that positive mood 
priming that has a goal-striving theme would aid in the examination of self-schema content. 
Specifically, it was theorized that this MIP would activate a subset of self-referent beliefs associated 
with goal-striving and achievement, which may be particularly relevant to mania in light of the 
reward sensitivity model. This hypothesis was also informed by previous research indicating that 
positive mood states appear to be associated with certain changes in cognition (e.g., positive self-
focused rumination) among those with a history of or risk for mania (Feldman et al., 2008; Gruber et 
al., 2008b; Raes et al., 2010). Notably, in the current study, effects of the MIP were only explored for 
self-schema content and not structure, since schema organization is theoretically a more stable 
characteristic and existing evidence indicates that mood priming may not be necessary for examining 
self-schema structure (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a). 
Research Question 3. Do self-schema components show utility in predicting the course of mood 
symptoms?  
The cross-sectional design of Study 1 also begins to address the third research question, by 
considering how self-schema components may function within pathways towards manic symptoms. 
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As described in more detail below, it was predicted that certain self-schema constructs would serve 
as mediators between mania risk and the occurrence of mood symptoms.  
Maladaptive Pathways. It was predicted that self-schema components would help to explain 
the nature of potential relations between the hypomanic personality and mood symptoms. That is, it 
was theorized that self-schema constructs may function as a pathway through which mania risk leads 
to mood symptoms. As such, it was examined whether maladaptive self-schema content (i.e., 
dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment, obsessive passion, perfectionism) mediate the relation 
between the hypomanic personality and manic symptoms. Similarly, aspects of self-schema structure 
that were hypothesized to be particularly relevant for mania (i.e., highly interconnected, positive self-
schema content) were expected to be significant mediators in paths to manic symptoms. Finally, a 
sub-hypothesis was that negative self-schema structure and certain forms of self-schema content 
highly implicated in depression (e.g., cognitive distortions in the achievement domain) would also 
serve as a mediator, but between the hypomanic personality and depressive symptoms.  
Adaptive Self-Schema Components.  As previously alluded to, Study 1 further expands on 
the current research literature by considering adaptive self-schema constructs related to achievement 
and goal-striving (i.e., harmonious passion and adaptive self-referent beliefs about success). Here, it 
was tentatively hypothesized that these constructs may have a protective function within the context 
of mania. Since it was not anticipated that every individual with high mania risk may exhibit 
hypothesized protective factors, these self-schema constructs were best conceptualized as moderators 
rather than mediators. Specifically, it was hypothesized that individuals displaying high risk for 
mania may show little manic symptomatology at high levels of these protective factors. 
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Study 1 – Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) program. This is 
an open access, online program that is utilized by over 100,000 people from more than 100 countries 
to complete paid computer tasks (Pontin, 2007). Existing evidence supports the use of this program 
for conducting psychological research, indicating that the quality of results obtained is comparable to 
traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012). The integrity of 
findings is supported particularly when MTurk users have a strong history of receiving approval for 
MTurk tasks (i.e., a high task-approval rating).  
Only individuals from primarily English-speaking countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and United States) were permitted to complete the study. In addition, only 
individuals with an MTurk approval rating of 95% were able to sign-up for the task, indicating that at 
least 95% of their previously completed MTurk tasks had been approved. Seven careful responding 
questions were also incorporated into the study questionnaire to assess the attentiveness of 
participants (e.g., I eat breakfast everyday at 4pm [True/False]; For this item, please select ‘Slightly 
Disagree’). The compensation rate for the current study was set at $1.50 on the MTurk website.  
A total of 482 adults enrolled in the study; however, 23 participants were excluded from 
analyses due to incorrectly answering two or more careful responding questions. Notably, almost all 
of these excluded participants also appeared to discontinue their participation partway through the 
study. Thus, the final sample comprised of 459 participants (244 females, 215 males). Nine percent 
of participants were aged 18 to 24 years, 46% were 25 to 34 years, 26% were 35 to 44 years, 12% 
were 45 to 54 years, 7% were 55 to 64 years, and 2% were 65 to 74 years. Regarding ethnicity, 76% 
of participants identified as White, 9% as Black or African-American, 7% as Hispanic, 6% as Asian, 
and 2% as another ethnicity. The vast majority of participants reported living in the United States 
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(99%), whereas less than 1% of individuals were living in Canada (0.6%) or Australia (0.4%). Sixty-
one percent of individuals reported an education level of post-secondary degree completion or 
higher. Regarding mental health history, 19% of participants reported a past diagnosis of mental 
disorder, with 7% endorsing more than one diagnosis and 15% reporting a current diagnosis. 
Commonly listed diagnoses included depression (10% of the total sample) and anxiety disorders 
(6%).  In addition, a history of bipolar-related disorder was reported by 2.4% of participants. 
Materials 
The materials utilized in this study are described below. A summary of these measures is also 
provided in Table 1.1.   
Risk for Mania. Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). As 
previously mentioned, the HPS is a self-report measure that has been used extensively to index risk 
for the future development of manic and hypomanic episodes. Specifically, this scale examines 
features of the hypomanic personality style, whereby individuals are “characterized as upbeat, 
gregarious, confident and energetic people who sometimes display these attributes to a maladaptive 
extreme, becoming euphoric, hypersociable, grandiose, and overactive” (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986, 
p. 216). As such, this construct reflects a temperamental risk factor for mania. The HPS is comprised 
of 48 true-false items (e.g., I often have moods where I feel so energetic and optimistic that I feel I 
could outperform almost anyone at anything; When I feel an emotion, I usually feel it with extreme 
intensity). High scores on this measure correspond with high psychological vulnerability towards 
mania. In this dissertation, mania risk is treated as a continuous variable, which has been one major 
approach in the literature (e.g., Johnson & Carver, 2006).  
A large literature supports the reliability and validity of the HPS. Specifically, the HPS has 
demonstrated good internal consistency (e.g., Stanton, McArtor, & Watson, 2019) and convergent 
validity. In particular, numerous studies have demonstrated that HPS scores strongly predict  
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Table 1.1 
Summary Table of Measures for Study 1 
Category Scale Brief Description of 
Measure 
Risk for Mania 
 
Hypomanic Personality Scale A commonly used and well-validated measure 
of mania risk. It assesses the extent to which 
individuals display temperamental 
characteristics associated with the future 
development of manic symptoms. 
Mood 
Symptomatology 
Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale Examines self-perceived manic symptoms (i.e., 
heightened euphoria, activity, confidence, 
talkativeness and decreased need for sleep) 
over the previous week. 
 DASS-21 – Depression subscale Assesses the degree to which participants have 
experienced depressive symptoms over the 
previous week. 
Self-Schema  
Structure 
Psychological Distance Scaling  
Task 
Examines the organization or consolidation of 
positive and negative self-beliefs within 
interpersonal and achievement domains.   
Self-Schema  
Content 
Belief Statements Questionnaire – 
Fulfillment subscale 
This subscale assesses the extent to which 
individuals display adaptive self-referent 
beliefs related to achievement. 
 Cognitive Distortions Scale Examines the extent to which participants 
notice the presence of several cognitive 
distortions within achievement and 
interpersonal situations. 
 DAS – Goal Attainment Subscale Assesses the degree to which participants 
display dysfunctional attitudes related to goal 
attainment, which have been linked to mania. 
 Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale 
Three subscales examine participants’ 
agreement with four perfectionistic tendencies, 
which relate to a strong desire for perfection 
that is directed towards oneself (Self-
Oriented), others (Other-Oriented), or is 
attributed to others despite one’s self-focus 
(Socially Prescribed). 
 Passion Scale Considers whether individuals display a 
passion for an activity and whether this is 
adaptive (Harmonious Passion) or maladaptive 
(Obsessive Passion). 
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concurrent and future manic symptoms and episodes (e.g., Kwapil et al., 2000; Walsh et al., 2015). 
The HPS also correlates highly with bipolar-relevant measures that have demonstrated adequate 
sensitivity and specificity, including the Mood Disorder Questionnaire (Hirschfeld et al., 2000). 
Recent research has also examined the factor structure underlying the HPS, indicating the 
presence of five distinct factors/ subscales: (1) Activation, (2) Charisma, (3) Intellectual Confidence, 
(4) Lability, and (5) Modesty. The Activation subscale, in particular, appears to support the divergent 
validity of the HPS and its specificity to mania. This scale corresponds with high levels of activation, 
energy, and recklessness. Importantly, this subscale displays strong associations with bipolar-
relevant measures, similar to total HPS scores (Stanton et al., 2019). However, compared to the full 
scale and other subscales, the Activation subscale shows weaker associations with other forms of 
psychopathology and personality aspects (e.g., substance abuse, borderline personality disorder, 
psychopathy, narcissism; Stanton et al., 2019). As such, this subscale of the HPS was used as the 
major indicator of mania risk in the current dissertation.  
Current Mood Symptoms. Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (ASRM; Altman et al., 1997). The 
ASRM is a five-item scale that assesses manic symptomatology over the previous week.  This scale 
prompts individuals to consider their levels of euphoria, self-confidence, need for sleep, 
talkativeness, and activity, and specifically, their degree of change compared to typical levels. 
Example response items from this scale are: I do not feel happier or more cheerful than usual; I have 
frequently been more active than usual. 
This scale has been used extensively in the literature and has shown good test-retest reliability 
(Altman et al., 1997). The ASRM has also demonstrated good convergent validity, in that it has 
correlated strongly with other bipolar-relevant measures (Altman et al., 1997), including diagnostic 
interviews such as the Clinician-Administered Rating Scale for Mania (Altman et al., 1994) and 
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Young Mania Rating Scale (Young et al. 1978). In addition, this scale has distinguished individuals 
with mania from those with schizophrenia and unipolar depression (Altman et al., 1997).  
Depression subscale of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 is a widely used self-report instrument that assesses depressive, 
anxious, and stressful symptomology. Only the Depression subscale was administered in the current 
study to yield a continuous measure of depressive symptoms. This subscale is comprised of 7 
statements (e.g., I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all; I felt that I had nothing to 
look forward to), which participants are asked to rate using a 4-point scale, ranging from 0 (i.e., did 
not apply to me at all) to 3 (i.e., applied to me very much, or most of the time). The Depression 
subscale of the DASS-21 has shown excellent internal consistency (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & 
Swinson, 1998). This was also demonstrated in the current study (Cronbach’s alpha = .94 for this 
measure). In addition, the Depression subscale correlates highly with related measures, such as the 
Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), supporting the concurrent validity 
of this measure.  
Self-Schema Structure. Psychological Distance Scaling Task (PDST; Dozois & Dobson, 
2001b). The PDST is a computer-based task in which participants are presented with a number of 
adjectives on a screen (e.g., desirable, inadequate). They are asked to position each adjective within 
a four-quadrant grid based on their perceived self-descriptiveness (x-axis) and valence (y-axis). The 
left endpoint of the x-axis is labelled “not at all like me” and the right endpoint is labelled “very 
much like me”. In a similar manner, the top endpoint of the y-axis is labelled “very positive” whereas 
the bottom endpoint is labelled “very negative”.  
The set of adjectives employed in the current study can be found in Appendix A.  These 
adjectives were taken from previous research using this task (e.g., Dozois, 2007; Seeds & Dozois, 
2010), and have been matched on important variables such as word length, word frequency, 
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To compute the average interstimulus distance among the positive and negative
adjectives, the computer calculated a coordinate point (x- and y-axis) for each
adjective. Interstimulus distances for self-referent positive and self-referent negative
content were computed using the following idiographic formula:
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
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s
nðn" 1Þ=2
where X is the adjective placement on the self-descriptiveness axis, Y is the adjective
placement on the valence axis, and n is the total number of self-descriptive adjectives.
Therefore, the average interstimulus distances for a particular content of self-referent
adjectives equals the square root of the mean squared distances of every
adjective–adjective combination, divided by the total number of possible distances
for that content area (see Dozois & Dobson, 2001b for additional information
concerning the development of this measure).
Interstimulus distance scores were calculated for six areas of self-referent
information: overall positive, overall negative, interpersonal positive, interpersonal
negative, achievement positive, and achievement negative adjectives. Scores for the
present study were logarithmically transformed to compensate for violations in the
normality of the distribution. Hence, all scores reported and used in subsequent
analyses are log scores. The fundamental assumption of this task is that smaller
distance among adjectives is indicative of greater interconnectedness or consolida-
tion of self-referent content, whereas larger distance among adjectives is indicative of
less interconnectedness or consolidation. Psychometric properties of this measure
have been supported in other research papers (Dozois, 2002; Dozois & Dobson,
2001b, 2003).
Life events. The Negative Life Events Questionnaire (NLEQ; Metalsky & Joiner,
1992) was used to assess negative life events that may occur in the lives of young
adults. Items assess negative life events in different domains, such as academic
achievement and interpersonal stressors (e.g., ‘‘Not doing as well in school as you
would like,’’ ‘‘Fight or disagreement with romantic partner’’). We included 66 items
in the present investigation, similar to previous use of this measure in studies
examining diathesis-stress interactions and depression (e.g., Metalsky & Joiner,
1992). Scores consisted of the number of events endorsed as having been present
during the past year and ranged from 0 to 66. Higher scores reflect the occurrence of
more negative events. For the current study, participants were instructed to indicate
which of these 66 events had occurred to them over the past year. Item response on
the NLEQ varies according to the type and frequency of the life stress experiences;
thus, the calculation of internal consistency coefficients is not appropriate for this
particular scale. The NLEQ’s validity has been demonstrated in several previous
vulnerability and stress studies (e.g., Hankin, 2005; Hankin et al., 2004; Metalsky &
Joiner, 1992). The NLEQ was given at T2.
Procedure
During the initial assessment (T1), participants provided informed consent and
completed the demographic questionnaire, BDI-II, and PDST. They received course
credit for their participation. Approximately 1 year later (T2; M5 55.09, SD5 2.33
weeks), participants returned to the laboratory and met with a researcher. At this
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familiarity, and emotional intensity. These adjectives represent two different types of self-schema 
content, namely, positive and negative beliefs within the interpersonal and achievement domains. As 
such, 20 adjectives correspond with each of the following content domains: interpersonal positive 
(e.g., admired, kind), interpersonal negative (e.g., unloved, annoying), achievement positive (e.g., 
capable, successful), and achievement negative (e.g., failure, helpless). These content domains have 
been associated with excellent interrater reliability (94% agreement; κ = .87; Dozois, 2007; Dozois & 
Frewen, 2006). 
At the beginning of the task, participants are presented with one adjective that appears at the 
center of the grid. After the participant has positioned this adjective using the computer mouse, they 
can press the “Enter” key or click a “Submit” button located below the grid. Consequently, the 
adjective disappears, and then another adjective is presented, until a total of 60 adjectives have been 
placed. Over multiple iterations, the computer calculates the interstimulus distance between 
adjectives within a given content domain (e.g., achievement positive).  
To calculate and interpret PDST results in the present dissertation, a similar approach was taken 
to previous studies (e.g., Dozois & Dobson, 2001b; Seeds & Dozois, 2010). Specifically, interstimulus 
distance scores were calculated for six different content domains of the PDST: (i) Overall Positive, (ii) 
Overall Negative, (iii) Positive Achievement, (iv) Negative Achievement, (v) Positive Interpersonal, 
and (vi) Negative Interpersonal. To calculate interstimulus distance, the following idiographic formula 
was used: 
   
 
Here, X corresponds with the placement of adjectives along the self-descriptiveness axis, Y is 
the placement of adjectives along the valence axis, and  is the sum of all possible distances for a 
given domain. Thus, this formula computes the mean-squared distances of each adjective-adjective 
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combination within each content domain. This value is divided by the number of possible distances 
and the square root is taken. In the current study, these scores were then logarithmically transformed 
to address violations regarding the normal distribution of scores, consistent with previous research. 
The resulting value theoretically provides an indication of interconnectedness or consolidation, with 
the primary assumption being that less interstimulus distance between adjectives corresponds with 
greater interconnectedness, and vice versa. For more detailed information regarding this task, see 
Dozois & Dobson, 2001b. 
Extant evidence supports the psychometric properties of the PDST (e.g., Dozois, 2002; 
Dozois & Dobson, 2001b, 2003; Dozois & Frewen, 2006). Among stably depressed individuals, the 
6-month test-retest reliability coefficients are .70 and .51 for negative and positive interpersonal 
content, respectively (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a). The construct validity of this measure is informed 
by research demonstrating that negative self-schema content is highly consolidated among anxious 
and depressed samples, whereas diffuse, positive self-schema content appears to be characteristic of 
depression, in particular (Dozois & Dobson, 2001b). This task has also shown that the consolidation 
of negative, interpersonal content varies as a function of individual levels of dysphoria and number 
of previous depressive episodes (Dozois, 2002; Dozois & Dobson, 2003). Further investigations have 
demonstrated that the tight organization of negative self-schema content within the interpersonal 
domain is discernible outside of mood episodes in cases of depression (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a).  
Self-Schema Content. Belief Statements Questionnaire – Fulfillment subscale (Hillson, 
1997). The Beliefs Statements Questionnaire was designed to assess adaptive beliefs within the 
context of interpersonal and achievement-related situations. Only the Fulfillment subscale of this 
measure that probes participants about achievement situations was utilized in the current study. This 
subscale contextualizes adaptive beliefs (e.g., It is important to like and feel proud of oneself and 
one’s accomplishments), such that they become self-referential and reflect perceived embodiment of 
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those beliefs (e.g., I like and feel proud of myself and my accomplishments). Participants were 
presented with seven of these statements, which they were asked to rate using a 7-point scale, 
ranging from 1(Very untrue) to 7 (Very true).  The Accuracy subscale has good internal consistency 
(α  = .85), as well as concurrent validity regarding psychological well-being  (Hillson, 1997).    
Cognitive Distortions Scale (CDS; Covin, Dozois, Ogniewicz, & Seeds, 2011). The CDS is a 
self-report instrument that examines participants’ identification with ten cognitive distortions, 
namely, (1) Mindreading, (2) Catastrophizing, (3) All-or-Nothing Thinking, (4) Emotional 
Reasoning, (5) Labeling, (6) Mental Filter, (7) Overgeneralization, (8) Personalization, (9) Should 
Statements, and (10) Minimizing or Disqualifying the Positive. The CDS is comprised of 10 items 
that present a brief description of each cognitive distortion and two vignettes that exemplify how the 
distortion may manifest in daily life. For example, the item for Emotional Reasoning describes how 
“People can believe something to be true because it “feels” that way.” One of the accompanying 
vignettes illustrates how a man has received positive performance evaluations at work, and yet he 
feels like a failure and thus begins to believe he is a failure. For each cognitive distortion, 
participants are then asked to indicate the perceived frequency with which they experience that 
cognitive distortion within social (e.g., family, romantic relationships) and achievement-related 
situations (e.g., work, school), using a 7-point scale that ranges from 1(Never) to 7(All The Time). 
The CDS has shown excellent reliability (α = .85) and concurrent validity in terms of its association 
with measures of stress, anxiety, and depression (Covin et al., 2011).   
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Goal Attainment subscale (DAS-GA; Lam et al., 2004). This 
subscale of the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (Power et al., 1994) is designed to be specific to 
mania-relevant cognitions, as indicated by previous factor analytic research (Lam et al., 2004). It is 
comprised of six items that describe dysfunctional attitudes related to goal-striving and achievement, 
as well as the importance of consistently feeling positive (e.g., A person should do well at everything 
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he/she undertakes; I should be happy all the time). Participants are presented with these statements 
and indicate their agreement using a 7-point scale, from Totally Agree to Totally Disagree. This 
subscale has been associated with adequate internal consistency (α = .79), as well as good convergent 
and discriminant validity. In particular, this subscale has positively correlated with past 
hospitalizations due to manic episodes, and it has distinguished between patients with bipolar 
disorder and unipolar depression (Lam et al., 2004).  
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS; Hewitt & Flett, 1990). The MPS is a 45-item, 
self-report inventory that examines three dimensions of perfectionism: (1) Self-oriented, (2) Other-
oriented, and (3) Socially prescribed perfectionism. Self-oriented perfectionism refers to 
perfectionistic behaviour directed towards oneself (e.g., I strive to be as perfect as I can be; When I 
am working on something, I cannot relax until it is perfect), whereas other-oriented perfectionism 
focuses on the expectations of others (e.g., I have high expectations for the people that are important 
to me; I can’t be bothered with people who won’t strive to better themselves). Socially prescribed 
perfectionism involves attributing one’s perfectionistic behaviours to others (e.g., People expect 
nothing less than perfection from me; I find it difficult to meet others’ expectations of me). 
Participants rate their agreement with items using a 7-point scale, from 1(Strongly Disagree) to 7 
(Strongly Agree). The MPS has demonstrated good internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alphas 
ranging from .82 to .87 for the self-oriented, other-oriented, and socially prescribed subscales 
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991). Similarly, the validity of the MPS is supported by research indicating that 
these subscales converge with other measures of perfectionism, while also showing differential 
relationships with psychopathology and personality constructs in the expected manner. As one 
illustration, other-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism, in particular, have shown positive 
relationships with several personality disorders, highlighting the interpersonal dimension shared by 
these constructs (Hewitt & Flett, 1991). 
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Passion Scale (Vallerand et al., 2003). The Passion Scale is comprised of 17 items that 
participants rate using a 7-point scale, from 1(Not Agree at All) to 7(Very Strongly Agree). At the 
beginning of the questionnaire, participants are asked to bring to mind their favourite activity. In the 
current study, activities listed by participants included writing, dancing, and playing guitar. 
Participants are then presented with the items that address three basic components: (1) the criteria for 
passion, (2) obsessive passion, and (3) harmonious passion. Regarding the first component, five 
items assess the extent to which participants are passionate about their activity by examining its 
frequency, enjoyment and personal importance (e.g., This activity is part of who I am; I spend a lot of 
time doing this activity).  Secondly, six items examine whether individuals display ‘obsessive 
passion’ for the activity. Recall that this concept relates to having little control over an activity, and 
thus one’s identity and other life activities become unduly affected (e.g., I have the impression that 
my activity controls me; If I could, I would only do my activity). Conversely, six items assess the 
extent to which individuals display harmonious passion with their activity (e.g., This activity is in 
harmony with the other activities in my life; My activity is well integrated in my life). Previous 
research indicates that the Passion Scale has good psychometric properties (α = .73 and .85 for 
harmonious and obsessive passion, respectively). In addition, these constructs have shown expected 
relations with well-being indicators. For example, a study of football players found that harmonious 
passion was associated with higher levels of positive affect over the course of a season, whereas 
obsessive passion was associated with higher levels of negative affect (Vallerand et al., 2003).  
Mood Induction Procedures (MIPs). Individuals were asked to participate in a directed 
imagination task designed to evoke either a positive or neutral mood. The positive MIP has been 
used in previous studies of mania and instructed participants to imagine that they had attained a 
personally important goal (Tharp, Johnson, Sinclair, & Kumar, 2016). This exercise was adapted for 
the present study to also create a neutral MIP, which was not anticipated to evoke a strong emotional 
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reaction. Specifically, participants were asked to imagine a routine shopping trip, which has been 
used successfully in previous research as an emotionally neutral condition (Luten, 1995). This task 
was designed to be similar on important features, such as length of task and personal relevance.  
Participants were randomly assigned to either the positive or neutral MIP. Instructions for 
these tasks can be found in Appendix B. Specifically, audio instructions and visual prompts guided 
participants through the imaginary scenario. First, participants were given an overview of the task 
and the specific scenario they were asked to imagine. Next, they were prompted to type answers to a 
number of questions that would help them to imagine their situation in detail (e.g., What about your 
goal makes it important to you?; What would you think and feel if you achieved it?). They were then 
instructed to clear their mind for 30 seconds, before imagining their scenario for two minutes.  
Manipulation check. Follow-up questions were included in an effort to assess the 
effectiveness of the MIPs (see Appendix B). In particular, immediately following the imagination 
task, participants were asked to rate their emotional state using an 8-point Likert scale (-4 = 
Extremely negative, 0 = Neutral, 4 = Extremely Positive). For participants in the present study, the 
results of an independent t-test indicated their emotional state was significantly more positive 
following the positive versus neutral MIP, t(441) = 12.57, p <.001. In particular, the mean rating for 
emotional state was 3.04 (SD = 1.20) for the positive MIP and 0.94 (SD = 2.11) for the neutral MIP. 
Procedure 
Ethics approval was granted prior to data collection (see Appendix C for further details). 
Mechanical Turk users who met the inclusion criteria for the study were able to view the 
advertisement and proceed to the website hosting the study materials. After reading the Letter of 
Information and consenting to participate, individuals viewed an introductory video in which the 
experimenter introduced herself and provided a brief description of the study activities. Participants 
were then instructed to complete the HPS, before being presented with the ASRM, DASS-21, and 
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PDST in a randomized order. Following this, participants were randomly directed to either the 
Positive, Negative or Neutral MIP. Finally, they were asked to complete the PBS, CDS, DAS, 
Passion Scale, and MPS, in that order. Since it could not be precisely known how long the MIP 
effects would last, it was decided not to randomize this final set of questionnaires. Finally, 
participants were directed to the debriefing page, which contained information about the study, as 
well as the numeric MTurk input code needed by the participant in order to receive compensation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
Study 1 – Results and Discussion 
The means, standard deviations, ranges, and reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) for the mania, 
mood symptomatology, and self-schema measures can be found in Table 1.2. These values are 
consistent with those reported in previous research. In addition, the reliability coefficients for all 
measures were quite acceptable, ranging from .81 to .94. Simple correlations between the mania and 
mood symptomatology measures can be found in Appendix D. Consistent with previous research, 
significant positive relationships were found between mania risk and manic symptoms. Mania risk 
was also modestly associated with recent depressive symptoms.  
The correlation matrix for the self-schema content and structure domains can also be found in 
Appendix D. Consistent with expectations, many of these self-schema aspects intercorrelated with 
one another. For example, in terms of content, small to large relationships were shown amongst the 
perfectionism styles, obsessive passion, and dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment. In terms 
of structure, positive content within different domains (i.e., achievement and interpersonal) strongly 
correlated, and vice versa.   
Associations between Mania Risk and Self-Schema Constructs 
Recall that Research Questions 1 and 2 of this dissertation consider the relationships between 
mania risk and self-schema constructs. To begin exploring these primary research questions, 
bivariate correlations were calculated. These results are summarized in Table 1.3a and 1.3b, for self-
schema content and structure, respectively. Table 1.3a shows that risk for mania (i.e., HPS scores) 
positively correlated with the vast majority of measures reflecting maladaptive schema content. 
Specifically, mania risk shared moderately strong relationships with interpersonal cognitive 
distortions, obsessive passion, and socially-prescribed perfectionism. Additionally, the HPS was 
modestly associated with the other forms of perfectionism, dysfunctional attitudes about goal 
attainment, and achievement cognitive distortions. 
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Table 1.2   
Descriptive Statistics for the Mania, Mood Symptomatology, and Self-Schema Measures 
Notes. N = 438-459 for all self-report measures. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, Activation 
subscale; ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale; DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress 
Scales – 21, Depression Subscale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Goal Attainment Subscale; 
CDS-A = Cognitive Distortions Scale, Achievement Subscale; CDS- I = Cognitive Distortions Scale, 
Interpersonal Subscale; PBS = Positive Belief Statements Scale, Fulfillment Subscale; PS-O = 
Passion Scale, Obsessive Subscale; PS-H = Passion Scale, Harmonious Subscale; MPS-S = 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Self-Oriented Subscale; MPS-O = Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale, Other-Oriented Subscale; MPS-SP = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, 
Socially Prescribed Subscale; PSDT = Psychological Distance Scaling Task; AP = Achievement 
Positive; AN = Achievement Negative; IP = Interpersonal Positive; IN = Interpersonal Negative.  
 
Category        Measure   M SD Range Reliability 
Mania HPS Activation 2.05 2.53 0-9     .86 
Mood 
Symptomatology 
ASRM 4.27 4.52 0-20     .85 
 DASS-21 4.93 5.46 0-21     .94 
Self-Schema Content DAS 26.89 7.18 6-42     .84 
 CDS-A 39.38 12.63 10-70     .89 
 CDS-I 39.50 12.27 10-70     .88 
 PBS 38.09 8.53 7-49     .92 
 PS-O 20.92 8.91 6-42     .85 
 PS-H 32.61 6.08 12-42     .81 
 MPS-S 66.01 18.11 18-105     .91 
 MPS-O 54.99 13.89 16-95     .82 
 MPS-SP 54.14 15.09 15-102     .85 
Self-Schema Structure PDST Overall Positive 0.88 0.62 -1.25-3.76  
 PDST Overall 
Negative 
2.32 0.93 -0.81-4.92  
 PDST-AP 0.50 0.42 -0.58-2.40  
 PDST-AN 1.20 0.56 -0.33-2.48  
 PDST-IP 0.40 0.29 -0.67-1.84  
 PDST-IN 1.25 0.52 -0.49-2.49  
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Table 1.3a 
Correlations between Mania Risk and Self-Schema Content 
 DAS CDS-A CDS-I PS-O   PS-H MS-S MS-O MS-SP PBS 
HPS .20*** .16** .22*** .42***    -.05 .12* .14** .26*** -.01 
Notes. DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Goal Attainment Subscale; CDS-A = Cognitive 
Distortions Scale, Achievement Subscale; CDS- I = Cognitive Distortions Scale, Interpersonal 
Subscale; PS-O = Passion Scale, Obsessive Subscale; PS-H = Passion Scale, Harmonious Subscale; 
MPS-S = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Self-Oriented Subscale; MPS-O = 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Other-Oriented Subscale; MPS-SP = Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale, Socially Prescribed Subscale; PBS = Positive Belief Statements Scale, 
Fulfillment Subscale.*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Table 1.3b 
Correlations between Mania Risk and Self-Schema Structure 
  
PDST-P PDST-AP PDST-SP PDST-N PDST-AN PDST-SN 
HPS  -.22*** -.21*** -.19*** -.02 .06 -.09 
Notes. PDST = Psychological Distance Scaling Task; P = Overall Positive; N = Overall Negative;  
AP = Positive Achievement, AN = Negative Achievement, IP = Positive Interpersonal, IN = 
Negative Interpersonal. ***p < .01 
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Similarly, in Table 1.3b, it is illustrated that mania risk also shared significant relationships 
with self-schema structure domains. In line with expectations, high HPS scores corresponded with 
tightly organized content that was positive in valence. More specifically, higher HPS scores were 
associated with highly interconnected, positive content within the achievement and interpersonal 
domains. Notably, all the above correlations between the HPS and PDST positive domains were 
small in magnitude. Somewhat inconsistent with hypotheses, mania risk did not correlate with the 
organization of negative self-schema content. However, as an aside, it was observed that total scores 
on the HPS (versus HPS Activation scores) shared a small relationship with negative, interpersonally 
relevant content, r = -.15, p = .01. The direction of this relation suggests that high total HPS scores 
corresponded with tightly interconnected, negative content within the interpersonal domain.  
Predicting Self-Schema Aspects from Mania Risk  
In order to further understand how self-schema constructs (both content and structure) may 
distinguish those at heightened vulnerability towards mania, it is critical to parse the contribution of 
mood symptoms from the relation between mania risk and self-schema aspects. Thus, a number of 
block regression analyses were conducted to examine how self-schema constructs may be 
distinctively related to mania risk. For each hierarchical regression analysis, depressive and manic 
symptoms were entered in the first and second block, respectively, before mania risk was entered in 
the third block. 
Schema Content. The results of the regression analyses for the self-schema content measures 
are displayed in Table 1.4. These findings indicate that mania risk significantly added to the 
prediction of several content measures, even after controlling for the presence of mood symptoms. 
Specifically, after manic and depressive symptoms had been taken into account, high risk for mania 
corresponded with greater endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes concerning goal attainment, 
qualities indicative of obsessive passion, and socially prescribed perfectionism. In the third block of 
 
 
 
41 
Table 1.4 
Summary of Regression Results for Self-Schema Content 
Schema 
Content Block 1 
Block 2 
Change 
Block 3 
Change 
Overall Model and 
Predictors 
 
Dysfunctional 
Attitudes – 
Goal 
Attainment 
 
F = 0.01 
R2 = .00 
 
 
ΔF = 9.84** 
ΔR2 = .02 
 
ΔF = 7.44*** 
ΔR2 = .03 
 
F = 5.81*** 
R2 = .04 
Depression (-.03) 
Mania (.08) 
Mania Risk (.15)** 
Cognitive 
Distortions – 
Achievement 
F = 107.64*** 
R2 = .20 
 
ΔF = 10.98*** 
ΔR2 = .02 
ΔF = 1.60 
ΔR2 = .00 
F = 40.99*** 
R2 = .23 
Depression (.44)*** 
Mania (.11)* 
Mania Risk (.06) 
Cognitive 
Distortions – 
Interpersonal 
F = 105.15*** 
R2 = .20 
 
ΔF = 16.43*** 
ΔR2 = .03 
ΔF = 6.87** 
ΔR2 = .01 
F = 40.99*** 
R2 = .25 
Depression (.43)*** 
Mania (.11)* 
Mania Risk (.13)** 
Adaptive 
Beliefs about 
Achievement 
F = 369.88*** 
R2 = .47 
 
ΔF = 6.80** 
ΔR2 = .01 
ΔF = 0.22 
ΔR2 = .00 
F = 127.10*** 
R2 = .48 
Depression (-.69)*** 
Mania (.08)* 
Mania Risk (.02) 
Obsessive 
Passion 
F = 4.43* 
R2 = .01 
 
ΔF = 64.18*** 
ΔR2 = .13 
ΔF = 36.49*** 
ΔR2 = .07 
F = 37.25*** 
R2 = .21 
Depression (.06) 
Mania (.22)*** 
Mania Risk (.30)** 
Harmonious 
Passion 
F = 64.43*** 
R2 = .14 
 
ΔF = 2.27 
ΔR2 = .01 
ΔF = 0.20 
ΔR2 = .00 
F = 22.32*** 
R2 = .15 
Depression (-.37)*** 
Mania (-.08) 
Mania Risk (.02) 
 
 
 
42 
Self-Oriented 
Perfectionism 
F = 0.63 
R2 = .00 
 
ΔF = 2.15 
ΔR2 = .00 
ΔF = 3.50 
ΔR2 = .04 
F = 2.10 
R2 = .02 
Depression (.03) 
Mania (.02) 
Mania Risk (.11) 
Other-Oriented 
Perfectionism 
F = 0.37 
R2 = .00 
ΔF = 15.14*** 
ΔR2 = .04 
ΔF = 1.04 
ΔR2 = .00 
F = 5.52** 
R2 = .04 
Depression (.01) 
Mania (.16)** 
Mania Risk (.06) 
Socially 
Prescribed 
Perfectionism 
F = 49.05*** 
R2 = .11 
ΔF = 19.12**** 
ΔR2 = .04 
ΔF = 10.82*** 
ΔR2 = .02 
F = 27.64*** 
R2 = .18 
Depression (.30)*** 
Mania (.12)* 
Mania Risk (.17)*** 
 
Notes. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression coefficients.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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the regression analysis, mania risk also positively predicted cognitive distortions within the 
interpersonal domain. Contrary to expectations, the HPS did not predict achievement cognitive 
distortions once mood symptoms had been controlled for, despite the previously reported, positive 
relation shared between these constructs. This result can likely be explained by the strong 
contribution of recent depressive symptoms; depression was consistently a strong predictor of 
cognitive distortions within both the interpersonal and achievement domains. Finally, mania risk did 
not significantly add to the prediction of adaptive self-referent beliefs about achievement, 
harmonious passion, nor self-oriented or other-oriented perfectionism. 
As further illustrated in Table 1.4, mood symptoms also frequently added to the prediction of 
self-schema content. In particular, depression was a moderate to strong predictor of the majority of 
content constructs. This is not surprisingly since many of these scales were designed to examine 
depressogenic cognition, and such relationships have been well documented in the literature (e.g., 
Covin et al., 2011). Since one of the goals of this dissertation is to isolate self-schema aspects that 
appear to be distinctly related to mania, notable are findings that exclusively implicate manic 
symptoms and/or mania risk. As displayed in Table 1.4, dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment 
and obsessive passion represent cases in which depressive symptoms was not a significant predictor, 
once mania constructs have been entered into the regression equation. As such, these findings 
contribute to discriminant validity, suggesting that these content measures are particularly important 
for understanding self-referent beliefs within the context of mania.  
Schema Structure. The regression results for schema structure components are presented in 
Table 1.5. First, mania risk significantly predicted the organization of overall positive schema 
content, beyond the contributions of recent mood symptoms. Notably, although depression 
corresponded with loosely connected, positive content, recent manic symptoms as well as mania risk 
corresponded with tightly interconnected positive content. Alternatively, only recent depressive 
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Table 1.5. 
Summary of Regression Results for Self-Schema Structure 
Schema 
Structure Block 1 
Block 2 
Change 
Block 3 
Change 
Overall Model and 
Predictors 
 
Overall 
Positive 
 
F = 57.26*** 
R2 = .12 
 
 
ΔF = 39.49*** 
ΔR2 = .07 
 
ΔF = 12.71*** 
ΔR2 = .03 
 
F = 37.64*** 
R2 = .22 
Depression (.37)*** 
Mania (-.19)*** 
Mania Risk (-.17)*** 
Positive 
Achievement 
F = 38.36*** 
R2 = .08 
 
ΔF = 23.88*** 
ΔR2 = .05 
ΔF = 12.36*** 
ΔR2 = .03 
F = 26.08*** 
R2 = .15 
Depression (.31)*** 
Mania (-.14)** 
Mania Risk (-.17)*** 
Positive 
Interpersonal 
F = 50.86*** 
R2 = .10 
 
ΔF = 30.05*** 
ΔR2 = .06 
ΔF = 8.11** 
ΔR2 = .02 
F = 31.24*** 
R2 = .17 
Depression (.34)*** 
Mania (-.18)*** 
Mania Risk (-.14)** 
Overall 
Negative 
F = 74.07*** 
R2 = .22 
 
ΔF = 0.83 
ΔR2 = .00 
ΔF = 1.09 
ΔR2 = .00 
F = 25.32*** 
R2 = .22 
Depression (-.46)*** 
Mania (.09) 
Mania Risk (-.07) 
Negative 
Achievement 
F = 71.18*** 
R2 = .20 
 
ΔF = 5.39* 
ΔR2 = .02 
ΔF = 0.00 
ΔR2 = .00 
F = 25.81*** 
R2 = .22 
Depression (-.44)*** 
Mania (.12)* 
Mania Risk (.00) 
Negative 
Interpersonal 
F = 63.98*** 
R2 = .16 
 
ΔF = 0.04 
ΔR2 = .00 
ΔF = 3.38+ 
ΔR2 = .01 
F = 22.54*** 
R2 = .17 
Depression (-.39)*** 
Mania (.07) 
Mania Risk (-.12)+ 
Notes. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression coefficients.  
*p < .05, *p < .01, ***p < .001, +p = .06. 
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symptoms significantly predicted overall negative self-schema structure when all constructs were 
entered in the final block of the regression analysis.  
Positive Domains. When examining more specific domains of self-schema structure, mania 
risk significantly predicted the organization of positive content within the achievement domain after 
controlling for the influence of recent mood symptoms. HPS scores corresponded with highly 
interconnected content within the interpersonal domain as well. In both cases, manic 
symptomatology was also associated with tightly organized, positive content. Conversely, recent 
depressive symptoms corresponded with loosely organized, positive content within these domains, 
which is consistent with past research. 
Negative Domains. Contrary to tentative hypotheses, the HPS was not a significant predictor 
of negative achievement structure or interpersonal structure after accounting for the influence of 
mood symptoms. However, the trend for negative interpersonal structure (p = .06) showed the 
expected pattern, whereby high mania risk corresponded with highly interconnected negative 
content. Conversely, greater endorsement of recent manic symptoms corresponded with less 
connectivity within the achievement domain, but not the interpersonal domain. Greater depressive 
symptoms corresponded with highly interconnected negative content within both domains.  
Examining the Effects of Mood Priming on the Activation of Self-Schema Content 
To address the second research question of this dissertation, a set of multiple regression 
analyses was conducted to examine whether the positive mood induction procedure moderated 
relations between mania risk and self-schema content. To derive the predictors for these analyses, the 
MIP was numerically coded and the HPS was mean-centered. A product term was then calculated for 
the interaction effect. 
A summary of these analyses is presented in Table 1.6. As this table illustrates, there were no 
significant interaction effects associated with any of the self-schema content measures. Overall, these  
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Table 1.6 
Summary of Moderation Analyses examining the Effects of Mood Induction Procedures on the 
Activation of Self-Schema Content 
Schema Content Predictors Overall Model 
 
Dysfunctional Attitudes – 
Goal Attainment 
 
HPS (.29)*** 
MIP (.09) 
HPS x MIP (-.11) 
 
F = 8.37*** 
R2 = .06 
 
Cognitive Distortions – 
Interpersonal 
HPS (.34)*** 
MIP (.04) 
HPS x MIP (.06) 
F = 13.68** 
R2 = .09 
 
Cognitive Distortions – 
Achievement 
HPS (.21)** 
MIP (.08) 
HPS x MIP (.01) 
F = 7.49*** 
R2 = .05 
 
Self-Referent Adaptive 
Beliefs - Achievement 
HPS (-.02)** 
MIP (.04)** 
HPS x MIP (-.06)** 
F = 0.80 
R2 = .01 
 
Obsessive Passion HPS (.44)*** 
MIP (.01) 
HPS x MIP (-.09) 
F = 27.25** 
R2 = .17 
 
Harmonious Passion HPS (.00) 
MIP (-.04) 
HPS x MIP (.06) 
F = 1.54 
R2 = .01 
 
Self-Oriented 
Perfectionism 
HPS (.23)** 
MIP (.09) 
HPS x MIP (-.03) 
F = 7.34*** 
R2 = .05 
 
Other-Oriented 
Perfectionism 
HPS (.27)*** 
MIP (.07) 
HPS x MIP (-.05) 
F = 8.83*** 
R2 = .06 
 
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism 
HPS (.34)*** 
MIP (.09) 
HPS x MIP (-.04) 
F = 16.32*** 
R2 = .11 
 
 
Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; MIP = Positive Mood Induction Procedure;  
HPS x MIP = Interaction between HPS and MIP. Values in parentheses represent corresponding 
standardized regression coefficients. **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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findings indicate that the positive mood induction procedure did not impact the examination of self- 
schema content in the current study. As such, mood priming may not be necessary to detect these 
aspects of self-schema content showing sensitivity and/or specificity to mania.    
Self-Schema Components Mediate Maladaptive Pathways to Mood Symptoms 
To further assess the importance of self-schema content and structure in relation to mania 
constructs, it was examined whether self-schema components could help to explain the relation 
between mania risk and mood symptoms. Recall that the current measure of mania risk (i.e., HPS) 
indexes a stable pattern of cognitive, behavioural and emotional experiences that predicts onset of 
clinically significant manic symptoms, and the ASRM and DASS-21 assess the recent incidence of 
manic/depressive symptoms. Thus, it would be helpful to understand how self-schema components 
as potential mediators may elucidate the relation between a vulnerability marker (i.e., HPS) and the 
occurrence of mood symptoms. As such, multiple mediation analyses were conducted utilizing the 
procedures outlined by Preacher and Hayes (2008). This approach permitted analysis of the 
estimated indirect (i.e., mediated) effects, as well as the direct effect of the predictor (i.e., mania risk) 
on the criterion variable (i.e., mood symptoms) while controlling for the mediators within the model.  
Separate mediation analyses were conducted predicting manic symptoms and depressive 
symptoms, using the bootstrap sampling procedures developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008). This 
bootstrap method involves drawing a large number of samples (n = 1000) from the dataset using 
replacement, such that path coefficients can be calculated for each sample. The result is that mean 
direct and indirect effects and their confidence intervals (CIs) can be calculated on the basis of these 
sample estimates. The CIs are used to determine the statistical significance of the effects within the 
mediation model. In the current dissertation, if the value for a given effect (i.e., indirect or direct) did 
not fall within the 95% CI, it was concluded that this result was statistically significant at the p < .05 
level. 
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In addition, since the following mediation analyses were conducted using cross-sectional 
data, reverse mediation models were also conducted exchanging the predictor and criterion variables. 
This approach was used to examine whether further empirical support could be found for these 
mediation models that are based on theoretical considerations. 
Manic Symptoms. First, it was examined whether certain types of self-schema content and 
structure mediated between the HPS and manic symptoms. In light of the earlier regression results 
highlighting relations between mania risk and dysfunctional attitudes about success, obsessive 
passion, and socially prescribed perfectionism, these content constructs were examined as potential 
mediators for manic symptoms. Overall positive self-schema structure was also entered within this 
multiple mediation model. As displayed in Figure 1.1, results indicated that obsessive passion, 
perfectionism, and positive self-schema structure partially mediated the relation between mania risk 
and manic symptoms. These results were in the expected direction, with high mania risk 
corresponding with greater obsessive passion, higher levels of perfectionism, and highly 
interconnected positive self-schema content, which in turn predicted greater manic symptoms.  
Notably, when the reverse model was tested whereby manic symptoms served as the predictor 
variable and mania risk as the criterion variable, the regression coefficients and indirect effects 
looked similar to the theorized model (see Appendix E for details). However, one exception was that 
the indirect effect for positive self-schema structure was not significant in the reverse model (CI = -
.0014 to .0548). 
Depressive Symptoms. Given previous research that heavily implicates cognitive distortions 
within the context of depressive symptoms, a sub-hypothesis was that cognitive distortions in the 
achievement domain may follow from mania risk, but lead to depressive symptoms rather than manic 
symptoms. As displayed in Figure 1.2, meditational results supported this hypothesis and indicated 
that cognitive distortions within both the Achievement and Interpersonal domains fully mediated the  
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Figure 1.1 
Self-Schema Content and Structure Mediate between Mania Risk and Manic Symptoms	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented 
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Dysfunctional Attitudes, β = -.00; 
Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism, β = .03*; Obsessive Passion, β = .08*; Overall Positive Structure, 
β = .04*; Total indirect effect, β = .14*. *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1.2 
Cognitive Distortions Mediate between Mania Risk and Depressive Symptoms 
 
Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented 
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Achievement Cognitive Distortions,   
β = .04*; Interpersonal Cognitive Distortions, β = .05*; Total indirect effect, β = .09*. *p < .05,  
**p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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relation between the HPS and depressive symptoms. Specifically, the results of these analyses 
indicate that greater mania risk predicted high levels of cognitive distortions, which, in turn, 
predicted greater depressive symptoms. Moreover, neither achievement cognitive distortions (CI = -
.0153 to .0361) nor interpersonal cognitive distortions (CI = -.0247 to .0500) significantly mediated 
between the HPS and manic symptoms. 
 Again, the reverse model was also tested (i.e., depressive symptoms as the predictor variable 
and mania risk as the criterion variable), since the above results for the theorized model are cross-
sectional. As shown in Appendix E, for the reverse model, achievement cognitive distortions was not 
a significant mediator between depressive symptoms and mania risk (CI = -.1257 and .0366). In 
addition, the total indirect effects for both models were identical. Thus, it does not appear that the 
reverse model is superior to the theorized model in the current study. 
Adaptive Self-Schema Components as Moderators of Paths to Mood Symptoms 
Recall that it was also hypothesized that adaptive self-schema components (i.e., adaptive 
beliefs about success and harmonious passion) could potentially moderate pathways towards mood 
symptoms. A moderation effect was explored since it was not necessarily anticipated that there 
would be direct associations between the HPS and these protective constructs. Rather, it was 
theorized that there may be a subgroup of individuals at high risk for mania who display lower levels 
of mood symptoms at high levels of these adaptive self-schema constructs. 
To examine potential moderation effects, a multiple regression approach was employed 
utilizing centered values of the predictors. These results indicated that the interaction between 
harmonious passion and manic symptoms was not significant, β = -.06, t = -1.46, p = .08. However, 
the observed trend was in line with the hypothesis that harmonious passion acts as a protective factor 
among those with temperamental vulnerability towards mania. As displayed in Figure 1.3, it 
appeared that the slope representing high versus low levels of harmonious passion was less steep, 
 
 
 
52 
despite tests of simple slopes indicating that both slopes were significantly different from zero. Of 
note, the two main effects were significant, whereby high levels of mania risk and low levels of 
harmonious passion corresponded with greater manic symptoms. Together, these results suggest that 
mania risk was positively associated with manic symptoms, but there was a trend where this 
association may have been weaker among those showing high versus low levels of harmonious 
passion (see Figure 1.3). 
Regarding the other possible moderation effects involving adaptive constructs, adaptive 
beliefs about success also did not significantly moderate between mania risk and symptoms, β = -.05, 
t = -1.22, p = .22. Moreover, harmonious passion (β = -.02, t = -0.41, p = .68) and PBS (β = .01, t = 
0.40, p = .68) did not significantly moderate between the HPS and depressive symptoms. 
Summary of Major Findings  
Findings of this study suggest that manic self-schemas are characterized by maladaptive 
content, and particularly content that is relevant to goal-striving and achievement. Even after 
controlling for the influence of mood symptoms, temperamental risk for mania was associated with 
dysfunctional beliefs about goal attainment, obsessive passion, and a subtype of perfectionism 
(other-oriented perfectionism). However, results of the current investigation also indicate that 
cognitive distortions in interpersonal, rather than achievement contexts, are more predictive of mania 
risk after accounting for manic and depressive symptoms.  
Notably, this cross-sectional examination in Study 1 also suggests that certain aspects of self-
schema structure correspond with mania risk. In particular, the hypomanic personality was associated 
with highly interconnected positive content, within both the achievement and interpersonal domains, 
after accounting for manic and depressive symptoms. Contrary to predictions, mania risk as assessed 
by the Activation subscale of the HPS did not also correspond with highly consolidated negative 
self-schema content. However, regression results did approach significance (p < .06), in line with  
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Figure 1.3 
Harmonious Passion Moderates the Relation between Mania Risk and Symptoms 
 
Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. *** = p < .01. 
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mania risk predicting tightly organized negative content within the interpersonal domain. 
Moreover, the results of this study suggest that self-schema constructs could help to explain 
pathways leading to mood symptoms. Specifically, positive self-schema structure, obsessive passion, 
and socially-prescribed perfectionism partially mediated relations between mania risk and manic 
symptoms, whereas cognitive distortions fully mediated between mania risk and depressive 
symptoms. Study 1 also provided some preliminary evidence that adaptive constructs relevant to 
goal-striving (i.e., harmonious passion) may have a role in dampening manic symptoms among those 
at heightened risk for mania. 
Contrary to hypotheses, the above findings did not suggest that mood induction procedures 
increased the sensitivity with which manic self-schemas could be examined. Thus, it may not be 
necessary to employ these procedures while studying the types of self-schema content included in the 
present research.  
 Despite the promising findings of Study 1 that help to elucidate self-schema characteristics 
associated with mania, a number of limitations need to be addressed. In particular, an important 
extension of Study1 would be a longitudinal examination, in order to more rigorously investigate the 
role of self-schema components within a vulnerability framework of mania. For instance, if self-
schema components could predict prospective increases in manic symptoms, this finding would 
further support the predictive utility of schema constructs.  
Moreover, a question that still remains unanswered is how these self-schema components 
representing putative risk factors may interact with life events to give rise to mood symptoms among 
those at high mania risk. This consideration is critical to address from the perspective of a cognitive 
vulnerability-stress model.  
In addition, since this is one of the first known studies to examine self-schema organization in 
relation to mania, the temporal stability of self-schema structure is largely unknown. This is 
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particularly important to investigate within the context of mania, since previous research on bipolar 
disorder suggests that it may be associated with an unstable view of self (e.g., highly fluctuating 
levels of self-esteem; Bentall et al., 2011; Knowles et al., 2007; van der Gucht et al., 2009).   
Finally, since Study 1 represents a preliminary investigation of self-schema characteristics, it 
would be important to examine whether these results can be replicated and do not simply reflect 
spurious findings. Since the effect sizes associated with many of the major findings are quite small, 
this adds to the need for replication in order to consider the meaningfulness of results. 
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Chapter 3 
Study 2: A Longitudinal Examination 
Study 2 provides a longitudinal examination of the various potential relationships between 
manic risk, self-schema constructs (content and structure) and life events across four separate time-
points, each two-weeks apart. The four different time-points of Study 2 allows for a temporal 
examination of a range of potential effects concerning mania risk, the self-schema, life events, and 
mood symptomatology. In particular, Study 2 provides an initial empirical examination of a 
cognitive vulnerability-stress process that can be modeled and evaluated. As such, this longitudinal 
component of Study 2 directly addresses the third and fourth research questions of this dissertation, 
namely, to assess how the self-schema may predict changes in manic symptomatology over time, and 
how aspects of self-schema content and structure may interact with life events to differentially 
influence symptoms among individuals at varying levels of mania risk. In addition, the cross-
sectional components of Study 2 provide an opportunity for a replication test of the main findings of 
Study 1, but with a different sample. This cross-sectional replication addresses the sixth research 
question of this dissertation.  
Study 2 used a high-risk design to more sensitively examine the above research questions. 
This approach involved oversampling from individuals showing high levels of temperamental 
vulnerability for mania (i.e., high HPS scores), to increase statistical power and promote comparison 
among individuals at different levels of mania risk. In addition, mood symptoms and life events were 
measured at multiple time-points and were considered in relation to the cognitive constructs.  
Research Question 3: Do self-schema components show utility in predicting the course of mood 
symptoms?  
Study 2 further addresses this research question by testing self-schema components as robust 
predictors of the course of manic symptoms. Within a longitudinal design, this is possible by 
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assessing whether aspects of self-schema content and structure predicted future increases in manic 
symptoms. A paucity of research has utilized longitudinal or prospective designs to examine 
psychological vulnerability mechanisms in mania, which is the ‘gold standard’ approach. Moreover, 
no known investigations have examined the potential role of self-schema organization in predicting 
future manic symptoms. Assessing the predictive utility of self-schema components is important for 
gauging their potential as vulnerability factors and for addressing methodological limitations. 
Regarding the latter, if self-schema components predicted prospective increases in manic symptoms, 
this would seriously challenge methodological concerns that self-schema findings can be solely 
explained by concurrent manic symptomatology.  
Hypotheses. It was hypothesized that self-schema structure would robustly predict the course 
of manic symptoms. This hypothesis was informed by research on depression, which has established 
that self-schema organization is an enduring vulnerability factor, as well as a stronger predictor of 
future mood episodes compared to self-schema content (Dozois, 2007). In the case of mania, it was 
anticipated that positive self-schema structure, rather than negative, would be prospectively 
associated with future manic symptoms. To a lesser extent, it was predicted that self-schema content 
may also predict future changes in manic symptoms. 
Temporal Stability of Schema Structure. A secondary research question of Study 2 
concerns the temporal stability of self-schema structure in mania. The longitudinal design of this 
study also allows for a preliminary investigation of this question. Phenomenological characteristics 
of bipolar disorder (e.g., fluctuations in mood and self-esteem) suggest that the organization of self-
beliefs may be prone to change, despite general assumptions that self-schema structure is a relatively 
stable feature. For instance, findings concerning the temporal stability of self-esteem provide indirect 
evidence concerning the organization of an individual’s self-referent beliefs. In particular, research 
has demonstrated that mania is associated with high fluctuations in self-esteem, which are apparent 
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outside of mood episodes (Bentall et al., 2011; Knowles et al., 2007; van der Gucht et al., 2009). 
Thus, it was hypothesized that participants at a high risk for mania would show some change in the 
organization of self-schema content across time, in addition to unstable self-esteem levels, relative to 
individuals at lower levels of risk. This longitudinal component of the research also permits 
examination of the interplay between self-schema structure and self-esteem levels over time. 
Research Question 4: Do self-schema components interact with congruent life events to predict 
the course of mood symptoms among those at high risk for mania? 
As reviewed in the General Introduction, prior studies have begun to examine life events that 
may trigger manic symptoms. In particular, research has pointed to the role of achievement and goal-
striving events in the course of manic symptoms (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008; Nusslock et al., 2007). 
Consistent with a reward sensitivity model of mania (see Johnson et al., 2012), a subset of events has 
also been conceptualized as BAS-Activating (Urošević et al., 2010).  
Recall that very limited research has considered the potential interaction between cognitive 
vulnerability factors and life events in relation to mania. Thus, a major focus of Study 2 is to address 
this consideration, in keeping with a cognitive vulnerability model of mania. Moreover, in light of 
the current operationalization of mania risk, it is also important to examine whether these patterns 
operate differently among those at varying levels of mania risk.  
Hypotheses. Given past research and Study 1 findings, a broad hypothesis of Study 2 was that 
positive life events would interact with positive self-schema components to predict future manic 
symptoms, specifically among those at heightened risk for mania. Thus, it was predicted that a three-
way interaction between self-schema constructs, life events, and mania risk would be observed. It 
was again anticipated in Study 2 that self-schema structure would be a robust predictor showing 
these associations. As such, a core hypothesis was that highly interconnected, positive self-schema 
content would correspond with future increases in manic symptoms when activated by positive life 
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events, and among those at high risk for mania, in particular. Regarding the specific nature of 
positive events, it was predicted that goal attainment and BAS-Activating events would be the 
strongest predictors of future manic symptoms. Conversely, it was not anticipated that negative life 
events would trigger manic symptoms in conjunction with positive schema components.  
Research Question 5: Can major findings regarding self-schema components and their relation 
to mania show replication?  
Study 2 also begins to address the final research question of this dissertation by considering 
whether the cross-sectional results from Study 1 could be replicated in a similar sample. Thus, it was 
anticipated that the major findings of Study 2 would show replication, whereby both self-schema 
content and structure would predict concurrent manic symptoms, after accounting for the influence of 
recent mood symptoms. In addition, it was also hypothesized in Study 2 that self-schema constructs 
would similarly clarify the nature of pathways towards mood symptoms in mania by showing a 
mediating role in certain maladaptive pathways; and then showing a moderating role for self-schema 
content conceptualized as protective factors (i.e., Harmonious Passion and adaptive beliefs about 
success).  
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Study 2 – Method 
Participants 
The Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) program was again utilized to recruit participants. 
Similar to Study 1, only individuals from predominantly English-speaking countries were permitted 
to sign-up for Study 2. Likewise, only individuals with an MTurk approval rating of 95% or above 
were able to complete the task.  
A total of 996 participants (567 females, 429 males) completed Time 1 of this longitudinal 
study. Of the participants who completed Time 1, only 180 participants were invited to return for 
Times 2, 3, and 4, occurring 2, 4, or 6 weeks later, respectively. The goal was to identify a large 
number of high-scorers on the HPS at Time 1 and to retain these participants within the longitudinal 
sample, since high scores (HPS ≥ 33) are typically infrequent within the general population. Thus, an 
equal proportion of participants at different levels of the HPS (i.e., high risk: HPS ≥ 33, moderate 
risk: 32 ≤ HPS ≥ 21, and low risk: HPS ≤ 20) were randomly selected from the pool of Time 1 
participants and invited to complete the remaining study sessions. A summary of the sample 
demographics can be found in Table 2.1. There were no notable demographic differences between 
the initial and retained sample.  
Overall, a total of 139 participants (75 females, 64 males) completed Time 2, 137 participants 
(72 females, 65 males) completed Time 3, and 126 participants (63 females, 63 males) completed 
Time 4. Of those participants who completed Time 2-4, only 15% fell within the high risk group (26 
participants). As such, fewer than anticipated ‘high risk’ participants completed the entire study. 
Participants were compensated $0.50, $1.50, $2.00, and $2.00 for completing Times 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively. 
Careful responding questions were used in a similar manner as Study 1 to assess the attention 
of participants completing the study. One or two careful responding questions were interspersed 
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Table 2.1 
Demographic Characteristics of Sample across the Longitudinal Study 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 
 
Age 
 
11% (18-24 yrs) 
38% (25-34 yrs) 
25% (35-44 yrs) 
12% (45-54 yrs) 
14% (55-74 yrs) 
 
8% (18-24 yrs) 
42% (25-34 yrs) 
25% (35-44 yrs) 
10% (45-54 yrs) 
15% (55-74 yrs) 
 
6% (18-24 yrs) 
44% (25-34 yrs) 
24% (35-44 yrs) 
10% (45-54 yrs) 
16% (55-74 yrs) 
 
10% (18-24 yrs) 
42% (25-34 yrs) 
24% (35-44 yrs) 
9% (45-54 yrs) 
15% (55-74 yrs) 
Ethnicity 74% (White) 
10% (Black) 
5% (Hispanic) 
8% (Asian) 
3% (Other) 
 
75% (White) 
7% (Black) 
7% (Hispanic) 
7% (Asian) 
4% (Other) 
76% (White) 
7% (Black) 
6% (Hispanic) 
7% (Asian) 
4% (Other) 
75% (White) 
8% (Black) 
6% (Hispanic) 
7% (Asian) 
4% (Other) 
Country 98.5% (US) 
1% (Canada) 
0.5% (Australia) 
100% (US) 
 
100% (US) 
 
100% (US) 
 
Education 0.5% (HS) 
8% (HS diploma) 
4% (Voc. training) 
19% (College) 
68.5% (College 
degree) 
 
1% (HS) 
12% (HS diploma) 
6% (Voc. training) 
17% (College) 
64% (College 
degree) 
 
1% (HS) 
13% (HS diploma) 
5% (Voc. training) 
15% (College) 
66% (College 
degree) 
 
12% (HS diploma) 
4% (Voc. training) 
16% (College) 
68% (College 
degree) 
 
Mental 
Health 
History 
24% dx 
6.5% multiple dx 
20% current dx 
20% family history 
of BD 
 
 
 
27% dx 
10% multiple dx 
23% current dx 
25% family history 
of BD 
 
27% dx 
10% multiple dx 
23% current dx 
24% family history 
of BD 
 
25% dx 
10% multiple dx 
22% current dx 
24% family history 
of BD 
 
Notes. All demographic information was self-reported. Yrs = years; US = United States; HS = some 
high school completed; HS diploma = high school diploma; voc. training = trade/technical/vocational 
training; college = some college completed; dx = past self-reported diagnosis of mental disorder; 
current dx = current self-reported diagnosis of mental disorder; family history of BD = self-reported 
family history of bipolar disorder. 
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within the questionnaires for each time-point, depending on the length of the study session. If 
participants answered one or more of these questions incorrectly, they were not invited to complete 
Time 2-4, and their results were excluded from study analyses (n = 3).  
Materials 
A summary of the materials and the timing of their administration in Study 2 is shown in 
Figure 2.1. The 6-week longitudinal period was chosen primarily because the life events measure 
included in this study probed for events occurring over the previous four weeks (see below for 
further details of this measure). Thus, four weeks was the minimum required length for the study 
period, in order to assess change in mood symptoms as a function of life events reported by 
participants. However, given the overall objectives of this study, a 6-week time period was chosen.  
Here, participants were asked to complete one study session every two weeks, for a total of four 
sessions. This two-week interval between time-points was intended to provide sufficient opportunity 
to observe the incidence of mood symptoms among participants.  
Risk for Mania. Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). The HPS 
has been described previously. Cut-off scores used to delineate high (HPS ≥ 33) and low (HPS ≤ 21) 
mania risk have been well validated by previous research (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Kwapil et al., 
2000). In particular, a number of studies suggest that cases of high-risk scorers generalize to clinical 
samples of diagnosed bipolar disorder (e.g., Kwapil et al., 2000; Merikangas et al., 2007). The 
current study did not exclude participants who fell between these cut-offs (32 ≤ HPS ≥ 21) and 
ostensibly fit within a ‘moderate risk’ category, in order to permit examination of a wide range of 
effects. Similar to Study 1, the HPS was utilized as a continuous measure of mania risk within 
statistical analyses. The HPS was administered only during Time 1 of this study. 
Current Mood Symptoms. Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (ASRM; Altman et al., 1997). The 
ASRM has also been described previously in Study 1. This scale was administered at each of the four 
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Baseline 4 weeks 6 weeks 
Time 1:  
o Demographics 
o HPS 
o ASRM 
o DASS-21 
 
2 weeks 
Time 2:  
o ASRM 
o DASS-21 
o PDST 
o LES 
o RSEI 
 
Time 3:  
o ASRM 
o DASS-21 
o PDST 
o MIP 
o CDS 
o PBS 
o RSEI 
 
Time 4:  
o ASRM 
o DASS-21 
o LES 
o RSEI 
 
Figure 2.1 
Schematic Representation of Timeline and Design of Study 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale;  
DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales-21, Depression subscale; LES = Life Events 
Survey; RSEI = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory; CDS = Cognitive Distortions Scale; PBS = 
Positive Belief Statements Scale.  
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time-points of the present study to probe the presence of manic symptoms over the previous week.  
Depression subscale of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 Depression subscale, described previously in Study 1, was also 
administered at each of the four time-points of Study 2 to assess participants’ level of depressive 
symptoms over the previous week. See Study 1 for more detailed information about this scale.  
Self-Schema Structure. Psychological Distance Scaling Task (PDST; Dozois & Dobson, 
2001b). The PDST was once again employed as a measure of self-schema structure in the current 
study. Participants were asked to complete this task at two time-points (i.e., Time 2 and Time 3), in 
order to examine reliability of self-schema structure measurement, in addition to investigating other 
relations of interest. Further information about the PDST is provided in Study 1. 
Self-Schema Content. Belief Statements Questionnaire – Fulfillment subscale (Hillson, 
1997). This subscale of the Beliefs Statements Questionnaire was administered to participants during 
Time 3 of the present study to assess for the presence of adaptive beliefs related to achievement. For 
further information about this measure, see Study 1. 
Cognitive Distortions Scale (CDS; Covin, Dozois, Ogniewicz, & Seeds, 2011). Similar to 
Study 1, the CDS was utilized in the present study to examine cognitive distortions among 
individuals at different levels of mania risk. More detailed information about this measure can be 
found in Study 1. 
Life Events. Life Events Scale (LES; Alloy & Clements, 1992; Needles & Abramson, 1990). 
The Life Events Scale is a self-report measure that has been used in previous research to examine life 
events that are highly relevant to mania. An expanded version of this scale was employed in the 
present research, similar to the approach taken by previous researchers (e.g., Bender et al., 2010). 
This version of the LES was used because it contains a longer, 193-item form that probes for 
various kinds of life events that are not exclusive to negative or ‘stressful’ events. This is important, 
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given previous findings implicating certain positive life events (i.e., achievement, BAS-activating 
events) in the course of manic symptoms. In the current study, the LES probed for events occurring 
over the previous 4 weeks. As seen in Figure 2.1, this scale was administered at Times 2 and 4 in 
order to assess the relation between life events and mood symptoms (at Time 2), as well as life 
events and change in mood symptoms (i.e., change in symptoms from Time 2 to Time 4, based on 
life events reported at Time 4).   
The LES’s 193 items probe for events occurring in a number of different life domains (e.g., 
education, employment, finances, housing, caretaking, family, interpersonal/romantic relationships). 
The specified events vary along a number of dimensions, including valence (i.e., positive, negative) 
and content (e.g., achievement, interpersonal). A number of events were also intended to correspond 
with BAS Activation (e.g., Positive evaluation of work performance by someone other than a family 
member or a friend [e.g., yearly review, concert review in newspaper, etc.]), BAS Deactivation (e.g., 
Betrayed by boyfriend/ girlfriend/ spouse [e.g., lied to; cheated; important promise broken]), and 
Goal Attainment (e.g., Finished an important project, task, or venture that is related to school, work, 
hobby, etc.). Previous research has validated these categories using a priori team ratings, which have 
been associated with good interrater agreement. In particular, the consistencies among three 
independent raters were as follows: α = .79 for BAS Activation, α = .94 for BAS Deactivation, and α 
= .91 for Goal Attainment (Urošević, et al., 2011). Likewise, rating schemes have also been 
developed and validated to address the objective impact of events. Based on the consensus of 
independent raters, Objective Impact Ratings (OIRs) have been developed for each life event along a 
4-point scale, ranging from 0(no or slight impact) to 4(extreme impact) (Bender et al., 2010). 
At the beginning of the LES questionnaire, general instructions ask participants to indicate 
whether the specified events occurred over the past 4 weeks, regardless of how they “responded to, 
coped with, or felt after an event or situation”, and whether or not they consider the event or 
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situation “important”. Specifically, participants are asked to select No, did not occur or Yes, did 
occur for each life event presented (e.g., Kicked out of school; Received an "A" on an exam or major 
project in an important class; Put off major current life goal due to lack of money e.g., going to 
school; moving out of parents' house; etc.; Began relationship with new boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse). 
If participants selected Yes, did occur for a given event, they were then asked to indicate the number 
of occurrences of the event. 
The LES has demonstrated good reliability and validity (e.g., Alloy, Reilly-Harrington, et al., 
1999; Francis-Raniere et al., 2006, Safford et al., 2007). The gold-standard for administering this tool 
to index and contextualize life events is to use an accompanying interview (Francis-Raniere et al., 
2006). Since this was an initial examination of life events as they pertain to mania and self-schema 
constructs, and high levels of recruitment were prioritized given the low base rate of high HPS 
scorers, only the self-report measure was used in this dissertation as a measure of life events. 
Self-Esteem Variability. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (RSEI; Rosenberg, 1965). The 
RSEI was administered to participants at Times 2 to 4 to examine self-esteem stability over time. 
This self-report instrument consists of 10 items (e.g., I am able to do things as well as most other 
people, All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure). For each item, participants were asked to 
rate the statement using a 4-point Likert scale, from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. In a daily 
diary version that has been used in previous research (e.g., Knowles et al., 2007), this scale prompts 
respondents to consider their momentary self-esteem judgments (i.e., think of whether the statement 
applies to them “as of right now”).  
The RSEI is a widely used measure of self-esteem in psychological research studies. The 
English version of this scale, as well as a number of its translations, have been associated with good 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability (e.g., Martín-Albo et al., 2007; Sinclair et al., 2010). In 
addition, the convergent validity of this measure is supported by numerous studies examining 
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relationships between the RSEI and well-being indicators. For example, the RSEI has shown 
negative relationships with constructs such as depression and perceived stress, and positive 
relationships with life satisfaction and optimism (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001).  
Mood Induction Procedure (MIP). The positive MIP (Tharp et al., 2016) that was utilized in 
Study 1 was also employed in the present study. Since it was initially hypothesized that a positive 
mood state would be necessary to activate mania-relevant cognitions, participants engaged in this 
guided imagination task prior to completing measures of schema content. For more detailed 
information about this task, please refer to Study 1 and Appendix B. 
Procedure 
Ethics approval for the study was granted prior to participant enrolment (see Appendix C). 
MTurk users were able to view an advertisement and proceed to the study website if they met the 
inclusion criteria. The Letter of Information contained details about the four study phases and 
informed participants that they may or may not be asked to continue with the entire longitudinal 
study. For each of the four time-points, participants were presented with an introductory video 
similar to Study 1, in which the experimenter introduced herself and provided a brief description of 
the activities for that phase. Participants were then directed to the relevant questionnaires and tasks, 
which were presented in randomized order. The only exception was during Time 3, when the CDS 
and PBS were always presented in the same sequential order following the MIP. The rationale for 
this consistent ordering was described previously for Study 1. Finally, at the end of each study 
session, participants were directed to a debriefing page with information about the project and when 
they might be contacted about future study phases.  
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Study 2 – Results and Discussion 
The descriptive statistics (sample size, means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas) for the 
major measures of Study 2 can be found in Appendix F, for each of the 4 time-points of the study.  
Similar to Study 1, the present findings are consistent with values reported in previous research, with 
the Study 2 measures also displaying good psychometric properties.  
Replication Findings for Relations between Mania and Self-Schema Content and Structure 
Overall, the results for the present study were consistent with Study 1 findings indicating that 
significant relations exist between mania risk and self-schema components. The details of these 
analyses are summarized in Table 2.2.  
Structure. As shown in Table 2.2, block regression findings were replicated in Study 2 for 
self-schema structure, suggesting that high mania risk corresponded with tightly organized, positive 
self-schema content, even after controlling for recent mood symptoms. Significant effects were 
observed in Study 2 for overall positive structure and achievement structure. However, these results 
for positive interpersonal structure were non-significant in the present study.  
In addition, mania risk did not add to the prediction of negative self-schema structure. This is 
consistent with the results of Study 1, in which there was only a non-significant trend (p = .06) 
associated with the HPS as a predictor of negative interpersonal structure. Of note, however, in Study 
2 there was a significant bivariate correlation between mania risk and negative achievement structure, 
r  = -.24, p = .02. The direction of this relation is consistent with the non-significant trend observed in 
Study 1, in which high mania risk corresponded with highly interconnected negative content.  
Content. For the self-schema content measures included in the present study (i.e., CDS, 
PBS), no significant effects of mania risk were observed within the block regression analyses (see 
Table 2.2). This is somewhat inconsistent with Study 1 results, where a small, significant 
contribution of the HPS was documented for self-schema cognitive distortions within the  
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Table 2.2 
Study 2 Replication of Regression Results for Self-Schema Constructs of Structure and Content 
Self-Schema 
Construct Block 1 
Block 2 
Change 
Block 3 
Change 
Overall Model and 
Predictors 
 
Overall 
Positive 
Structure 
 
F = 21.47*** 
R2 = .14 
 
 
F-change = 6.19* 
R2 change = .04 
 
F-change = 7.0** 
R2 change = .05 
 
F = 12.27*** 
R2 = .22 
Depression (.43)*** 
Mania (-.15)+ 
Mania Risk (-.23)** 
Positive 
Achievement 
Structure 
F = 21.45*** 
R2 = .14 
 
F-change = 4.86* 
R2 change = .03 
F-change = 7.94** 
R2 change = .05 
F = 12.12*** 
R2 = .22 
Depression (.44)*** 
Mania (-.09) 
Mania Risk (-.25)** 
Positive 
Interpersonal 
Structure 
F = 12.35** 
R2 = .09 
 
F-change = 5.29* 
R2 change = .04 
F-change = 2.82 
R2 change = .02 
F = 7.04** 
R2 = .18 
Depression (.33)*** 
Mania (-.14) 
Mania Risk (-.16)+ 
Overall 
Negative 
Structure 
F = 39.63*** 
R2 = .32 
 
F-change = 1.12 
R2 change = .01 
F-change = 0.20 
R2 change = .00 
F = 13.54*** 
R2 = .33 
Depression (-.59)*** 
Mania (-.11) 
Mania Risk (.04) 
Negative 
Achievement 
Structure 
F = 48.33*** 
R2 = .33 
 
F-change = 1.33 
R2 change = .01 
F-change = 0.06 
R2 change = .00 
F = 16.58 
R2 = .18 
Depression (-.60)*** 
Mania (-.10) 
Mania Risk (.02) 
Negative 
Interpersonal 
Structure 
F = 21.43*** 
R2 = .17 
 
F-change = 0.80 
R2 change = .01 
F-change = 0.20 
R2 change = .00 
F = 7.41 
R2 = .17 
Depression (-.44)*** 
Mania (-.09) 
Mania Risk (.09) 
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Cognitive 
Distortions – 
Achievement 
F = 22.58*** 
R2 = .17 
 
F-change = 5.34* 
R2 change = .04 
F-change = 2.48 
R2 change = .02 
F = 10.55** 
R2 = .23 
Depression (.37)*** 
Mania (.18)* 
Mania Risk (.14) 
Cognitive 
Distortions – 
Interpersonal 
F = 31.01*** 
R2 = .22 
 
F-change = 4.24* 
R2 change = .04 
F-change = 1.34 
R2 change = .01 
F = 12.54*** 
R2 = .26 
Depression (.44)*** 
Mania (.15)+ 
Mania Risk (.10) 
Self-Referent 
Adaptive 
Beliefs - 
Achievement 
F = 55.10*** 
R2 = .33 
 
F-change = 0.01 
R2 change = .00 
F-change = 1.18 
R2 change = .01 
F = 18.62*** 
R2 = .35 
Depression (-.61)*** 
Mania (-.02) 
Mania Risk (.09) 
Notes. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression coefficients. 
Depressive and manic symptoms were entered in Block 1 and 2, respectively. To control for the role 
of concurrent mood symptoms in Block 1 and 2, Time 2 depressive/manic symptoms were entered as 
predictors for self-schema structure regression analyses, and Time 3 depressive/manic symptoms 
were predictors for self-schema content analyses (corresponding to the time-points when these 
schema constructs were measured during the study). Mania risk (i.e., Hypomanic Personality Scale) 
was entered in Block 3 of the regression equations.  
N = 132-136. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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interpersonal domain. In the current study, this result trended towards significance (p = .07). 
However, significant bivariate correlations in Study 2 indicated that heightened risk for mania 
corresponded with greater endorsement of self-schema cognitive distortions within both the 
achievement (r = .29, p = .001) and interpersonal (r = .23, p = .01) domains, consistent with the 
results of Study 1. Finally, neither mania risk nor manic symptoms in Study 2 predicted adaptive 
beliefs about achievement, as in the previous study. 
Role of Mood Symptoms. Depressive symptoms in Study 2 again corresponded with poor 
consolidation of positive self-schema content as well as highly consolidated negative self-schema 
content. Higher levels of depressive symptoms were also associated with more cognitive distortions 
in achievement and interpersonal contexts (see Table 2.2). Likewise, manic symptoms in Study 2 also 
corresponded with schema constructs in the expected manner (i.e., greater connectivity regarding 
positive self-schema structure and higher levels of cognitive distortions). Similar to Study 1, manic 
symptoms often contributed to the prediction of schema constructs in Block 2, and occasionally lost 
significance as a predictor, once mania risk was added in Block 3.  
Self-Schema Structure and the Prediction of Future Increases in Manic Symptoms 
The impetus for a longitudinal component in the current study was to examine temporal 
relations between the self-schema constructs (structure and content) and mood symptomatology. As 
such, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to investigate whether positive self-schema 
structure, in particular, was predictive of future increases in manic symptoms. Block 1 controlled for 
previous manic symptoms, and positive self-schema structure components were entered as predictors 
in Block 2 of individual regression equations. Since self-schema structure was initially assessed at  
Time 2, Time 2 manic symptoms were entered in Block 1 and the three positive PDST scores from 
Time 2 were entered in Block 2 of individual regressions predicting Time 3 or Time 4 manic 
symptoms. A summary of these analyses is presented in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 
Study 2 Regression Findings for Self-Schema Structure Predicting Future Increases in Manic 
Symptoms 
Schema 
Construct 
Time 3  Time 4 
Block 1 Block 2  Block 1 Block 2 
 
Overall 
Positive 
Structure 
 
F = 59.78*** 
R2 = .34 
 
ASRM2 (.59)*** 
 
F-change = 2.21 
R2 change-= .01 
 
ASRM2 (.52)*** 
PDST-P (-.12) 
 
 
 
F = 62.71*** 
R2 = .38 
 
ASRM2 (.63)*** 
 
F-change = 3.51+ 
R2 change = .02 
 
ASRM2 (.60)*** 
PDST-P (-0.16)* 
Positive 
Achievement 
Structure 
 
F-change = 0.60 
R2 change = .00 
 
ASRM2 (.57)*** 
PDST-A (-.06) 
 
 
 
F-change = 1.56 
R2 change = .01 
 
ASRM2 (.61)*** 
PDST-A (-.10) 
Positive 
Interpersonal 
Structure 
 
F-change = 6.90* 
R2 change = .03 
 
ASRM2 
(0.55)***	
PDST-I (-0.18)*	
 
 
F-change = 5.70** 
R2 change = .04 
 
ASRM2 (.59)***	
PDST-I (-.20)** 
Notes. ASRM2 = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale, Time 2 Symptoms; PDST = Psychological 
Distance Scaling Task, PDST-P = Overall Positive Structure, PDST-A = Achievement Structure, PDST-I = 
Interpersonal Structure. Time 3 and Time 4 manic symptoms were the dependent variables in 
regression equations for Time 2 – Time 3 and Time 2 – Time 4 change in symptoms, respectively.  
* = p < .05, **p < .01, *** = p < .001. 
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The findings in Table 2.3 indicate that overall positive and positive interpersonal self-schema 
structure contributed to the prediction of future manic symptoms in the expected direction. 
Specifically, higher connectivity of positive self-beliefs predicted increases in manic symptoms at 
both Time 3 and Time 4 for positive interpersonal structure. However, overall positive self-schema 
structure only predicted increases in manic symptoms at Time 4, whereas positive achievement 
structure was not a significant predictor for either Time 3 or 4. When taken together, these 
longitudinal results of Study 2 support the potential role of positive self-schema structure in 
contributing to the course of manic symptoms. In turn, this pattern of findings challenges a 
methodological concern that any self-schema differences among those at high mania risk may solely 
reflect current manic symptomatology.  
Mediating Role of Self-Schema Components. The longitudinal component of the current 
study also replicates and extends the Study 1 cross-sectional results concerning the mediating role of 
self-schema components within maladaptive pathways. In particular, overall positive self-schema 
structure in the current study fully mediated the relation between mania risk and future (i.e., Time 4) 
manic symptoms. These longitudinal mediation results are displayed in Figure 2.2a. Similar to Study 
1, higher HPS scores in Study 2 led to greater connectivity of positive content (measured at Time 2), 
which, in turn, led to higher levels of Time 4 manic symptoms. To control for previous levels of 
manic symptoms within this model, Time 2 manic symptoms were entered as a covariate (β = .61, p 
< .001). Of note, the mediation model was not significant for the prediction of Time 3 manic 
symptoms (CI = -.0188 to .0595).  
Moreover, cognitive distortions again mediated the relation between mania risk and 
depression, but in the current study this was also shown for future depressive symptoms. As 
displayed in Figure 2.2b, high mania risk predicted greater cognitive distortions in the interpersonal 
domain (measured at Time 3), which, in turn, predicted higher levels of Time 4 depressive symptoms  
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0.20* 
 
Mania Risk 
 
T4 Depressive 
Symptoms 
Achievement 
Cognitive 
Distortions 
0.50*** 
0.32*** (0.26*) 
0.24*** -0.32* 
Interpersonal 
Cognitive 
Distortions 
Figure 2.2a 
Longitudinal Mediation Results for Manic Symptoms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented 
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effect for Overall Positive Structure was β = .05*. *p < .05 
 
 
Figure 2.2b 
Longitudinal Mediation Results for Depressive Symptoms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented 
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Achievement Cognitive Distortions,   
β = -.08; Interpersonal Cognitive Distortions, β = .10*; Total indirect effect, β = .02. *p < .05,     
***p  <.001 
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(when controlling for previous levels of depressive symptoms at Time 3, β = .68, p < .001). This 
pattern resembled Study 1 findings. However, contrary to the results of Study 1, the indirect effect for 
achievement cognitive distortions was not significant within this multiple mediation model (CI = -
.2044 to .0008). In addition, Study 1 results indicated that cognitive distortions (in both domains) 
fully mediated pathways from mania risk to depressive symptoms, whereas the current results were 
consistent with a partial mediation effect. Overall, these longitudinal findings provide more robust 
support compared to the Study 1 cross-sectional results, concerning the theorized meditational 
models advanced in the present dissertation. 
Moderating Role of Adaptive Self-Schema Content. In the current study, recall that only 
the PBS was included as a measure of adaptive self-schema content. Thus, Study 2 permitted an 
examination of the PBS as a potential protective factor concerning future mood symptoms. Similar to 
Study 1, the PBS did not significantly moderate between the HPS and manic symptoms, but in this 
instance for future manic symptoms measured at Time 4, β = .03, t = 0.69, p = .79. However, in the 
present investigation, the PBS (measured at Time 3) was a significant moderator between mania risk 
and future depressive symptoms at Time 4, when controlling for previous (Time 3) depressive 
symptoms, β = -.19, t = -2.67, p .01 (see Figure 2.3). There was also a significant main effect of the 
HPS (β = .13, t = 2.19, p = .03), but not the PBS (β = -.13, t = -1.68, p = .10), in which high levels of 
mania risk corresponded with high levels of depressive symptoms. Tests of simple slopes suggest that 
high mania risk was only associated with greater depressive symptoms among individuals who also 
displayed low adaptive beliefs about success, t = 2.77, p = .007. Thus, this pattern is consistent with 
the PBS having a protective role in the course of depressive symptoms among individuals with high 
temperamental vulnerability to mania.  
Mania Risk and Temporal Stability of Self-Schema Structure  
The longitudinal component of Study 2 also permitted examination of the temporal stability 
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Figure 2.3 
Adaptive Self-Referent Beliefs about Success Moderate the Relation between Mania Risk and 
Depressive Symptoms 
 
Notes. Analysis controlled for the influence of previous depressive symptoms (Time 3). T4 = Time 4; 
HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; PBS = Positive Beliefs Statements. **p < .01 
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of self-schema structure among individuals at heightened risk for mania. For the total sample, there 
were moderate to strong correlations between participants’ Time 2 and Time 3 PDST scores (r = .55 
to .90; see Table 2.4), suggesting good overall temporal stability of self-schema structure, as 
measured by the PDST. This finding is consistent with previous research that has reported on the 
stability of self-schema structure across time (e.g., Dozois & Dobson, 2001a; Dozois, 2007).  
To examine whether mania risk may be associated with reduced temporal stability of self-
schema structure, difference scores were created for each PDST domain, in which absolute 
differences between Time 2 and Time 3 scores were calculated. Subsequently, block regression 
analyses were conducted to determine whether mania risk predicted difference scores, while 
controlling for participants’ initial PDST scores. Thus, Time 2 PDST scores were entered in the first 
block of these regression analyses, and HPS scores were entered in the second block. As shown in 
Table 2.4, the HPS significantly predicted difference scores for overall positive structure, as well as 
positive and negative achievement structure, suggesting that heightened mania risk is modestly 
associated with less stable measurement of self-schema structure in these areas. 
Mania Risk as a Predictor of Self-Esteem Stability 
Relatedly, another supplementary hypothesis of Study 2 concerns the stability of self-esteem. 
Recall that limited research suggests that individuals with a history or risk of mania display more 
variable levels of self-esteem compared to control participants (e.g., van der Gucht et al., 2009). The 
results of the current study are in line with this finding. In particular, elevated HPS scores predicted 
high fluctuations in self-esteem. Block regression results indicated that the HPS positively predicted 
variance in participants’ self-esteem ratings across the study period after controlling for initial self-
esteem levels (β = .35, p < .001), and even after controlling for a participant’s average levels of 
depressive and manic symptoms (β = .28, p = .004). Average levels of manic symptoms (β = .27, p = 
.01), but not depressive symptoms (β = .18, p = .18), also positively predicted self-esteem  
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Table 2.4 
Temporal Reliability of PDST Domains and Relation to Mania Risk 
PDST Domain	 Overall Temporal Reliability	
Predicting Difference Scores from Mania Risk	
Block 1	 Block 2 
Overall Positive r = .71** F = 3.59 
R2 = .03 
 
PDST-P2 (-.18) 
	
F-change = 5.88* 
R2 change = .05 
 
HPS (.22)* 
 
Overall Negative r = .90** F = 2.96 
R2 = .04 
 
PDST-N2 (.21) 
	
F-change = 0.01 
R2 change = .00 
 
HPS (-.01) 
 
Positive Achievement r = .75** F = 0.08 
R2 = .00 
 
PDST-A2 (.04) 
	
F-change = 6.75** 
R2 change = .06 
 
HPS (.24)** 
 
Positive Interpersonal r = .62** F = 11.48** 
R2 = .09 
 
PDST-I2 (-.30)** 
	
F-change = 2.16 
R2 change = .02 
 
HPS (.13) 
 
Negative Achievement	 r = .55**	 F = 7.31** 
R2 = .10 
 
PDST-NA2 (.32)** 
	
F-change = 4.86* 
R2 change = .06 
 
HPS (.25)* 
	
Negative Interpersonal	 r = .63**	 F = 1.80 
R2 = .02 
 
PDST-NI2 (.15) 
	
F-change = 0.13 
R2 change = .00 
 
HPS (.04) 
	
Notes. Temporal reliability and difference scores were calculated using PDST results from Time 2 
and Time 3. Block 1 controlled for a participant’s initial PDST score (i.e., Time 2) for the 
respective structure domain. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, PDST = Psychological Distance 
Scaling Task, PDST-A2 = Time 2 Positive Achievement Structure, PDST-I2 = Time 2 Positive 
Interpersonal Structure; PDST-N2 = Time 2 Negative Structure; PDST-NA2 = Time 2 Negative 
Achievement Structure; PDST-NI2 = Time 2 Negative Interpersonal Structure. *p < .05, **p < .01 
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fluctuations; however, neither predictor was significant after the HPS was entered into the block 
regression analysis (β = .11, p = .24 and β = .14, p = .33, respectively). Thus, overall, it appears that 
heightened risk for mania is associated with self-esteem instability, and this relation is robust 
compared to the influence of mood symptoms.  
As an aside, higher HPS scores were associated with lower mean levels of self-esteem, 
overall (i.e., averaging Time 2 to Time 4 measurements), r = -.20, p = .02. This finding is also 
consistent with previous research, in which individuals with bipolar disorder have generally shown 
lower levels of self-esteem compared to those with no history of disorder (see Nilsson et al., 2010). 
Self-Schema Structure and Self-Esteem Variability. To place the above findings related to 
the stability of self-schema organization within the context of self-esteem, Study 2 also examined 
how self-schema components assessed at the different time-points may predict momentary levels of 
self-esteem. These constructs showed the expected pattern, whereby higher levels of self-esteem at 
Time 2 were associated with Time 2 PDST scores representing highly interconnected, positive self-
schema content (r =-.46, p < .001) and loosely interconnected, negative self-schema content (r = .55, 
p < .001). The same pattern was shown for Time 3 self-esteem levels and Time 3 Overall Positive  
(r = -.40, p < .001) and Negative (r = .63, p < .001) PDST scores. These findings reinforce 
assumptions that self-schema organization of positive and negative content bears upon one’s 
momentary feelings of self-liking. 
Life Events and Mania 
A central research question addressed by this dissertation is whether self-schema components 
interact with life events to predict the course of mood symptoms. Recall that previous research 
implicates certain positive life events in the course of manic symptoms, particularly goal attainment 
and BAS-activating events (e.g., Johnson, 2008; Urošević et al., 2008). As summarized in Appendix 
F, in the present sample, simple correlations showed many of the expected, positive relationships 
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between positive life events (Positive, BAS-Activating, Goal Attainment) and concurrent or future 
manic symptoms. Conversely, the same relationships were not demonstrated among negative life 
events and manic symptoms. Instead, consistent with the literature, negative life events (Negative and 
BAS-Deactivating) shared positive relationships with concurrent/ future depressive symptoms (see 
Appendix G). 
Manic Symptoms: Testing for Interactions with Positive Self-Schema Structure by Life Events 
To comprehensively evaluate a vulnerability-stress model of mania, Study 2 examined 
whether self-schema components interacted with life events and mania risk to predict the course of 
manic symptoms. Recall that it was hypothesized that individuals with certain self-schema 
characteristics (e.g., tightly organized positive content) would show high prevalence of manic 
symptoms, when activated by positive life events and at higher levels of mania risk (indexed by the 
HPS).  
To test these predictions, sets of three-way interaction effects were examined in the present 
study. Recall that life events were measured at both Time 2 and Time 4, with each time-point probing 
for events occurring over the prior four weeks. Thus, it was possible to examine: (i) the relation 
between life events (reported at Time 2) and concurrent manic symptoms (assessed at Time 2), and 
(ii) change in manic symptoms (between Time 2 and Time 4) as a function of the various life events 
(reported at Time 4). For concurrent mood symptoms, individual predictors were entered in Block 1, 
two-way interaction terms were entered in Block 2, and the three-way interaction was entered in 
Block 3 of the regression analyses. For predicting change in manic symptoms over time, Time 2 
manic symptoms were entered in Block 1, individual predictors were entered in Block 2, and two-
way and three-way interaction terms were entered in Blocks 3 and 4, respectively. For all analyses, 
Overall Positive PDST scores from Time 2 (when first assessed) were utilized as predictors for self-
schema structure. All predictors were centered prior to conducting the above analyses. 
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Concurrent Symptoms. As summarized in Table 2.5, there were no significant three-way or 
two-way interactions for Time 2 life events predicting concurrent (Time 2) manic symptoms. 
However, there were significant main effects of the HPS, self-schema structure, and positive and goal 
attainment events, whereby greater mania risk, highly interconnected positive self-schema content, 
and greater life events corresponded with higher levels of manic symptoms reported at Time 2. 
Prospective Increases in Manic Symptoms. For life events reported at Time 4 predicting 
change in manic symptoms between Time 2 and 4, there were no significant three-way interactions 
for any of the life events studied. However, there were two significant interaction effects associated 
with positive and goal attainment events, concerning the relation between these life events and 
positive self-schema structure (see Table 2.6 for details). Similar to the above results for concurrent 
manic symptoms, there were also main effects of life events and positive self-schema structure.  
Tests of simple slopes were conducted to examine the nature of the significant two-way 
interaction effects. As displayed in Figure 2.4a and 2.4b, for both positive and goal events, slopes 
representing high interconnectivity of positive self-schema content significantly differed from zero, 
whereas slopes corresponding with low interconnectivity did not. Consistent with what was 
hypothesized, these results suggest that greater positive and goal attainment events were associated 
with increases in manic symptoms over time, but only among individuals with tightly organized, 
positive self-schema content. 
Specific Domains of Self-Schema Structure. Follow-up analyses were conducted in light of 
these significant moderation results to examine more specific domains of positive self-schema 
content. As such, the above analyses for positive and goal attainment events were repeated for 
positive content parsed in the achievement and interpersonal domains. Results of these analyses 
indicated that positive achievement self-schema structure significantly interacted with both positive  
(β = -.18, p = .04) and goal events (β = -.19, p = .03). Conversely, the interaction terms for  
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Table 2.5 
Moderation Results for Concurrent Manic Symptoms (Time 2): Positive Self-Schema Structure x Positive Life 
Events 
Predictor ΔF ΔR2 β Final Model 
 
Positive Events 
  Block 1: 
     HPS  
     T2 PDST-P  
     T2 LES-P 
  Block 2: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P 
     HPS x T2 LES-P 
     T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-P  
  Block 3: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-P  
 
  
6.64*** 
 
 
 
0.78 
 
 
 
1.41 
 
 
 
  
 .44 
 
 
 
.02 
 
 
 
.03 
 
 
  
  
.26**  
-.19* 
.19* 
 
.08 
-.14 
.01 
 
-.01 
 
 
 
(.24)** 
   (-.22)* 
(.18)* 
 
(.08) 
   (-.14) 
(.02) 
 
R2 = .39, F(7, 124) = 3.14** 
BAS-Activating Events 
  Block 1: 
     HPS  
     T2 PDST-P  
     T2 LES-B 
  Block 2: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P 
     HPS x T2 LES-B 
     T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-B  
  Block 3: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-B  
6.24** 
 
 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
 
0.03 
 
.13 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
 
 
.00 
 
 
 
.25**  
-.20* 
-.01 
 
 
.11 
-.12 
.03 
 
-.03 
 
 
(.26)** 
(-.25)* 
(.07) 
 
 
(.11) 
   (-.11) 
(.06) 
 
R2 = .14, F(7, 124) = 2.92** 
Goal Attainment Events 
  Block 1: 
     HPS  
     T2 PDST-P  
     T2 LES-G 
  Block 2: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P 
     HPS x T2 LES-G 
     T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-G  
  Block 3: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P x T2 LES-G 
 
6.78** 
 
 
 
0.58 
 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
.14 
 
 
 
.01 
 
 
 
.00 
 
 
 
.25**  
-.18* 
.18* 
 
.08 
-.09 
.03 
 
.01 
 
 
 
(-.21)* 
(.23)** 
(.18)* 
 
(.11) 
(-.11) 
(.06) 
 
R2 = .15, F(7, 124) = 3.10** 
 
Notes. Values in parentheses represent Block 4 regression coefficients. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; 
T2 = Time 2; PDST-P = Psychological Distance Scaling Task, Positive Structure; LES = Life Events Scale; 
LES-P = Positive Events; LES- B = BAS-Activating Events; LES-G = Goal Events. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p 
< .001 
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Table 2.6 
Moderation Results for Time 2- Time 4 Change in Manic Symptoms: Positive Self-Schema Structure x Positive 
Life Events 
Predictor ΔF ΔR2 β Final Model 
 
Positive Events 
  Block 1: 
     T2 ASRM 
  Block 2: 
     HPS  
     T2 PDST-P  
     T4 LES-P 
  Block 3: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P 
     HPS x T4 LES-P 
     T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-P  
  Block 4: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-P  
 
  
64.15*** 
 
3.29* 
 
 
 
1.58 
 
 
 
0.20 
 
  
 .40 
 
.06 
 
 
 
.03 
 
 
 
.00 
 
 
  
  
.63***   
 
.09 
-.17* 
.19* 
 
-.06 
.03 
-.16* 
 
.05 
 
 
 
(.55)*** 
 
(.04) 
(-.27)* 
(.23)* 
 
(-.08) 
(.06) 
 (-.22)* 
 
R2 = .49, F(8, 117) = 10.53*** 
 
BAS-Activating Events 
  Block 1: 
     T2 ASRM 
  Block 2: 
     HPS  
     T2 PDST-P  
     T4 LES-B 
  Block 3: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P 
     HPS x T4 LES-B 
     T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-B 
  Block 4: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-P  
 
 
64.15*** 
 
1.58 
 
 
 
0.05 
 
 
 
0.10 
 
 
.40 
 
.03 
 
 
 
.00 
 
 
 
.00 
 
 
 
 
.67***   
 
.04 
-.15 
-.05 
 
-.01 
-.04 
-.07 
 
.06 
 
 
 
(.57)*** 
 
(.05) 
(-.15) 
(-.05) 
 
(-.01) 
(-.30)* 
(0.21)+ 
 
R2 = .43, F(8, 117) = 8.44*** 
 
Goal Attainment Events 
  Block 1: 
     T2 ASRM 
  Block 2: 
     HPS  
     T2 PDST-P  
     T4 LES-G 
  Block 3: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P 
     HPS x T4 LES-G 
     T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-G 
  Block 4: 
     HPS x T2 PDST-P x T4 LES-G 
 
 
64.15*** 
 
3.14* 
 
 
 
2.06 
 
 
 
1.04 
 
 
.39 
 
.06 
 
 
 
.04 
 
 
 
.01 
 
 
 
 
.63***   
 
.09 
-.16* 
.18* 
 
.04 
-.08 
-.30* 
 
.13 
 
 
 
(.56)*** 
 
(.08) 
(-.32)* 
 (.22)* 
 
(.11) 
(-.11) 
(-.30)* 
 
R2 = .49, F(8, 117) = 10.96*** 
Notes. Values in parentheses represent Block 4 regression coefficients. ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania 
Scale; PDST-P = Psychological Distance Scaling Task, Positive Structure; LES = Life Events Scale; LES-P = 
Positive Events; LES- B = BAS-Activating Events; LES-G = Goal Events. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Figure 2.4a 
Positive Self-Schema Structure Interacts with Positive Events to Predict Increases in Manic 
Symptoms 
 
Figure 2.4b 
Positive Self-Schema Structure Interacts with Goal Events to Predict Increases in Manic Symptoms 
 
Note. **p < .01 
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interpersonal structure were not significant for positive (β = -.13, p = .11) or goal events (β = -.15, p 
= .06). The results of simple slope tests and interpretation of the significant interaction effects for 
positive achievement structure were consistent with the above results for overall positive structure. 
Taken together, moderation results pertaining to positive self-schema structure suggest that 
increases in manic symptoms may be associated with positive events (i.e., general positive and goal 
attainment) when positive self-schema content is also highly interconnected. Within analyses of 
three-way interactions, mania risk as indexed by the HPS did not have a clear moderating role 
regarding the impact of positive events in the course of manic symptoms. One possibility is that there 
was not adequate power in this study to comprehensively examine the potential impact of mania risk 
within the context of life events and self-schema structure, since fewer than expected ‘high HPS’  
participants were retained in the longitudinal sample. Another consideration is that there may be 
considerable competition or overlap between the role of the HPS and positive self-schema structure 
as predictors regarding the trajectory of manic symptoms.  
Moreover, it is also unclear why there was a discrepancy between concurrent versus 
prospective manic symptoms in the above moderation results, whereby significant two-way 
interactions between life events and positive self-schema structure were only found for prospective 
increases in manic symptoms. One possibility is that examining the relation between life events and 
change in manic symptoms over time served as a more rigorous examination of these constructs, 
which may have resulted in greater precision and statistical power.  
Summary of Major Findings  
Study 2 replicated and extended major findings from Study 1 concerning aspects of self-
schema structure and content associated with mania. In the present study, positive self-schema 
structure again shared important relations with mania constructs. Longitudinal results also provided 
preliminary support for self-schema structure as an enduring vulnerability factor associated with 
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mania. Specifically, high connectivity of positive self-schema content predicted increases in manic 
symptoms over time. Regarding self-schema content, cognitive distortions in interpersonal/ 
achievement domains and adaptive beliefs about achievement also appeared relevant to the cognitive 
profile of mania, specifically in relation to depressive symptoms.  
Notably, the longitudinal component of Study 2 permitted examination of the stability of self-
schema characteristics over time. Greater mania risk was associated with less stable organization of 
overall positive content, as well as positive and negative content within the achievement domain, 
despite evidence that self-schema structure was a relatively stable characteristic within the current 
sample. Relatedly, high mania risk also corresponded with fluctuations in self-esteem over time, 
whereby self-schema structure was a strong predictor of momentary levels of self-esteem. 
Study 2 also provided an initial examination of the role of self-schema structure within a 
cognitive vulnerability-stress framework of mania, by considering the interaction between life events 
and the organization of positive self-schema content. These results indicated that self-schema 
structure moderated the relation between life events and change in manic symptoms over time, such 
that positive and goal events were associated with increases in manic symptoms among individuals 
with tightly organized, positive self-schema content. A role of positive achievement structure, in 
particular, was implicated in interactions with life events.  
Although it was anticipated that interactions between positive life events and self-schema 
constructs would only be observed at high levels of mania risk, this was not found in the current 
investigation. That is, three-way moderation results were not significant, suggesting that the HPS did 
not play a role in the interactions between life events and positive self-schema structure. Of note, the 
current sample was considerably smaller compared to Study 1, and sample attrition between Time 1 
and future study sessions resulted in fewer than expected ‘high HPS’ individuals participating in 
Study 2. Thus, it would be important to further examine relations between life events and schema 
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components within a larger sample, to assess whether a lack of significant three-way interactions 
involving mania risk may be attributed, at least in part, to low statistical power in the current study.  
In addition, the current study only included measures of self-schema content (i.e., CDS and 
PBS) that appear particularly relevant for the course of depressive symptoms, rather than manic 
symptoms within the context of mania risk. Thus, interactions between life events and self-schema 
content were not assessed in Study 2. As such, Study 3 will examine interactions between life events 
and self-schema content measures that have been used previously in Study 1 (i.e., dysfunctional 
attitudes about achievement and obsessive passion) that were hypothesized to be more important for 
the course of manic symptoms.  
Finally, the first two studies of this dissertation were conducted with samples drawn from the 
same population (i.e., an online, community sample). Thus, it would be important to examine 
relations between mania and self-schema components within an entirely different, non-clinical 
sample, in order to further assess whether the previous findings may be characteristic of a non-
clinical investigation of mania risk. 
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Chapter 4 
Study 3: Replication of Main Findings with a University Student Sample 
The third and final study in this dissertation focuses primarily on the sixth research question 
by examining whether the main findings demonstrated in the first two studies replicate when 
extended to a different, nonclinical sample. In doing so, the previously described set of research 
questions were examined in a university student sample to provide a further test of the empirical 
associations among mania risk, self-schema components, life events, and mood symptomatology. In 
this Study 3 examination of the constructs and hypotheses tested in the prior two studies, it was not 
expected that there would be marked differences between the main findings obtained for the previous 
two community samples, when compared with the current university sample.  
Hypotheses.  The hypotheses put forth in Study 3 derived from those advanced in Studies 1 
and 2. Specifically, it was anticipated that self-schema content and self-schema structure would both 
predict temperamental vulnerability to mania, after controlling for the influence of mood symptoms. 
Once again, tightly organized, positive self-schema content was expected to correspond with mania 
risk. However, in light of the findings obtained in Studies 1 and 2, it was not expected that this 
pattern of findings for positive self-schema structure would be restricted to content within the 
achievement domain. It was also predicted in Study 3 that the additional self-schema content 
examined in Study 1 (i.e., dysfunctional attitudes about achievement and obsessive passion) would 
once again be positively associated with mania risk in this current study. Moreover, it was again 
expected that self-schema constructs in Study 3 would play a significant role in the relations between 
mania risk and mood symptoms. In particular, it was anticipated that self-schema components would 
function as significant mediators in certain maladaptive pathways. In Study 3 these include positive 
self-schema structure, along with self-schema content of dysfunctional attitudes and obsessive 
passion, as significant mediators of manic symptoms. Consistent with earlier hypotheses, it was also 
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predicted that a putative protective factor, namely, harmonious passion, may moderate (rather than 
mediate) the relation between mania risk and manic symptoms within the present investigation. 
In Study 3, it was again posited that significant three-way interactions would be found 
concerning self-schema constructs, positive life events, and mania risk, when predicting manic 
symptoms. Despite some Study 2 evidence that does not support a role for the hypomanic personality 
(HPS) in these three-way interactions, it is suggested here that these Study 2 null findings may 
primarily relate to limited statistical power. This proposal is generally supported by other findings in 
Studies 1 and 2 that show a positive association between the HPS and manic symptoms.  
Furthermore, the results of Study 2 implicate self-schema structure, in particular, interacting 
with life events. As such, it was predicted that positive self-schema structure in Study 3 would again 
interact with positive life events to predict manic symptoms, with this pattern particularly noticeable 
among those at high risk for mania. In addition, Study 3 examines self-schema content (i.e., DAS and 
Obsessive Passion) that is hypothesized to interact with mania risk and positive life events to predict 
manic symptoms. However, recall here that a general hypothesis of this dissertation was that self-
schema structure may be more relevant to a cognitive vulnerability-stress model of mania, compared 
to self-schema content. 
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Method Study 3 
Participants 
Participants were students enrolled in an introductory Psychology course at The University of 
Western Ontario, who completed this study in exchange for course credit1. Five hundred and fifty-
three students signed up for the study, however results from 22 participants were excluded from 
analyses due to incorrect answers to careful responding questions (i.e., two or more incorrect 
responses to seven questions). Thus, 531 students (386 females, 145 males) comprised the final 
sample for the current study. The vast majority of participants were aged 18 to 24 years (98%), with 
only 2% of participants aged 25 to 44 years. Regarding ethnicity, 48% of participants identified as 
White, 40% as Asian, and 12% as another ethnicity. In terms of the mental health history of 
participants, 11% of individuals reported a past diagnosis of mental disorder, with 4% endorsing 
more than one diagnosis and 9% reporting a current diagnosis. A family history of bipolar-related 
disorder was also reported by 6% of participants. 
Materials 
 A list of the materials used in the current study is presented in Table 3.1. All of the measures 
employed in Study 3 were used in Study 1 and/or 2, and have been described in more detail in 
previous chapters of this dissertation. 
Mania Risk. The HPS (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) was again used in the present study as a 
continuous measure of temperamental risk for mania. For further details of this measure, please see 
Chapter 2 (Study 1). 
Mood Disorder Symptoms. The ASRM and DASS were also used in Study 3 to measure 
                                                
1
 This study was originally planned as a longitudinal investigation, similar to Study 2, to promote statistical power. 
However, the study design was modified such that only a cross-sectional examination was completed, due to significant 
attrition at the second time-point of the study occurring 3 weeks later (total n = 33 at Time 2).  
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Table 3.1 
Summary of Study 3 Materials 
Study Measure 
 
Hypomanic Personality Scale 
Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale 
DASS-21 – Depression subscale 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory 
Psychological Distance Scaling Task 
Life Events Survey 
Mood Induction Procedure 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale 
Passion Scale 
Note. DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales-21. 
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recent manic and depressive symptoms, respectively. Detailed information regarding these measures 
is also presented in Chapter 2.   
Life Events. As in Study 2, the expanded version of the LES was employed to examine 
various life events experienced by participants. In the present study, participants were asked to 
consider whether any of the specified life events had occurred over the previous 3 weeks. A detailed 
description of the LES is provided in Chapter 3 (Study 2).  
Mood Induction Procedure. The same positive MIP utilized in Study 1 and 2 was employed 
in the current study to promote the potential activation of self-schema content relevant to mania. This 
was implemented prior to understanding the impact of the MIP on the study of schema 
characteristics. For details, see Chapter 2 (Study 1) and Appendix B. 
Self-Schema Structure. Psychological Distance Scaling Task (PDST; Dozois & Dobson, 
2001b). The PDST was similarly employed as a measure of self-schema structure in the present 
study. See Chapter 2 (Study 1) for a detailed description of this task.  
Self-Schema Content. The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale and Passion Scale were again 
administered in the current study to examine aspects of self-schema content. Details regarding each 
of these measures can be found in Chapter 2 (Study 1). 
Procedure 
Ethics approval was obtained prior to participant recruitment (see Appendix H). Once they 
had viewed the advertisement, students could sign-up for the study and complete the study session 
online. After being directed to the study website and consenting to participate in the study, 
individuals were randomly presented with the mood symptom, mania risk, self-esteem, schema 
structure, and life event measures. Following the mood induction procedure, all participants 
completed the DAS and Passion Scale in that order, in light of previously explained considerations 
(see Chapter 2).  
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Study 3 – Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics (sample size, means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas) for the 
study measures are displayed in Appendix I.  
Replication Results for Relations between Mania and Schema Constructs 
In the current Study 3 university student sample, the major findings from Studies 1 and 2 
were replicated concerning relations between mania and self-schema constructs (see Table 3.2).  
Similar hierarchical regression analyses were again conducted in Study 3 to determine the 
contribution of mania risk to self-schema constructs, controlling for recent manic and depressive 
symptoms. As in Studies 1 and 2, heightened mania risk in Study 3 corresponded with tightly 
organized, positive self-schema content. However, contrary to the results of the two prior studies, 
only manic symptoms (and not mania risk) significantly predicted high connectivity of positive 
content within the achievement domain. Moreover, consistent with Study 1, but not Study 2, greater 
mania risk predicted high connectivity of positive self-schema content within the interpersonal 
domain in the current investigation (see Table 3.2).  
In addition, mania risk did not contribute to the prediction of negative self-schema content 
within Study 3 block regression analyses, similar to Studies 1 and 2. However, of note, bivariate 
correlations indicate that mania risk showed a weak association with negative interpersonal structure, 
r = -.10, p = .04. Although a similar correlational result was observed in Study 2 whereby mania risk 
corresponded with high connectivity of negative self-schema content, recall that this was shown for 
negative achievement (rather than interpersonal) structure. 
Moreover, Study 3 also replicated results regarding the contribution of mania risk to the 
prediction of self-schema content. Specifically, higher mania risk was again associated in the present 
study with greater endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment and higher levels of  
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Table 3.2 
Study 3 Replication of Regression Results for Self-Schema Constructs of Structure and Content in a 
University Student Sample 
Self-Schema 
Construct Block 1 
Block 2 
Change 
Block 3 
Change 
Overall Model and 
Predictors 
 
Overall Positive 
Structure 
 
F = 165.63*** 
R2 = .24 
 
 
F-change = 8.91** 
R2 change = .02 
 
F-change = 5.78* 
R2 change = .01 
 
F = 61.49*** 
R2 = .26 
Depression (.48)*** 
Mania (-.08)* 
Mania Risk (-.10)* 
Positive 
Achievement 
Structure 
F = 142.08*** 
R2 = .21 
 
F-change = 5.76* 
R2 change = .01 
F-change = 2.22 
R2 change = .01 
F = 50.55*** 
R2 = .22 
Depression (.44)*** 
Mania (-.07)* 
Mania Risk (-.06) 
Positive 
Interpersonal 
Structure 
F = 104.76** 
R2 = .16 
 
F-change = 8.36** 
R2 change = .02 
F-change = 
7.92** 
R2 change = .01 
F = 41.30*** 
R2 = .19 
Depression (.38)*** 
Mania (-.08)* 
Mania Risk (-.12)** 
Overall 
Negative 
Structure 
F = 98.31*** 
R2 = .19 
 
F-change = 1.83 
R2 change = .00 
F-change = 2.19 
R2 change = .00 
F = 34.27*** 
R2 = .19 
Depression (-.44)*** 
Mania (-.04) 
Mania Risk (-.07) 
Negative 
Achievement 
Structure 
F = 108.12*** 
R2 = .20 
 
F-change = 1.54 
R2 change = .00 
F-change = 1.05 
R2 change = .00 
F = 36.95*** 
R2 = .19 
Depression (-.45)*** 
Mania (-.04) 
Mania Risk (-.05) 
Negative 
Interpersonal 
Structure 
F = 71.39*** 
R2 = .13 
 
F-change = 3.16 
R2 change = .01 
F-change = 2.39 
R2 change = .00 
F = 25.82*** 
R2 = .14 
Depression (-.37)*** 
Mania (-.06) 
Mania Risk (-.07) 
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Dysfunctional 
Attitudes – 
Goal 
Attainment 
Content 
F = 0.45 
R2 = .00 
 
F-change = 
10.63*** 
R2 change = .02 
F-change = 
7.12** 
R2 change = .02 
F = 10.55** 
R2 = .04 
Depression (-.03) 
Mania (.10)* 
Mania Risk (.14)** 
Obsessive 
Passion Content  
F = 11.42** 
R2 = .02 
 
F-change = 
25.56*** 
R2 change = .05 
F-change = 
23.48*** 
R2 change = .04 
F = 20.86** 
R2 = .11 
Depression (.15)** 
Mania (.13)** 
Mania Risk (.22)*** 
Harmonious 
Passion Content  
F = 11.28** 
R2 = .02 
 
F-change = 5.54* 
R2 change = .01 
F-change = 2.67 
R2 change = .00 
F = 6.55*** 
R2 = .04 
Depression (-.12)** 
Mania (.08) 
Mania Risk (.07) 
Notes. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression coefficients. 
Depressive and manic symptoms were entered in Block 1 and 2, respectively. Mania risk (i.e., 
Hypomanic Personality Scale) was entered in Block 3 of the regression equations.  
N = 531. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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obsessive passion. Consistent with earlier results of this dissertation, mania risk was not a significant 
predictor of harmonious passion. 
Within the block regressions analyses of Study 3 (see Table 3.2), depressive symptoms again 
showed expected patterns. Notably, depression was not associated in the Study 3 sample with 
dysfunctional attitudes about achievement, similar to the Study 1 sample. In addition, manic 
symptoms in Study 3 often added to the prediction of self-schema components, showing the same 
patterns of findings as mania risk. Overall, these results for Study 3 are generally consistent with the 
regression findings from Studies 1 and 2.  
Self-Schema Constructs Mediate between Mania Risk and Symptoms in a University Sample 
In Study 3 it was demonstrated that self-schema components once again helped to explain 
relations between important mania-relevant constructs, but in this instance, for a university student 
sample. These findings are shown in Figure 3.1 below. Specifically, the current findings indicate that 
positive self-schema structure and obsessive passion significantly mediated the relation between 
mania risk and manic symptoms. Of note is that consistent across all three studies in this dissertation, 
greater mania risk corresponded with tighter organization of positive self-schema content (i.e., less 
interstimulus distance), which, in turn, predicted higher levels of manic symptoms.  
The mediating effect for obsessive passion in the current study was also very similar to that 
reported previously in Study 1, as higher HPS scores were once again associated with greater 
obsessive passion, which predicted higher levels of manic symptoms (see Figure 3.1). Furthermore, 
similar to Study 1 findings, there was not a significant indirect effect for dysfunctional attitudes about 
goal attainment within this multiple mediation model that included self-schema structure and other 
types of self-schema content (see Figure 3.1). 
Replication Results for the Moderating Role of Harmonious Passion for Manic Symptoms  
The current study permitted further examination of harmonious passion as a protective 
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-0.10* 
 
Mania Risk 
Dysfunctional 
Attitudes 
Positive  
 
Mania Symptoms 
Obsessive 
Passion 
Positive  
Positive 
Structure 
Positive  
-0.21*** 
0.33*** (0.27***) 
0.09* 0.06 
0.25*** 0.11* 
Figure 3.1. Replication of Mediation Results for Manic Symptoms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect is presented 
in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Dysfunctional Attitudes, β = .01; 
Obsessive Passion, β = .03*; Overall Positive Structure, β = .02*; Total indirect effect, β = .05*.       
*p < .05, ***p < .001. 
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attribute within the context of mania. Similar to Study 1, it was examined whether harmonious 
passion was adaptive as a moderator of mania risk, with high levels of harmonious passion 
corresponding with attenuated manic symptoms. Moderation analysis in Study 3 indicated that 
harmonious passion did not significantly interact with mania risk to predict manic symptoms within 
the university student sample, β = .02, t = 0.56, p = .57. This is consistent with the non-significant 
result found in Study 1; although recall that in Study 1 there was a trend (p = .08) in line with the 
hypothesis that harmonious passion moderated between mania risk and symptoms.  
Manic Symptoms: Testing Interactions between Mania Risk, Life Events and Self-Schema 
Constructs 
To further investigate a cognitive vulnerability-stress hypothesis, potential three-way 
interactions among mania risk, self-schema constructs, and life events in predicting recent manic 
symptoms were also examined within the university student sample of Study 3. A multiple regression 
approach similar to that used in the previous two studies was once again employed with the Study 3 
sample, using centered values of predictors. A summary of the details of these moderation analyses is 
presented in Table 3.3.  
Self-Schema Structure. Consistent with hypotheses, significant three-way interactions were 
found for general positive and BAS-Activating events. Of note, for the remaining analysis involving 
goal attainment events, there was a non-significant trend (p = .08) that resembled the result for 
general positive events.  
The interaction effect for Positive events is depicted in Figure 3.2. Corresponding regression 
results indicated there were main effects of the HPS and PDST, suggesting that high mania risk and 
greater connectivity of positive self-schema content was associated with higher levels of manic 
symptoms. None of the two-way interaction terms were significant within the context of the 
significant three-way interaction.   
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Table 3.3.  
Schema Structure: Three-Way Interaction Results Predicting Manic Symptoms. 
Predictor ΔF ΔR2 β Final Model 
 
Positive Events 
  Block 1: 
     T1 HPS  
     T2 LES-P 
     T2 PDST-P 
  Block 2: 
     HPS x LES-P 
     LES-P x PDST-P 
     HPS x PDST-P 
  Block 3: 
     HPS x T2 LES-P x T2 PDST-P 
 
  
32.01*** 
 
 
 
0.36 
 
 
 
3.72* 
 
  
 .15 
 
 
 
.00 
 
 
  
.01 
 
 
  
  
.29***   
.10*** 
-.20*** 
 
-.02 
-.04 
-.01 
 
-.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
(.29)*** 
(.07)+ 
(-.18)*** 
 
(-.03) 
(-.04) 
(-.01) 
 
(-.10)* 
 
R2 = .16, F(7, 533) = 14.42*** 
 
BAS-Activating Events 
  Block 1: 
     T1 HPS  
     T2 LES-B 
     T2 PDST-P 
  Block 2: 
     HPS x LES-B 
     LES-B x PDST-P 
     HPS x PDST-P 
  Block 3: 
     HPS x T2 LES-B x T2 PDST-P 
 
  
31.00*** 
 
 
 
1.16 
 
 
 
6.62** 
 
  
 .15 
 
 
 
.00 
 
 
  
.01 
 
 
  
  
.31***   
-.06 
-.20*** 
 
-.04 
-.07 
-.01 
 
-.11** 
 
 
 
 
 
(.33)*** 
(-.06) 
(-.17)*** 
 
(-.03) 
(-.09)* 
(-.00) 
 
(-.11)** 
 
R2 = .15, F(7, 533) = 14.89*** 
 
Goal Attainment Events 
  Block 1: 
     T1 HPS  
     T2 LES-G 
     T2 PDST-P 
  Block 2: 
     HPS x LES-G 
     LES-G x PDST-P 
     HPS x PDST-P 
  Block 3: 
     HPS x T2 LES-G x T2 PDST-P 
 
  
32.67*** 
 
 
 
0.04 
 
 
 
2.58+ 
 
  
 .15 
 
 
 
.00 
 
 
  
.005 
 
 
  
  
.29***   
.10** 
-.19*** 
 
.00 
-.01 
-.01 
 
-.08+ 
 
 
 
 
 
(.33)*** 
(-.06) 
(-.17)*** 
 
(-.01) 
(-.01) 
(-.01) 
 
(-.08)+ 
 
R2 = .15, F(7, 533) = 14.34*** 
Notes. Values in parentheses represent Block 4 regression coefficients. ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania 
Scale; PDST-P = Psychological Distance Scaling Task, Positive Structure; LES = Life Events Scale;  
LES-P = Positive Events; LES- B = BAS-Activating Events; LES-G = Goal Attainment Events.  
+p < .10, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Figure 3.2 
Three-Way Interaction between Positive Schema Structure, Positive Events, and Mania Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. Slopes were plotted using high and low values of 
constructs (± 1 standard deviation). **p < .01  
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As shown in Figure 3.2, only the slope reflecting high HPS scores and high connectivity of 
positive self-schema content was significantly different from zero (t = 2.48, p = .01), indicating that 
these individuals showed greater manic symptoms when they experienced more positive life events 
compared to fewer positive life events. Such an effect was not observed at other levels of the HPS 
and self-schema structure. Similarly, tests of slope differences also indicated that this slope 
corresponding with high HPS scores and high self-schema connectivity was significantly different 
from the slope corresponding with high HPS levels and low self-schema connectivity (t = -1.94, p = 
.04). Overall, these Study 3 findings suggest that positive life events were associated with higher 
levels of manic symptoms within the current student sample, specifically among those who displayed 
high temperamental risk for mania as well as tightly organized, positive self-schema content.  
Moderation results associated with BAS-Activating events showed a slightly different pattern 
of results (see Table 3.3). As depicted in Figure 3.3, the slope representing high mania risk and high 
connectivity of positive self-schema content was the only slope that was positively graded, but this 
slope was not statistically different from zero (t = 1.10, p = .25). Thus, this result does not 
definitively suggest that higher levels of BAS-Activating events were associated with greater manic 
symptoms among individuals at high mania risk. Conversely, it was the slope representing high HPS 
levels and low connectivity of positive content that significantly differed from zero (t = -3.49, p = 
.002), indicating that greater BAS-Activating events were actually associated with fewer manic 
symptoms among these individuals. Nevertheless, these two slopes corresponding with high mania 
risk significantly differed from each other (t = 3.10, p  = .002), indicating that BAS-Activating events 
had a dissimilar role when individuals with high HPS scores also showed high connectivity of 
positive self-schema content.   
Specific Domains of Self-Schema Structure. Follow-up analyses were also conducted in 
Study 3 to explore content domains of self-schema structure that may be involved in the above 
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Three-Way Interaction between Positive Schema Structure, BAS-Activating Events, and Mania Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. Slopes were plotted using high and low values of 
constructs (± 1 standard deviation). **p < .01  
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significant interactions. For general positive events, the three-way interaction for positive 
interpersonal structure was significant (β = -.10, t = -2.02, p = .04), whereas the interaction associated 
with achievement structure was non-significant (β = -.08, t = -1.86, p = .07). Alternatively, both 
positive achievement (β = -.10, t = -2.17, p = .03) and interpersonal structure (β = -.12, t = -2.81, p = 
.01) moderated the effect of BAS-activating events on manic symptoms, in conjunction with mania 
risk. The interpretation of these significant interactions was identical to that for overall positive self-
schema structure, described previously. 
The above findings for Study 3 are generally consistent with the moderation results from 
Study 2. Important differences include how significant two-way interaction effects included positive 
and goal attainment events in the previous study, whereas three-way interaction results for goal 
events only approached significance in the present study. Moreover, BAS-Activating events were not 
implicated within significant interactions involving life events in Study 2. In the present study, BAS 
events were associated with several moderating effects that showed a somewhat different pattern of 
results compared to the other events studied in this dissertation. Specifically, it did not appear that 
BAS-Activating events had the same sensitization effect as positive and goal events in the current 
and/or previous study, where greater BAS-Activating events corresponded with higher levels of 
manic symptoms. 
Furthermore, there were no significant three-way interactions found in Study 2 that supported 
a moderating role of the HPS, whereas the present results of Study 3 indicate that individuals 
showing greater risk for mania reported greater manic symptoms at differing levels of positive self-
schema structure and life events. In this regard, one notable difference between the two studies was 
the number of observations available (i.e., n =139 in Study 2 and n=531 in Study 3) for the above 
analyses involving life events. This likely resulted in greater statistical power in the present study, 
which could help to explain the additional presence of significant, three-way interaction effects. 
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Moreover, another difference between the two studies was that there appeared to be a more 
prominent role for positive achievement self-schema structure within Study 2 interactions involving 
life events, whereas both achievement and interpersonal domains were implicated in the present 
study. 
Schema Content. Study 3 also examined self-schema content that was not explored in Study 
2 (i.e., the DAS and Obsessive Passion), regarding potential interactions with life events and mania 
risk. However, no significant three-way or two-way interaction effects involving life events were 
found for dysfunctional attitudes about achievement or obsessive passion in Study 3, despite main 
effects of the individual predictors in the expected directions. Specifically, greater mania risk (i.e., 
HPS), positive events (i.e., positive and goal attainment), and maladaptive self-schema content (i.e., 
DAS and Obsessive Passion) corresponded with higher levels of manic symptoms. A full summary of 
these moderation results for Study 3 can be found in Appendix J. 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
The present dissertation addressed several research questions associated with the preliminary 
examination of a novel, cognitive vulnerability-stress model of mania. In particular, the three studies 
in this dissertation focused on self-schema constructs that have yet to be examined in relation to 
mania. These self-schema constructs span both cognitive structure (i.e., degree of interconnection) 
and content (i.e., cognitive distortions in different domains, adaptive self-referent beliefs about 
success, and obsessive passion).   
This dissertation project considered the relation between self-schema components and mania 
constructs, as well as the predictive utility of self-schema constructs for the course of mood 
symptoms. The current investigation also addressed whether mood induction procedures (MIP) may 
be required to facilitate the empirical examination of any self-schema content relevant to mania.  
A central aspect of this dissertation was the assessment of whether self-schema components 
may play an important role in a vulnerability-stress model of manic symptoms. This was done by 
considering possible interactions among self-schema components and various life events. As this 
dissertation provided an initial examination of a cognitive vulnerability model that centralized the 
role of self-schema structure, the research question of whether major findings could be replicated 
within different non-clinical samples was also considered. Overall, this initial work is intended to 
help inform future clinical research and theory in this domain. The major findings across the three 
studies of this dissertation are discussed below. In doing so, limitations and extensions of the current 
research are also considered. 
Mania and Self-Schema Constructs of Content and Structure 
A central objective of this dissertation was to identify self-schema characteristics that 
correspond with mania, and in particular, appear distinctly related to vulnerability to mania rather 
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than depression. As such, the present research extended the literature by examining several novel 
types of self-schema content in relation to mania. Importantly, this examination also considered the 
relevance of each type of content for mania versus depressive symptoms.   
Self-Schema Content Findings. To begin, it was first found that mania risk was associated 
with high levels of dysfunctional attitudes about goal attainment, which have been previously linked 
to bipolar disorder (Lam et al., 2004). Recall that these attitudes pertain to unrealistic goals about 
success (e.g., “A person should do well at everything he or she undertakes”) and positive mood states 
(e.g., “I should be happy all the time”). Across Studies 1 and 3, the present findings supported the 
notion that these attitudes appear particularly relevant to mania, as they also showed no significant 
associations with depressive symptoms. However, within the mediation model tested in the current 
research, these attitudes did not significantly mediate between the hypomanic personality and manic 
symptoms. Thus, it is possible that these attitudes may have a less distinctive role within the course 
of manic symptoms, in comparison to self-schema structure and other types of self-schema content. 
In the present dissertation, obsessive passion was a newly studied construct (Vallerand et al., 
2003) in relation to mania. The present findings suggest that this construct is particularly relevant for 
the course of manic versus depressive symptoms. It was initially hypothesized that this individual 
difference characteristic would pertain to the content of the manic self-schema, since it captures 
relentless pursuit of a valued activity at the expense of other values and life activities (e.g., “I have 
the impression that this activity controls me”; “I have difficulties controlling the urge to do my 
activity”; Vallerand et al., 2003). As such, obsessive passion relates to maladaptive patterns of 
activation and goal pursuit. Recall that goal dysregulation has been implicated in bipolar disorder 
(Johnson, 2005), where success has been associated with higher levels of activation and goal pursuit, 
rather than the short-term reduction in effort towards future goals that is seen amongst the general 
population (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fulford et al., 2010). Importantly, results of both Studies 1 and 3 
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in the present dissertation indicate that obsessive passion was not only associated with mania 
constructs, but it also served as a significant mediator between the hypomanic personality and manic 
symptoms within a model that also accounted for other types of self-schema content and self-schema 
structure. Conversely, obsessive passion showed minimal associations with depressive symptoms, 
particularly in comparison to mania constructs (see Study 1 and Study 3). Accordingly, this is the 
first known investigation to identify obsessive passion as an individual difference characteristic that 
is highly relevant to mania in comparison to depression. 
When considering self-schema content, a number of previous investigations have linked 
bipolar disorder to perfectionistic attitudes (e.g., Scott et al., 2000; Corry et al., 2017). The results of 
the present dissertation continued to build on this prior work. Specifically, Study 1 of this dissertation 
showed that the mania constructs of risk and symptoms were both associated with self-oriented and 
other-oriented perfectionism, whereas the same patterns were not shown for recent depressive 
symptoms. This is somewhat inconsistent with previous research linking self-oriented perfectionism 
with chronic depressive symptoms (e.g., Corry et al., 2017). However, since Study 1 only assessed 
recent depressive symptoms, this could likely help to explain the discrepancy between the present 
results and this existing finding in the literature.    
Moreover, in the present thesis it was found that mania risk also predicted high levels of 
socially-prescribed perfectionism, even after accounting for the influence of recent mood symptoms. 
This pattern of results in Study 1 suggests that socially-prescribed perfectionism may be a more 
enduring vulnerability characteristic associated with mania. In addition, socially-prescribed 
perfectionism also played a role within the multiple mediation model of manic symptoms tested in 
Study 1. These results are consistent with limited prior work indicating that chronic manic symptoms 
are associated with high levels of socially-prescribed perfectionism, of all the different dimensions of 
perfectionism (Corry et al., 2017; Hewitt et al., 1998). The present research extends these findings by 
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documenting an association between socially-prescribed perfectionism and mania risk within a non-
clinical sample. Recall that this aspect of perfectionism addresses perfectionistic behaviour that is 
attributed to the motives and expectations of others (Hewitt & Flett, 1990). As such, socially-
prescribed perfectionism incorporates a strong social evaluative component.  
The above findings concerning socially-prescribed perfectionism may fit well with existing 
theory and research on goal dysregulation in bipolar disorder (Johnson, 2005). Recall that a pattern of 
extremely optimistic life ambitions has been noted among individuals with bipolar disorder and high 
mania risk, in which extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivations appear dominant (e.g., success, fame) 
(Gruber & Johnson, 2009; Johnson, Eisner, & Carver, 2009). In turn, these extrinsic motivations may 
relate to the importance of social evaluation regarding one’s goals. Thus, there may be an 
interpersonal component to maladaptive beliefs about achievement that have been implicated in 
vulnerability to mania (e.g., Lam et al., 2004). In particular, individuals may strongly base self-
judgments about success in relation to their ability to exceed perceived high standards from the 
perspective of others. 
The present findings also showed that high levels of cognitive distortions appear to 
characterize the manic self-schema. Here, it was initially hypothesized that cognitive distortions in 
the achievement domain would be the most closely associated with mania constructs. Instead, the 
findings of Study 1 and 2 indicate that cognitive content distortions in both the achievement and 
interpersonal domains were significantly associated with the hypomanic personality and manic 
symptoms. However, it was only in Study 1 that mania risk added to the prediction of interpersonal 
cognitive distortions, beyond the contributions of manic and depressive symptoms. This latter finding 
was not replicated in Study 2. Instead, strong associations were found between cognitive distortions 
and depressive symptoms across Studies 1 and 2.  
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Taken together, the above findings suggest that this type of self-schema content may bear 
more strongly on the course of depressive versus manic symptoms in bipolar disorder. In line with 
this proposal, cognitive distortions (particularly within the interpersonal domain) mediated between 
mania risk and depressive symptoms, rather than manic symptoms. This is somewhat unsurprising, 
particularly since the nature of cognitive distortions seems to suggest that these are more likely to 
lead to dysphoria or anxiety, rather than an elevated state. 
Finally, the current research provided the first known investigation to consider self-referent 
adaptive beliefs that may be relevant to reward sensitivity and goal dysregulation theories of mania 
(Hillson, 1997). Results were somewhat inconclusive as to whether harmonious passion and adaptive 
self-referent beliefs about success may be protective among individuals at heightened risk for mania. 
In particular, only a non-significant trend in Study 1 indicated that greater harmonious passion 
corresponded with attenuated manic symptoms at high levels of the HPS. In addition, greater 
adaptive beliefs about success corresponded with fewer depressive symptoms at high levels of the 
HPS in Study 2, but this finding only approached significance in Study 1. This line of inquiry 
pertains to psychological resiliency in bipolar disorder, and the current findings point to a need to 
further examine and more sensitively investigate cognitive mechanisms that may be protective 
among those at heightened risk for mania.  
In summary, the above findings identified several types of self-schema content that appear to 
characterize mania. However, it should be noted that there was considerable overlap between 
depressive symptoms and mania constructs in terms of self-schema content, with limited 
characteristics showing unique associations with mania risk and symptoms. 
Self-Schema Structure Findings. A core finding of this dissertation pertains to the 
organization of self-referent information and mania. Specifically, replicated results across all three 
studies suggest that the self-schema in mania has a structural component that is distinct from 
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depression. Both the core measure tapping vulnerability to mania (hypomanic personality), as well as 
manic symptoms, were consistently associated with positive self-schema content that was highly 
interconnected. In contrast, and consistent with prior research (e.g., Dozois & Frewen, 2006), it was 
also found across all three studies of the present dissertation that depression relates to the loose 
organization of positive content. Furthermore, greater interconnectivity of positive self-schema 
content also mediated between the hypomanic personality and manic symptoms in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
of the present dissertation, suggesting that this structural self-schema characteristic may help to 
explain how mania risk translates to manic symptoms. Further evidence consistent with this notion 
was obtained in Study 2, showing that high connectivity of positive self-schema content 
prospectively predicted increases in manic symptoms over time.  
The above findings concerning positive self-schema structure were consistent with 
hypotheses, whereby it was posited that a densely interconnected subset of positively valenced, self-
referent information could help to explain the phenomenology of manic episodes (e.g., grandiosity, 
energy). Specifically, the organization of positively valenced information would bear on the 
accessibility of information about the self and thus, on the regulation of emotion. This differentiated 
pattern of self-schema organization could also help to resolve commonalities regarding self-schema 
content across mania and depression.  
The present findings regarding self-schema structure expand the very limited existing 
research on cognitive organization in bipolar disorder. Recall that a handful of investigations (Alatiq 
et al., 2010; Power, de Jong, & Lloyd, 2002; Taylor et al., 2007) have documented that individuals 
with bipolar disorder display a highly compartmentalized self-concept, in which self-aspects (e.g., 
family member, colleague, friend) show some polarization in terms of the valence of self-
characteristics (i.e., predominantly positive or negative in nature). Similarly, the current findings 
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suggest there is a pattern of highly interconnected, positively valenced content among individuals 
with higher temperamental risk for mania. 
It is important to clarify here that the present findings are not being interpreted as showing 
that, in cases of mania, individuals have an overly positive self-view. As described previously in the 
General Introduction and noted above, bipolar disorder appears to be characterized by predominantly 
negative self-schema content, which has been observed during and outside of depressive episodes 
(e.g., Alloy et al., 2009). Indeed, there was no significant association in the present research between 
the hypomanic personality and the positive self-referent beliefs studied (e.g., “I like and feel proud of 
my achievements”; Hillson, 1997). Further, recall that there was even a small association in Study 2 
between the hypomanic personality and self-esteem, whereby individuals with greater mania risk 
actually showed lower levels of self-esteem. Finally, the effect sizes associated with positive self-
schema structure were quite small in magnitude, albeit, consistently replicated across all three 
studies. As such, it is not posited that individuals with high mania risk hold themselves in too positive 
a regard. Rather, it is theorized that positively valenced information about the self may be organized 
in a problematic manner. One possibility is that individuals with temperamental risk for mania may 
display a relatively small amount of positive self-referent information, however, this information 
could be tightly organized in the self-schema structure.  
Regarding this hypothesis that dense connectivity of positive self-schema content may be 
restricted to a sub-network of self-relevant information, the current research did not find any direct 
evidence for this proposal or elucidate the precise nature of highly interconnected, positive content. 
Recall that it was predicted that beliefs in the achievement domain would show the highest levels of 
self-schema connectivity, given previous research on reward sensitivity and goal-striving (e.g., Alloy 
& Abramson, 2008; Johnson et al., 2012). However, across the three studies, results were mixed as to 
whether the organization of achievement versus interpersonally-relevant content may be more 
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predictive of the course of manic symptoms. For instance, recall that in Study 2, positive 
interpersonal structure, instead of achievement structure, predicted future increases in manic 
symptoms. Yet, as discussed in more detail below, positive achievement structure showed significant 
interactions with life events in Study 2. Conversely, it appeared that positive self-schema structure, in 
general, demonstrated more consistent patterns in the present research.  
Several considerations may help to clarify why mania risk was not associated with a 
consistent pattern of self-schema structure organization within a specific content domain. This could 
have occurred since the measure of self-schema structure employed in the present research, the PDST 
(Dozois & Dobson, 2001b), derives from research on depression. As such, the content areas 
examined for depression may not hold the same meaning for mania. Moreover, as mentioned when 
discussing the current self-schema content findings, a social evaluative component may, in fact, be 
highly relevant to ideas of achievement or success in mania. As a result, the distinction between 
achievement and interpersonal content may be more blurred. Thus, an important future direction for 
this research would be to modify content of the PDST, such that new domains are considered 
according to their hypothesized relevance to mania. Given previous research highlighting attitudes 
regarding the importance of success and highly ambitious goals in relation to mania risk (e.g., Lam et 
al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2012), this is an important content domain to examine.  
Another domain of potential interest for future investigation concerns the intersection 
between activation and self-appraisals. Previous research has considered how self-appraisals of 
internal states may be implicated in the development of mania (e.g., Jones & Day, 2008; Mansell et 
al., 2007). Specifically, these self-appraisals refer to the manner in which internal changes (e.g., high 
energy, racing thoughts) are interpreted in a personally relevant manner (Jones, 2001). Extremely 
positive self-appraisals of hypomanic states (e.g., interpreting increased energy as a sign of 
impending success) have been implicated in the development of mania (Jones & Day, 2008; Jones et 
 
 
 
113 
al., 2006). Appraisals of internal states were not examined in the present research, yet these may 
relate to specific areas of content that are densely connected and would putatively lead to elevated 
mood states.  
A further consideration is that Study 2 in this dissertation found that the hypomanic 
personality was associated with less temporal stability of self-schema structure. This supports the 
notion that high connectivity of positive self-schema content may not reflect stably high self-views, 
but rather dynamically changing self-appraisals. Similarly, consistent with past research on bipolar 
disorder (e.g., van der Gucht et al., 2009), the current results for Study 2 also indicated that greater 
temperamental risk for mania corresponded with fluctuations in self-esteem, even after accounting 
for the influence of mood symptoms. In the present research, self-schema structure also predicted 
momentary levels of self-esteem, which provides some empirical support for the theory that the 
activation of differently organized networks corresponds with changes in self-liking, which would 
ostensibly impact one’s mood state. 
Future research could examine how self-schema instability findings may relate to different 
types of self-appraisals. One consideration is that the measurement of self-schema structure may not 
only capture an individual’s firm beliefs (e.g. their actual self-views), but also their aspirations or 
expectations for themselves (e.g., their ideal self-views). This possibility seems particularly viable in 
mania, given the previously described research on bipolar disorder, perfectionism, and the over-
endorsement of highly ambitious goals (e.g., Johnson, 2005; Lam et al., 2004). In this regard, self-
discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) may also be quite relevant to mania, as this approach postulates 
that there are different domains of self-conceptualization. Here, the ‘actual-self’ refers to one’s 
actual, self-perceived qualities, whereas the ‘ideal-self’ and ‘ought-self’ encompass the qualities a 
person wishes or feels obliged to have, respectively.  
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Researchers have more recently considered self-discrepancy theory in relation to bipolar 
disorder (Alatiq et al., 2010; Bentall et al., 2005). Although evidence suggests that self-discrepancies 
are generally quite stable over time (Strauman, 1996), one study examined self-discrepancy over 
different phases of bipolar illness (Bentall et al., 2005). These investigators found that bipolar 
depressed patients exhibited greater discrepancy between their actual and ideal-selves compared to 
manic, hypomanic, and remitted bipolar disorder patients and healthy control participants. A 
converse relationship was demonstrated amongst (hypo)manic patients, who reported abnormally low 
levels of discrepancy between their actual, ideal and ought-selves compared to the other groups. 
These results suggest that how individuals with bipolar disorder view themselves against their 
idealized standard of being is subject to change. In addition, periods of (hypo)mania may be 
associated with appraisals that individuals are closer to idealized standards of being (Bentall et al., 
2005). Thus, it may be advisable for future studies of mania risk to differentiate between beliefs 
regarding one’s current self-appraisals, versus appraisals pertaining to one’s future potential or 
idealized outcomes; and then examine the organization of these beliefs.  
Contrary to hypotheses, despite some inconsistent associations between the HPS and negative 
self-schema structure, the current project did not find that mania risk robustly predicted the 
organization of negative self-schema content. Recall that it was hypothesized that some areas of 
negative self-schema content would show high connectivity, similar to the pattern shown for 
depression. This hypothesis stemmed from the fact that individuals with a history of mania also 
frequently experience depressive symptoms (Akiskal et al., 2000). Although there was some weak 
evidence for these expected associations between mania risk and negative self-schema structure 
across the three studies, this pattern was less clearly demonstrated compared to that for positive self-
schema structure. 
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There are several possible explanations for why the current results do not support this 
hypothesis. For one, since there is evidence to suggest that vulnerability mechanisms in mania and 
depression are separable (e.g., McGuffin et al, 2003), it is possible that high connectivity of negative 
self-schema content is specific to depressive symptoms in cases of bipolar disorder. Thus, this 
increased consolidation of negative self-schema content may not be observed when examining the 
hypomanic personality, alone, and particularly when also accounting for the influence of depressive 
symptoms. In order to better understand the organization of negative self-beliefs among individuals 
with bipolar disorder, a more sensitive design would be informative, which contrasts the self-schema 
structure of individuals with a history of mania and depression, individuals with a history of mania 
alone, and individuals with a history of unipolar depression.  
Another possible explanation for these findings pertains to the previous consideration 
regarding self-schema measurement and potentially tapping idealized ways of being (Higgins, 1967). 
Since results of the current research suggest that greater mania risk was associated with unstable 
measurement of negative achievement structure, there is some indication that dynamic factors may be 
influencing the apparent organization of negative self-beliefs. Finally, the current research may not 
have captured the domain in which negative self-schema content may show high levels of 
connectivity. For instance, the importance of negative self-appraisals of internal states, in addition to 
positive appraisals, has also been considered in relation to bipolar disorder (e.g., Mansell et al., 
2007). Negative appraisals of (hypo)manic symptoms could relate to fears such as being out of 
control and on the verge of breakdown (Mansell et al., 2006). Moreover, in line with reward 
sensitivity and goal dysregulation models (e.g., Johnson et al., 2012), negative content that pertains to 
failing to meet one’s high standards or future aspirations may also be relevant to mania. As such, 
these important subsets of beliefs should also be considered in future studies of self-schema 
organization in mania. 
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One major limitation of the current research is that it was conducted with non-clinical 
samples. As mentioned in the General Introduction, there are advantages to a research design that 
uses risk markers rather than remitted diagnostic status to study vulnerability to psychopathology. In 
addition, the HPS (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), as a measure reflecting risk for mania, has been 
extensively used in contemporary psychological research on mania (e.g., Kim et al., 2017; 
Pornpattananangkul et al., 2015). However, it is still critical that future research be conducted among 
clinical samples of bipolar disorder, in order to determine whether individuals exhibit similar self-
schema characteristics as identified by the current investigation. Another future direction of this 
research would involve examining whether this project’s findings would extend to various different 
presentations of mania (e.g., manic episodes with psychotic features), or whether differences exist 
among certain groups (e.g., bipolar I versus bipolar II disorder). In addition, contrasting self-schema 
content and structure displayed by individuals with bipolar disorder compared to similar clinical 
presentations (e.g., major depressive disorder, schizophrenia), would also be important to further 
understand unique and shared aspects of psychological vulnerability. 
Mood Induction Findings 
The present dissertation also considered whether mood induction procedures (MIPs) appear to 
impact the study of self-schema content associated with mania. Contrary to tentative hypotheses, 
there was not a significant effect of positive mood induction, whereby individuals were asked to 
imagine that they had achieved an important goal. As such, these null findings suggest that the MIP 
was not necessary to detect associations between mania and the specific types of self-schema content 
studied in the current dissertation. Thus, one possibility is that mood priming may not be required for 
the study of self-schema content characterizing mania. However, it is important to recognize that 
there were several limitations of the current assessment of MIPs. First, it cannot be determined how 
long presumed effects of the MIP lasted in the present investigation. Thus, it is unclear whether 
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certain measures administered further after the mood induction may have shown significant MIP 
impact, if they had been presented closer in time to the induction. As such, a more rigorous test of 
MIPs is still warranted, particularly since very limited research has thus far assessed the effects of 
mood priming on the study of self-schema characteristics in mania.  
Similarly, since the current investigation was the first test of this MIP, it is not clear whether 
the use of this procedure was relevant to the activation of self-schema components associated with 
mania. In the future, it would be important to compare and contrast the effects of other possible MIPs 
(e.g., negative mood prime), before ruling out the importance of mood priming for the study of self-
schema characteristics associated with mania.  
Finally, an effect of the MIP was not examined for self-schema structure, since existing 
research suggests that this is a more stable characteristic of the self-schema (e.g., Dozois & Dobson, 
2001a). As such, mood priming is likely not necessary to study self-schema organization. However, 
given the current results pertaining to reduced temporal stability of self-schema structure in mania, it 
would be important to examine whether there might be an impact of mood priming on the 
momentary, perceptible organization of self-beliefs. One possibility is that highly interconnected 
networks of positive content may become even more discernible when activated by mania-relevant 
triggers, which would help to explain variability associated with repeated measurement of self-
schema structure among individuals at high mania risk. This pattern would be consistent with the 
following results concerning interactions between positive self-schema structure and life events. 
Findings for Interactions between Life Events and Self-Schema Components 
This dissertation applied the cognitive vulnerability-stress framework to mania by examining 
both the content and structure of self-schemas, as well as providing a preliminary investigation of the 
interplay between self-schema components and life events. Consistent with previous research, the 
current results implicate the role of positive life events in the course of manic symptoms. Across 
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Studies 2 and 3, there were main effects of positive life events, in which generally positive and goal 
attainment events, in particular, predicted concurrent and prospective increases in manic symptoms. 
Most importantly, initial support was also provided in Studies 2 and 3 for a cognitive vulnerability-
stress framework, whereby positive self-schema structure significantly interacted with positive life 
events. Specifically, high frequency and impact of positive life events predicted concurrent or future 
increases in manic symptoms, particularly among individuals who showed high interconnectivity of 
positive self-schema content. Study 3 also found that this interaction between positive self-schema 
structure and positive life events was only observed at high levels of mania risk. 
The above findings support the current literature regarding the impact of life events in bipolar 
disorder (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 2010; Nusslock et al., 2007), and how this pattern is differentiated 
from depression (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008a), by continuing to show that certain positive versus 
negative events predict the course of manic symptoms. The current project also extends existing 
research by demonstrating that positive life events interact with the organization of positive self-
beliefs to predict manic symptoms. It is theorized that this relation was observed because certain 
positive events, particularly those related to activation and goal-striving, triggered highly 
interconnected networks of positively valenced, self-referent information. It is postulated that these 
events may play such a role because they provide momentary evidence to individuals regarding 
dysfunctional beliefs about positive emotion, success, or power, such that one is capable of anything 
(Lam et al., 2004; Mansell et al., 2007). Since this positive self-schema content is tightly organized, 
activation of such a network would lead to widespread activation of similar beliefs or ideas about 
oneself, which would ostensibly lead to high levels of positive emotion and energy, in turn.  
Such elevations in mood and energy could then initiate a feedback loop, in which positive 
self-schema content continues to be activated. This proposal is supported by the previously reviewed 
research on bipolar disorder and responses to positive affect, in which individuals with a history or 
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risk for mania are likely to respond to positive affect with positive self-focused rumination (e.g., Raes 
et al., 2010). Moreover, such changes in cognition would likely be accompanied by behavioural 
responses. Existing research on mania suggests that high levels of activation could lead to momentary 
behaviour that continues to propel mood upwards, otherwise referred to as ‘ascent behaviours’ (e.g., 
ingesting stimulants, increasing activity; Mansell et al., 2007). This would be particularly relevant if 
the content of activated cognitions pertains to positive self-appraisals of elevated states (Mansell et 
al., 2007). As such, a vicious cycle could be created, in which the repetitive activation of cognitions 
and triggering of ascent behaviours give rise to manic symptomatology.  
In terms of more specific types of positive events, consistent with hypotheses, both goal 
attainment events and BAS-activating events shared significant interactions with self-schema 
structure in Studies 2 and 3, respectively. Although the expected pattern was shown for goal 
attainment events, BAS-activating events did not show a significant, sensitization effect regarding 
their association with manic symptoms at high levels of mania risk and positive self-schema 
connectivity. Conversely, it was noted that greater BAS-activating events in Study 3 unexpectedly 
predicted fewer manic symptoms at high levels of mania risk, when there were also low levels of 
connectivity for positive content. It is unclear what this pattern of findings could mean concerning 
the impact of BAS events among individuals at high mania risk. One possible interpretation is that 
highly interconnected, positive self-beliefs play an important role in determining the impact of BAS 
events on manic symptoms, and without this characteristic, individuals who display high 
temperamental risk for mania would not show high levels of manic symptomatology within the 
context of these events.  
Another consideration is that the nature of BAS-Activating events is quite different from 
general positive and goal attainment events, in that BAS-Activating events may not always be 
positive or as noticeable as achievement events (e.g., studying for an upcoming exam, planning a 
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party, having an argument with a family member). As such, a more sensitive design may be required 
to accurately assess BAS-activating events experienced by participants, along dimensions that are 
proposed to be significant to mania. In this regard, a further limitation of the present dissertation is 
that an interview method was not used to contextualize life events reported by participants, and more 
sensitively rate their impact. As such, an important future direction of this research would be to 
examine interactions between life events and self-schema structure using a more rigorous study 
design that incorporates a life events interview. 
As previously discussed, another limitation of this dissertation is that this research was not 
conducted with clinical samples of bipolar disorder. Since the role of mania risk was demonstrated in 
significant interactions with life events and schema structure when a larger sample was examined in 
Study 3, it may be the case that there was not sufficient power in Study 2 to examine differences 
across levels of mania risk within moderation analyses. However, it would be important to replicate 
these findings and determine whether they can generalize to different expressions of mania.  
Regarding interactions between life events and specific domains of self-schema structure, the 
current findings were mixed as to whether the organization of achievement or interpersonal content 
was more critical. In line with initial hypotheses, there was slightly more support for the role of 
achievement self-schema structure in interactions with life events, with both Study 2 and 3 showing 
significant results for this domain of self-schema content. However, findings of Study 3 also 
indicated that significant interactions with life events involved interpersonal self-schema structure. 
Of note, there were significantly more female participants than male participants in Study 3, 
compared to Study 2 where the gender distribution was more balanced. Thus, one possibility is that 
gender differences may help to explain this discrepancy across Studies 2 and 3. Another possibility, 
as discussed in the first section of this General Discussion, is that the self-schema structure domains 
examined in the present dissertation may not capture the most relevant content for mania. Thus, it is 
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important that future research consider other content domains of self-schema structure and how these 
may moderate the impact of life events on manic symptoms. Another future direction of the current 
research involves examining gender differences in relation to self-schema characteristics associated 
with mania. 
 Finally, the results of this dissertation indicated that self-schema structure was more 
important than content for moderating the relation between positive life events and manic symptoms. 
Contrary to results for structure, none of the content measures studied interacted with life events to 
predict concurrent or prospective increases in manic symptoms. However, since only Study 3 
examined interactions between life events and self-schema content, it is important to replicate this 
finding. Nevertheless, the current results suggest that self-schema structure may be more informative 
for the course of manic symptoms from a cognitive vulnerability-stress perspective. This finding 
could relate to existing research on self-schema structure, indicating that it is a more enduring 
characteristic and more predictive of relapse in depression compared to self-schema content (e.g., 
Dozois, 2007). Since substantial overlap exists between mania and depression in terms of the self-
schema content that appears to characterize these presentations, self-schema structure may also be a 
more distinguishing feature of cognitive vulnerability to mania. Future research is needed to clarify 
the relative importance of self-schema structure versus content within the context of mania. 
Clinical Implications 
  Given the limitations of this research, only tentative statements can be made regarding the 
generalizability of these findings to cases of bipolar disorder and the clinical implications of this 
work. However, the present results linking mania to self-schema structure irregularities fit within a 
broader literature suggesting that self-concept disturbance characterizes bipolar disorder (e.g., 
dysfunctional attitudes about success; highly fluctuating levels of self-esteem; unstable actual versus 
idealized self-views) (e.g., Bentall et al., 2006; Lam et al., 2004; van der Gucht et al., 2009). Overall, 
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this evidence indicates that an important therapeutic goal would be to support patients in exploring 
and challenging maladaptive views of oneself, in order to develop a more balanced and adaptive self-
understanding. This overarching goal is consistent with current applications of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT) for bipolar disorder (Oud et al., 2016).  
More specifically, if it is the case that individuals prone to mania show a set of positive 
beliefs that are temporally unstable and tightly organized, this could have important negative 
consequences for psychological well-being. In particular, this pattern suggests that individuals only 
have select moments in which they feel positively about themselves and that this is not consistently 
experienced. This proposal is also corroborated by documented associations between mania and the 
prevalence of negative self-beliefs and fluctuating self-esteem levels (e.g., Bentall et al., 2011; 
Adams et al., 2014). Further, activation of highly interconnected networks of positive self-schema 
content would theoretically lead to momentary positive self-appraisals that are extreme. This would 
contribute to drastically different views of the self from moment to moment, which would reasonably 
correspond with rapid changes in mood. Alternatively, adopting a more generalized and balanced 
positive self-view would likely contribute to more stable moods and higher levels of well-being. As 
such, therapeutic work could support individuals in generalizing and balancing positive self-beliefs 
so they are more temporally stable and less polarized regarding their organization.  
If future research can extend this work and provide further support for self-schema structure 
as a vulnerability marker for mania, there would also be helpful applications to psychological 
assessment. For instance, a tool such as the PDST (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a, 2001b) could be 
adapted for use in a clinical context, particularly if more specific domains of structure can be 
identified for mania. Changes in the measurement of self-schema structure (e.g., greater temporal 
stability) could be used to gauge the effectiveness of clinical interventions for bipolar disorder (e.g., 
psychotropic drugs, psychological treatments), particularly in relation to manic symptoms.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Psychological Distance Scaling Task – Word List 
Interpersonal Positive  
Admired, Caring, Comforted, Comical, Considerate, Desirable, Devoted, Encouraged, Generous, 
Humorous, Joyful, Kind, Playful, Outgoing, Neighbourly, Romantic, Supported, Trustworthy, 
Understanding, Valuable  
Interpersonal Negative  
Alone, Annoying, Conceited, Demanding, Dependent, Deserted, Shy, Forsaken, Dull, Lonely, 
Overbearing, Pushy, Quarrelsome, Rejected, Resentful, Shunned, Snobbish, Unfriendly, Unloved, 
Unwanted  
Achievement Positive  
Achieving, Ambitious, Capable, Driven, Eager, Efficient, Exceptional, Gifted, Impressive, 
Intelligent, Extraordinary, Outstanding, Marvellous, Remarkable, Respected, Skillful, Striving, 
Successful, Superior, Talented  
Achievement Negative  
Aimless, Apathetic, Beaten, Criticized, Defeated, Deficient, Destroyed, Failure, Hasty, Helpless, 
Hurried, Inadequate, Incompetent, Inferior, Insignificant, Lazy, Stagnant, Stupid, Useless, Worthless  
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Appendix B: Mood Induction Procedures  
  
POSITIVE MOOD INDUCTION:  
 
In this part of the experiment, we will ask you to participate in an exercise that is meant to create a 
temporary positive mood state. We’d like you to think about a goal that is important to you and 
imagine that you have achieved it. This goal could be anything – it could be a success in the 
workplace, achieving a dream in a love or family relationship, an achievement of recognition for 
something that is important to you, or many other things.   
 
Bring to mind a goal that is very important to you and which would make you very happy if you 
achieved it. First take some time to describe this goal. 
What about your goal makes it important to you?  
What would you think and feel if you achieved it?   
Are there other people there? What would you see, hear, smell, feel, etc?  
 
Now we’re going to ask you to spend some time imagining that you have achieved this goal.   
First, try and clear your mind for 30 seconds. When you hear the bell, begin imagining this scenario. 
To help create a happy mood, please try to vividly imagine achieving this goal and how this would 
make you feel. When you hear the bell a second time, please answer the questions onscreen. 
 
(Participants visualize for 2 minutes) 
 
Manipulation check: 
How did you feel while imagining that you achieved this goal? (-4 to 4 scale, where -4 is extremely 
negative, 0 Is neutral and 4 is extremely positive) 
Did you think of anything else besides achieving your goal just now? 
What emotions did you feel, if any?  
Name the emotion and rate it on a 0-8 scale, where 0 Is no emotion and 8 is the strongest 
manifestation of that emotion in your entire life. 
 
 
NEUTRAL EMOTION INDUCTION:  
 
In this part of the experiment, we will ask you to participate in mental imagery exercise. We’d like 
you to think about doing some routine shopping in a store and imagine that you are doing it in this 
moment. The type of shopping should be part of your regular routine  – such as going to a grocery 
store, drug store, etc.  
 
Bring to mind an example of regular shopping you do as part of your living routine. First take some 
time to describe this situation. 
What store and type of shopping are you thinking of? 
What would you think and feel while doing the shopping? 
Are there other people there? What would you see, hear, smell, feel, etc?  
 
Now we’re going to ask you to spend some time imagining that you are doing this shopping in the 
store.  
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First, try and clear your mind for 30 seconds. When you hear the bell, begin imagining this scenario. 
To help to create the mental imagery, please try to vividly imagine you are doing this shopping and 
how this would make you feel. When you hear the bell a second time, please answer the questions 
onscreen. 
 
(Participants visualize for 2 minutes) 
 
Manipulation check: 
How did you feel while imagining that you were shopping? (-4 to 4 scale, where -4 is extremely 
negative, 0 Is neutral and 4 is extremely positive) 
Did you think of anything else besides doing this routine shopping just now? 
What emotions did you feel, if any? 
Name the emotion and rate it on a 0-8 scale, where 0 Is no emotion and 8 is the strongest 
manifestation of that emotion in your entire life. 
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Appendix C: Study 1 and 2 Ethics Approval Notice 
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Appendix D: Simple Correlations among Study 1 Major Measures 
Correlations between the Mania and Mood Symptomatology Measures 
 ASRM DASS-21 
HPS 
Activation  
.47** .15* 
 
Correlations between the Self-Schema Content Measures. 
 DAS CDS-I CDS-A PBS PS- H PS-O MPS-SF MPS-O MPS-S 
DAS  .20*** .17*** .21*** .12* .33*** .42*** .22*** .23*** 
CDS-I   .84*** -.34*** -.17** .30*** .23*** .17** .39*** 
CDS-A    -.35*** -.14** .30*** .21*** .10* .41*** 
PBS     .53*** .04 .13** .05 -.32*** 
PS-H      .18*** .07 -.14** -.23** 
PS-O    .   .18*** .19*** .29*** 
MS-SF        .56*** .43*** 
MS-O         .42*** 
 
Correlations between the Self-Schema Structure Domains. 
 PDST-AP PDST-AN PDST-IP PDST-IN 
PDST-AP  -.33*** .71*** -.10 
PDST-AN   -.26*** .54*** 
PDST-IP    -.19** 
Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale; DASS-21 = 
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales-21, Depression subscale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, 
Goal Attainment Subscale; CDS- I = Cognitive Distortions Scale, Interpersonal Subscale; CDS-A = 
Cognitive Distortions Scale, Achievement Subscale; PBS = Positive Belief Statements Scale, 
Fulfillment Subscale; PS-O = Passion Scale, Obsessive Subscale; PS-H = Passion Scale, Harmonious 
Subscale; MPS-S = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Self-Oriented Subscale; MPS-O = 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Other-Oriented Subscale; MPS-SP = Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale, Socially Prescribed Subscale; PDST = Psychological Distance Scaling Task; AP = 
Achievement Positive; AN = Achievement Negative; IP = Interpersonal Positive; IN = Interpersonal 
Negative. ***p < .001, **p <.0, *p < .05. 
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Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect 
is presented in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Dysfunctional 
Attitudes, β = -.00; Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism, β = .03*; Obsessive Passion, β = 
.09*; Positive Structure, β = .02; Total indirect effect, β = .14*. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p 
< .001. 
	
-0.27*** 
 
Manic Symptoms 
Dysfunctional 
Attitudes 
Positive  
 
Mania Risk 
Obsessive 
Passion 
Positive  
Positive 
Structure 
Positive  
-0.09 
0.47*** (0.32***) 
0.14** 0.02 
0.25*** 0.38*** 
 
Perfectionism  
0.23*** 0.14** 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
Notes. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. The estimated direct effect 
is presented in parentheses. The estimated indirect effects were as follows: Achievement 
Cognitive Distortions, β = -.04; Interpersonal Cognitive Distortions, β = .14*; Total 
indirect effect, β = .09*. *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
0.45*** 
 
Depressive 
Symptoms 
 
 
Mania Risk 
Achievement 
Cognitive 
Distortions 
0.30*** 
0.10* (0.01) 
0.45*** -0.09 
Interpersonal 
Cognitive 
Distortions 
Appendix E: Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Reverse Models 
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Appendix F: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Time 1 Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures 
 
 
 
Time 2 Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures 
 
 
 
Category        Measure   M SD Range Reliability 
Mania HPS Activation 2.09 2.39 0-9     .80 
Mood Symptomatology ASRM 4.48 4.39 0-20     .84 
 DASS-21 4.63 5.16 0-21     .94 
Category        Measure   M SD Range Reliability 
Mood Symptomatology ASRM 5.77 4.33 0-19     .83 
 DASS-21 3.46 4.27 0-21     .93 
Self-Schema Structure PDST Overall Positive 0.81 0.66 -1.46-2.96  
 PDST Overall Negative 2.32 1.02 -0.21-4.59  
 PDST-AP 0.45 0.44 -0.75-2.20  
 PDST-AN 1.40 0.60 -0.05-2.50  
 PDST-IP 0.37 0.28 -0.71-1.29  
 PDST-IN 1.27 0.56 -0.19-2.42  
Life Events Positive 19.74 19.71 0-104  
 Goal Attainment 13.44 15.17 0-85  
 BAS-Activating 22.25 23.14 0-123  
 Negative 52.56 69.81 0-315  
	 BAS-Deactivating	 47.81 63.74 0-287	 	
Self-Esteem	 RSEI Total	 32.50	 6.14	 10-40	 .92	
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Time 3 Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures 
 
 
Time 4 Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures 
 
 
Category        Measure   M SD Range Reliability 
Mood Symptomatology ASRM 5.18 4.18 0-16     .80 
 DASS-21 3.96 5.01 0-21     .94 
Self-Schema Content CDS-A 39.38 12.63 10-70     .88 
 CDS-I 39.50 12.27 10-70     .87 
 PBS 38.09 8.53 7-49     .91 
Self-Schema Structure PDST Overall Positive 0.82 0.58 -0.87-2.85  
 PDST Overall Negative 2.60 0.97 0.51-4.68  
 PDST-AP 0.46 0.40 -0.46-2.16  
 PDST-AN 1.27 0.61 0.10-2.51  
 PDST-IP 0.37 0.29 -0.41-1.43  
 PDST-IN 1.31 0.56 -0.49-2.49  
Self-Esteem	 RSEI Total	 31.65	 7.03	 10-40	 .94	
Category        Measure   M SD Range Reliability 
Mood Symptomatology ASRM 5.54 4.68 0-16     .83 
 DASS-21 3.97 4.93 0-21     .95 
Life Events Positive 16.98 16.14 0-60  
 Goal Attainment 11.26 12.74 0-55  
 BAS-Activating 18.42 19.96 0-88  
 Negative 45.38 56.03 0-265  
	 BAS-Deactivating	 41.33	 51.44	 0-265	 	
Self-Esteem	 RSEI Total	 32.00	 7.10	 10-40	 .94	
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Other Descriptive Statistics for Major Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N = 438-455 for all measures. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, Activation subscale; 
ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale; DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales – 21, 
Depression Subscale; PSDT = Psychological Distance Scaling Task; AP = Achievement Positive; 
AN = Achievement Negative; IP = Interpersonal Positive; IN = Interpersonal Negative; CDS-A = 
Cognitive Distortions Scale, Achievement Subscale; CDS- I = Cognitive Distortions Scale, 
Interpersonal Subscale; PBS = Positive Belief Statements Scale, Fulfillment Subscale; RSEI = 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory; T1 = Time 1, T2 = Time 2, T3 = Time 3, T4 = Time 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category   M SD Range 
Average Manic Symptoms 
T1-T4 
4.27 4.52 0-20 
Average Depressive Symptoms 
T1-T4 
4.93 5.46 0-21 
PDST Positive Difference 
T2-T3	
0.33	 0.34	 0-2.13	
PDST Negative Difference 
T2-T3	
0.38	 0.27	 0.01-0.27	
PDST AP Difference 
T2-T3	
0.22	 0.20	 0-0.11	
PDST AN Difference 
T2-T3	
0.41	 0.40	 0-1.70	
PDST IP Difference 
T2-T3	
0.16	 0.18	 0-1.09	
PDST IN Difference 
T2-T3	
0.38	 0.29	 0.01-1.09	
Self-Esteem Variability 
T2-T4 
1.77 1.67 0-7.78 
Average Self-Esteem 
T2-T4 
31.76 6.36 10-40 
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Appendix G: Study 2 Simple Correlations between Mood Symptoms and Life Events 
 
Correlations between Positive Life Events at Time 2 and Manic Symptoms. 
 Positive T2 BAS-Activating T2 Goal Attainment T2 
Manic T2 .27** .16+ .28** 
Manic T3 .17+ .08 .11 
Manic T4 .21* .09 .23* 
Average Manic .35** .25** .33** 
 
Correlations between Positive Life Events at Time 4 and Manic Symptoms. 
 Positive T4 BAS-Activating T4 Goal Attainment T4 
Manic T4 .37** .06 .39** 
Average Manic .35** .12 .39** 
 
Correlations between Negative Life Events and Manic Symptoms. 
 Negative T2 BAS-Deactivating 
T2 
Negative T4 BAS-
Deactivating T4 Manic T2 
 
.04 .05   
Manic T3 
 
.00 .01   
Manic T4 
 
.00 .02 -.07 -.05 
Average  
 
.13 .14 .04 .05 
 
Correlations between Negative Life Events and Depressive Symptoms. 
 Negative T2 BAS-Deactivating 
T2 
Negative T4 BAS-
Deactivating T4 
Depression T2 
 
.52** .53**   
Depression T3 
 
.43** .45**   
Depression T4 
 
.48** .50** .51** .52** 
Average .51** .52** .52** .53** 
 
Notes. Manic = Manic symptoms; T2= Time 2; T3 = Time 3; T4 = Time 4; Average Manic = 
Average number of manic symptoms reported across the entire study; Positive = General Positive 
Life Events; BAS-Activating = BAS-Activating Events; Goal Attainment = Goal Attainment Events; 
Depression= Depressive symptoms; Average Depression = Average number of depressive symptoms 
reported across the entire study; Negative = General Negative Life Events; BAS-Deactivating = 
BAS-Deactivating Events. ** = p < .01, * = p < .05, + = p < .08 
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Appendix H: Study 3 Ethics Approval Notice 
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Appendix I: Study 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category        Measure   M SD Range Reliability 
Mania HPS Activation 3.25 2.54 0-9     .86 
Mood Symptomatology ASRM 4.27 4.52 0-20     .80 
 DASS-21 4.93 5.46 0-21     .90 
Self-Schema Content DAS 26.37 6.79 6-42     .80 
 PS-O 19.39 8.17 6-42     .83 
 PS-H 29.43 6.84 12-42     .81 
Self-Schema Structure PDST Overall Positive 0.86 0.49 -1.35-3.56  
 PDST Overall Negative 2.41 0.90 -0.52-5.03  
 PDST-AP 0.49 0.34 -0.65-2.31  
 PDST-AN 1.27 0.55 -0.36-2.64  
 PDST-IP 0.38 0.21 -0.66-1.53  
 PDST-IN 1.22 0.47 -0.20-2.55  
Life Events	 Positive	 53.40	 31.57	 0-186	 	
	 Goal Attainment	 29.30	 20.13	 0-113	 	
	 BAS-Activating	 48.30	 30.44	 0-153	 	
	 Negative	 58.93	 48.10	 0-277	 	
	 BAS-Deactivating	 45.77	 40.73	 0-237	 	
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Appendix J: Study 3 Moderation Results for Self-Schema Content 
Three-Way Interactions: Positive Events 
Self-Schema Content β Model 
Dysfunctional Attitudes –  
Goal Attainment 
HPS (.30)*** 
DAS (.11)** 
LES Positive (.11)** 
HPSxDAS (.02) 
HPSxLES (-.02) 
DASxLES (-.01) 
HPSxDASxLES (.01) 
F = 11.42, R2 = 13, p < .001 
Obsessive Passion HPS (.30)*** 
Obsessive (.11)** 
LES Goal (.13)** 
HPSxObsessive (.02) 
HPSxLES (.01) 
ObsessivexLES (-.01) 
HPSxObsessivexLES (-.04) 
F = 11.72, R2 = 13, p < .001 
 
Three-Way Interactions: Goal Attainment Events 
Self-Schema Content β Model 
Dysfunctional Attitudes –  
Goal Attainment 
HPS (.30)*** 
DAS (.11)** 
LES Positive (.11)** 
HPSxDAS (.01) 
HPSxLES (-.01) 
DASxLES (-.02) 
HPSxDASxLES (.01) 
F = 11.42, R2 = 13, p < .001 
Obsessive Passion HPS (.29)*** 
Obsessive (.10)* 
LES Goal (.12)** 
HPSxObsessive (-.05) 
HPSxLES (.01) 
ObsessivexLES (-.02) 
HPSxObsessjvexLES (.04) 
F = 11.69, R2 = 13, p < .001 
Notes. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Goal Attainment 
subscale; LES – Life Events Scale; Obsessive = Obsessive Passion; Positive = Positive Events; Goal 
= Goal Attainment Events. Values in parentheses represent corresponding standardized regression 
coefficients. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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